Richardson v. Richardson

• Decision Date: 03 November 2010
• Citation: 910 N.Y.S.2d 149,80 A.D.3d 32
• Parties: In the Matter of Annette P. RICHARDSON, respondent, v. Dorothy E. RICHARDSON, appellant. (Proceeding No. 1) In the Matter of Andrew G. Hourie, respondent, v. Dorothy E. Richardson, appellant. (Proceeding No. 2) In the Matter of Aaron G. Hourie, respondent, v. Dorothy E. Richardson, appellant. (Proceeding No. 3) In the Matter of Dorothy E. Richardson, appellant, v. Andrew G. Hourie, respondent. (Proceeding No. 4) In the Matter of Dorothy E. Richardson, appellant, v. Annette P. Richardson, respondent. (Proceeding No. 5) In the Matter of Dorothy E. Richardson, appellant, v. Aaron J. Hourie, respondent. (Proceeding No. 6)
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

910 N.Y.S.2d 149

80 A.D.3d 32

In the Matter of Annette P. RICHARDSON, respondent,

v.Dorothy E. RICHARDSON, appellant. (Proceeding No. 1)

In the Matter of Andrew G. Hourie, respondent,

v.Dorothy E. Richardson, appellant. (Proceeding No. 2)

In the Matter of Aaron G. Hourie, respondent,

v.Dorothy E. Richardson, appellant. (Proceeding No. 3)

In the Matter of Dorothy E. Richardson, appellant,

v.Andrew G. Hourie, respondent. (Proceeding No. 4)

In the Matter of Dorothy E. Richardson, appellant,

v.Annette P. Richardson, respondent. (Proceeding No. 5)

In the Matter of Dorothy E. Richardson, appellant,

v.Aaron J. Hourie, respondent. (Proceeding No. 6)

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Nov. 3, 2010.

Homer W. Richardson, Brooklyn, N.Y., for appellant.

William A. Sheeckutz, Massapequa, N.Y., for respondent Annette P. Richardson.

Steven A. Feldman, Uniondale, N.Y., for respondent Andrew G. Hourie.

Joseph P. Abbenda, Glen Cove, N.Y., for respondent Aaron J. Hourie.

JOSEPH COVELLO, J.P., DANIEL D. ANGIOLILLO, JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, and SANDRA L. SGROI, JJ.

LEVENTHAL, J.

The principal issue presented on these appeals, which appears to be one of first impression for an appellate court in this state, is whether the Family Court has subject matter jurisdiction over family offense proceedings where the alleged acts occurred outside of the state and even outside of the country. We hold that Family Ct. Act § 812 grants the Family Court subject matter jurisdiction to hear such proceedings and that the Family Court properly exercised jurisdiction over the parties' petitions, despite the fact that the acts alleged occurred on the island territory of Anguilla.

On March 4, 2009, Annette P. Richardson and her sons Aaron J. Hourie and Andrew G. Hourie (hereinafter collectively the respondents) filed three separate family offense petitions seeking the entry of orders of protection in favor of them and against Dorothy E. Richardson (hereinafter the appellant), Annette's mother, and her sons' grandmother. The alleged family offenses included, inter alia, assault, harassment, and menacing. In their respective petitions, the respondents described how they were related to the appellant and asserted that the parties all resided together in a home in Elmont, Nassau County. The petitions detailed certain incidents which allegedly occurred on February 19, 2009, on the island of Anguilla.¹ According to the respondents, the appellant pushed Annette to the floor twice, causing her to hurt her back and hit her head. The appellant allegedly was screaming, yelling, and cursing at Annette during the assault. In addition, the appellant allegedly used a glass bowl to strike Andrew on the head, causing injuries. Further, the appellant allegedly chased Aaron with a meat cleaver and threw an ashtray at him, which hit him in the back.

Thereafter, on March 6, 2009, the appellant filed three of her own family offense petitions seeking orders of protection in her favor and against the respondents. The appellant alleged thaton or about February 14, 2009, also in Anguilla, the respondents committed the family offenses of, inter alia, aggravated harassment in thesecond degree, harassment in the first degree, attempted assault, and menacing in the third degree.

During an initial appearance before the Family Court, the appellant's counsel objected to the court's exercise of subject matter jurisdiction because the alleged offenses occurred in Anguilla. The Family Court held that "the fact that this took place in the West Indies is no different from it taking place in Pennsylvania, Virginia, or Vermont. They're [all residents] of Nassau County and they're entitled to protection from future occurrences. Family Orders of Protection ... are to prevent further hostility and further assault, attempted assault, ... et cetera."

On June 24, 2009, after a hearing, the Family Court found that the respondents proved by clear and convincing evidence that the appellant had committed certain family offenses against them and granted the respondents' respective petitions. The Family Court also entered three two-year orders of protection on behalf of the respondents and against the appellant. The orders of protection directed the appellant to stay away from each of the respondents and to refrain from assaulting, stalking, and similar conduct. In addition, the Family Court issued three orders of dismissal which dismissed the appellant's three petitions.

The appeals are from the three orders of protection and from the three orders dismissing the appellant's petitions. We affirm.

As a threshold matter, it is evident that the Family Court acquired personal jurisdiction over the appellant, as she appeared before the Family Court without challenging personal jurisdiction. Additionally, the appellant affirmatively sought the entry of orders of protection against the respondents ( see Family Ct. Act § 167; CPLR 320; cf. Matter of El-Sheemy v. El-Sheemy, 35 A.D.3d 738, 826 N.Y.S.2d 695 [by appearing in article 6 proceeding and seeking custody, the mother waived her claim that the Family Court did not acquire personal jurisdiction over her] ). Further, venue was appropriate inasmuch as the petitions were filed in the Family Court, Nassau County, the county where the parties resided ( see Family Ct. Act §§ 174, 818 ²; CPLR 503).

The appellant's contentions provide this Court with an opportunity to address an issue which does not appear to havebeen previously addressed by an appellate court in this state: the limits of the subject matter jurisdiction of the Family Court with respect to family offenses which occurred outside of the state, and even outside of the country.

The Family Court is a court of limited jurisdiction constrained to exercise only those powers conferred upon it by the state Constitution or by statute ( see Matter of H.M. v. E.T., 14 N.Y.3d 521, 904 N.Y.S.2d 285, 930 N.E.2d 206; Matter of Johna M.S. v. Russell E.S., 10 N.Y.3d 364, 366, 859 N.Y.S.2d 594, 889 N.E.2d 471). Article VI of the New York State Constitution establishes "[t]he family court of the state of New York" (N.Y. Const., art. VI, § 13[a] ) and "enumerates the powers thereof" (Matter of H.M. v. E.T., 14 N.Y.3d 521, 904 N.Y.S.2d 285, 930 N.E.2d 206). Included within the actions and proceedings over which the Family Court has been given subject matter jurisdiction are family offense proceedings. Pursuant to the New York State Constitution, family offense proceedings are to determine "as may be provided by law ... crimes and offenses by or against minors or between spouses or between parent and child or between members of the same family or household" (N.Y. Const., art. VI, § 13[b][7] ). In light of the provision stating "as may be provided by law," the grant of jurisdiction to the Family Court over family offense proceedings is permissive and requires legislative action to be implemented.

In that regard, Family Court Act article 8 delineates the parameters of the Family Court's subject matter jurisdiction. The Family Court Act and the Criminal Procedure Law provide the criminal court and the Family Court with "concurrent jurisdiction" over certain enumerated criminal offenses when allegedly committed by one family member against another ( see Family Ct. Act §§ 115[e]; § 812[1]; CPL 100.07, 530.11[1] ). Thus, while a family member may choose to seek redress for a family offense in the Family Court, a parallel criminal proceeding also is available ( see Family Ct. Act § 813 [3] ). Indeed, the Legislature has specifically authorized a petitioner to commence a family offense "proceeding in either or both Family Court and criminalcourt" ( People v. Wood, 95 N.Y.2d 509, 512-513, 719 N.Y.S.2d 639, 742 N.E.2d 114; see Family Ct. Act § 813[3]; CPL 100. 07). Moreover, each court has the authority to issue temporary or final orders of protection ( see Family Ct. Act §§ 813[2], 821-a[2][b], 828, 841[d], 842; CPL 530.12).

As relevant here, Family Court Act § 812(1) provides:

"Jurisdiction. The family court and the criminal courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction over any proceeding concerning acts which would constitute disorderly conduct, harassment in the first degree, harassment in the second degree, aggravated harassment in the second degree, sexual misconduct, forcible touching, sexual abuse in the third degree, sexual abuse in the second degree as set forth in subdivision one of section 130.60 of the penal law, stalking in the first degree, stalking in the second degree, stalking in the third degree, stalking in the fourth degree, criminal mischief, menacing in the second degree, menacing in the third degree, reckless endangerment, assault in the second degree, assault in the third degree or an attempted assault between spouses or former spouses, or between parent and child or between members of the same family or household except that if the respondent would not be criminally responsible by reason of age pursuant to section 30.00 of the penal law, then the family court shall have exclusive jurisdiction over such proceeding. Notwithstanding a complainant's election to proceed in family court, the criminal court shall not be divested of jurisdiction to hear a family offense proceeding pursuant to this section."

Furthermore, Family Court Act § 812(2)(b) provides: "[t]hat a family court proceeding is a civil proceeding and is for the purpose of attempting to stop the violence, end the family disruption and obtain protection."

Generally, in order to properly interpret a statute, a court should first consider the statute's plain language, which is "the most compelling evidence of the Legislature's intent" (Matter of Tompkins County Support Collection Unit v. Chamberlin, 99 N.Y.2d 328, 335, 756 N.Y.S.2d 115, 786 N.E.2d 14; see Hudson Val. Oil Heat Council, Inc. v. Town of Warwick, 7 A.D.3d 572, 574, 777 N.Y.S.2d 157). Here, the plain language of Family Court Act § 812 provides that the Family Court has jurisdiction...