Richardson v. PSB Armor, Inc.

• Decision Date: 13 September 1996
• Parties: James RICHARDSON and Lisa Richardson v. PSB ARMOR, INC., et al. 1941631.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 438

682 So.2d 438

James RICHARDSON and Lisa Richardson v. PSB ARMOR, INC., et al.

1941631.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Sept. 13, 1996.

L. Andrew Hollis, Jr. of Pittman, Hooks, Marsh, Dutton & Hollis, P.C., Birmingham, and Rufus R. Smith, Dothan, for plaintiffs James Richardson and Lisa Richardson.

S. Allen Baker, Jr. and Teresa G. Minor of Balch & Bingham, Birmingham, for defendants Southern Company Services, Inc. and Alabama Power Company.

Alan C. Livingston of Lee & McInish, Dothan, for defendant PSB Armor, Inc. (filed brief taking "no position on the certified questions").

PER CURIAM.

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama has certified to this Court several questions relating to the Alabama's Workers' Compensation Act, and, particularly, when it is proper under that Act for an employer's "service company," or a "group thereof," to be deemed to be an "employer."

Underlying the certified questions are the following facts:

In May 1993, James Richardson, an employee of the Farley Nuclear Plant in Dothan, received an on-the-job injury. Workers' compensation benefits were awarded to Richardson from his employer, Southern Nuclear Operating Company ("Southern Nuclear").

Southern Nuclear, Richardson's statutory "employer," operates the Farley Nuclear Plant for the plant's owner, Alabama Power Company ("APCo"). Southern Nuclear handles the plant's day-to-day operations, under a contract between it and APCo. In turn, Southern Nuclear receives support services from Southern Company Services, Inc. ("SCSI"), under a January 1991 contract between it and SCSI. ¹ All three companies--APCo, which owns the plant; Southern Nuclear, which manages the plant's day-to-day operations for APCo (and which employs Richardson); and SCSI, which provides support services to Southern Nuclear in the operation of the plant--are wholly owned subsidiaries of The Southern Company.

In January 1994, Richardson sued APCo, SCSI, and other entities in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. He sought damages from APCo and SCSI for his work-related injuries. APCo and SCSI both denied liability and each has moved for a summary judgment.

It is undisputed that if APCo or SCSI is properly afforded "employer" status under the Alabama Workers' Compensation Act, then it is entitled to immunity from Richardson's claim. In this regard, APCo contends that it is immune because the definition of "employer" under the Alabama Workers' Compensation Act includes the phrase "a group thereof" and it claims to come within that phrase. SCSI argues that it is entitled to the status of an "employer," because, it says, as a "service company" for a self-insured employer, Southern Nuclear, it also falls within the statutory definition of "employer."

Regarding APCo and SCSI's summary judgment motions, the district court has certified the following questions to this Court:

"(a) Whether a service company that does not provide assistance related to workers' compensation benefits qualifies as a 'service company for a self-insurer' and, thus, is an 'employer' for purposes of the Alabama Workers' Compensation Laws.

"(b) Whether the services provided by [SCSI] to Southern Nuclear Operation Company (as those services are listed in [a] January 15, 1995 agreement) render Southern Company Services, Inc., an 'employer' under § 25-5-1(4) [Ala.Code 1975] [a part] of the Alabama Workers' Compensation Laws.

"(c) Whether a corporation-owner of a plant, which relinquishes operating control to a sister company that is wholly owned by the same parent corporation as the owner, is a 'group' of a plant employee's 'employer' within the meaning of the Alabama Workers' Compensation Laws, where the corporation-owner indirectly pays the employee's wages and workers' compensation benefits.

"(d) Does it alter the opinion of the Court if, in addition to the facts in (c), the corporation-owner has tried to limit its liability to payment of workers' compensation benefits?"

SCSI's Status as a Service Company

The Alabama Workers' Compensation Act provides an exclusive remedy for the employee injured in a workplace accident:

"Except as provided in this chapter, no employee of any employer subject to this chapter ... shall have a right to any other method, form, or amount of compensation or damages for an injury or death occasioned by an accident or occupational disease proximately resulting from and while engaged in the actual performance of the duties of his or her employment and from a cause originating in such employment or determination thereof."

Ala.Code 1975, § 25-5-52. Section 25-5-53 similarly provides, in pertinent part:

"Except as provided in this chapter, no employer shall be held civilly liable for personal injury to or death of the employer's employee, for purposes of this chapter, whose injury to or death is due to an accident or to an occupational disease while engaged in the service or business of the employer, the cause of which accident or occupational disease originates in the employment."

Thus, whether a person or entity is an "employer" within the meaning of the Act determines whether the employee can maintain a civil lawsuit against that person or entity. In this context, whether the person or entity the employee wishes to sue is deemed an "employer" is of critical significance.

"Employer" is defined at Ala.Code 1975, § 25-5-1(4), which reads, in pertinent part:

"(4) EMPLOYER. Every person who employs another to perform a service for hire and pays wages directly to the person. The term shall include a service company for a self-insurer or any person, corporation, copartnership, or association, or group thereof, and shall, if the employer is insured, include his or her insurer, the insurer being entitled to the employer's rights, immunities, and remedies under this chapter, as far as applicable."

We are called upon initially to address the question whether a "service company" that does not assist the employer in regard to its workers' compensation benefits plan fits within this definition of "employer." Richardson argues that the term "service company for a self insurer" applies only to those service companies that assist with the administration of the employer's workers' compensation program. We agree.

In determining the legislative intent, the "polestar" of statutory construction, see Sunflower Lumber Co. v. Turner Supply Co., 158 Ala. 191, 48 So. 510 (1909); Ex parte Jordan, 592 So.2d 579, 581 (Ala.1992), we are guided by Ala.Code 1975, § 25-5-53, through which the legislature has expressly stated which nonemployer entities enjoy statutory immunity. That section provides, in pertinent part, that "immunity from civil liability for all causes of action except those based on willful conduct shall ... extend to the workers' compensation insurance carrier of the employer [or] to a ... corporation responsible for the servicing and payment of workers' compensation claims for the employer."

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