Richardson v. McGill
| Decision Date | 14 May 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 20955,20955 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | George RICHARDSON, Appellant, v. Frank McGILL, Respondent. |
Stevens, Stevens & Thomas, Loris, for appellant.
Wallace D. Connor, Kingstree, for respondent.
The question for decision in this action for slander is whether the lower court committed error in granting respondent's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the alleged slanderous statements made by respondent concerning appellant were made on an absolutely privileged occasion.
On September 23, 1975, when the alleged slanderous statements were made, respondent was a member of the Williamsburg County Legislative Delegation, composed of Senator LaNue Floyd, with respondent and B. J. Gordon, as Members of the House of Representatives. Appellant was Director of the Williamsburg County Recreation Department which was under the immediate supervision of the Williamsburg County Recreation Commission. At the request of a member of the Legislative Delegation a joint meeting between the Delegation and the Commission was held in the office of Senator Floyd on the night of September 23, 1975, at which only appellant, members of the Legislative Delegation and the Recreation Commission were present. While some mention was made in the testimony to the possible presence of two other individuals at the meeting, there was no proof of probative value of their presence and the conclusion of the trial judge that the meeting was attended only by the members of the Delegation, the Commission, and appellant is conclusively sustained by the record.
The foregoing private meeting between the participants was called for the purpose of discussing appellant's performance as Director of the Recreation Commission. In the course of this meeting, it is alleged that respondent uttered the following defamatory statements about appellant:
That people are dissatisfied with George Richardson (appellant), that he is incompetent.
That he was going with the women in the Department and no woman would be hired unless George Richardson could go to bed with them and as a result he would hire no married women.
This action was brought to recover damages for the alleged slanderous statements. Respondent interposed a general denial and alleged that, if the statements were made, they were made on a privileged occasion in a meeting between the Williamsburg County Legislative Delegation and the Williamsburg County Recreation Commission concerning matters within his official duties as a legislator. The lower court granted respondent's motion for summary judgment, holding that the statements were made in the course of his official duties and were absolutely privileged. This appeal is from the order for summary judgment. We affirm.
No contention is made that the alleged statements would not have been defamatory; and it is conceded, in effect, that summary judgment for respondent can be sustained only on the basis that the alleged defamatory remarks were absolutely privileged.
Privileged communications in the law of libel and slander are either Absolute or Qualified. Bell v. Bank of Abbeville, 208 S.C. 490, 38 S.E.2d 641.
While the court stated in Fulton v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 220 S.C. 287, 67 S.E.2d 425, that "the class of absolutely privileged communications is narrow, and practically limited to legislative and judicial proceedings and acts of State," our decisions show that application of the absolute privilege has not been so narrowly restricted. Judge Russell, in Corbin v. Washington Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 278 F.Supp. 393, citing a decision and review of our cases by the late Judge Wyche in Johnson v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 94 F.Supp. 959, stated the general principle that privilege in libel or slander is based on considerations of public policy and correctly set forth the general rule governing the application of the absolute privilege in this State, as follows:
While there has been some tendency in the decisions...
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