Richardson v. Sheriff of Middlesex County

Decision Date17 May 1990
Citation553 N.E.2d 1286,407 Mass. 455
PartiesJohn RICHARDSON et al. 1 v. SHERIFF OF MIDDLESEX COUNTY.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Richard M. Zielinski (David B. Deitch, Boston, and Lee J. Gartenberg with him) for plaintiffs.

Richard L. Barry, Jr. (Ellen M. Dente, with him) for defendant.

Nancy Ankers White, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., and Michael H. Cohen, for Dept. of Correction, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Before LIACOS, C.J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS, NOLAN and LYNCH, JJ.

ABRAMS, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment enjoining the defendant, the sheriff of Middlesex County, from continuing certain practices instituted as a result of overcrowding at the Middlesex County jail (jail). The sheriff claims error in the judge's conclusion that conditions of confinement at the jail violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights, and in the denial of his motion to compel joinder of additional defendants pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 19, 365 Mass. 765 (1974). The plaintiffs, a class of pretrial detainees at the jail, cross appealed from the judgment and the denial of their motion to amend judgment pending appeal. The plaintiffs, in their cross appeal, argue that the judge should have ordered two special criminal sessions for persons detained and awaiting trial, and a special bail review session for persons held on $500 bail or less and for all detainees who can raise fifty per cent of their bail. We granted the plaintiffs' application for direct appellate review. We affirm the trial judge's judgment concerning liability and his order, and we remand the case for such further proceedings as may be needed at this time.

The case was submitted on statements of agreed facts. On motion of the plaintiffs, the judge also took a view of the conditions at the jail. The jail, a modern structure designed to hold 161 inmates, has for several years held many more prisoners than it was designed to accommodate. In September, 1988, for example, the population of the jail ranged from 261 to 303 inmates. As a result, several inmates were forced to sleep on the floor, some without mattresses. Inmates also were placed in the visiting rooms, common areas, and other spaces that were not designed to house inmates. In one dayroom, sixty-two inmates were housed together. In these makeshift rooming areas, inmates were provided with bunk beds placed extremely close together. Some of these areas lacked bathrooms. 2 Some inmates were housed on floor mattresses in a ground level area, adjacent to a garage, designed to hold temporarily prisoners awaiting transportation to and from court. In this ground level area, prisoners were "double bunked" in small single-occupancy cells.

During the day, inmates who were not occupying cells stayed in an area immediately outside the cells, sitting on picnic tables or on the floor. Here, also, there was no access to bathrooms. An inmate needing to use a toilet had to get permission--not always forthcoming--from an inmate in a cell to use his, or had to gain access to another area in the jail, such as a recreational area, to use the toilet.

The judge found that "[t]he facts, as stipulated, indicate clear violations of [Department of Correction and Department of Public Health] regulations." The judge found violations of 103 Code Mass.Regs. § 972.03 (1986), which sets standards for multiple occupancy cells and dormitories; 3 103 Code Mass.Regs. § 972.07 (1986), which sets standards for the provision of toilets and showers; 4 105 Code Mass.Regs. § 451.104 (1986), which requires that every inmate be supplied with a bed; 105 Code Mass.Regs. § 451.112 (1986), which requires that adequate and conveniently located toilet facilities be provided for all inmates; 105 Code Mass.Regs. § 451.114 (1986), which requires that each inmate have access to a toilet and handwashing facilities at all times; and 105 Code Mass.Regs. § 451.114 (1986), which requires at least one working toilet and sink for every ten inmates.

After having taken a view of the conditions at the jail on the night of November 9, 1988, the judge found that "[a]reas that were designed for day rooms, libraries and other such facilities, including a sick bay, were being used to house the Jail inmates. In one particular section sixty (60) men were being housed with access to only two toilets and one shower. The crowding seemed to me to contain all the ingredients for a riot."

The judge, while noting that the sheriff had made "conscientious efforts" to comply with his legal obligations, concluded that the conditions in the jail violated the due process rights of the detainees. 5 Accordingly, he ordered as follows: "Judgment should enter enjoining defendant[:] 1. From allowing inmates to sleep on the floor. Every inmate shall be furnished with a bed. 2. From allowing more than one inmate to be housed in a cell. 3. From allowing inmates to be housed in or to sleep in the cells on the [ground floor] except for any purpose relating to the transportation of prisoners to and from the jail. 4. From allowing inmates to be housed on or to sleep anywhere on the 17th floor except for any purpose relating to the transportation of prisoners to and from the jail. 5. From housing inmates in any multiple occupancy cell or dormitory where there is not at least one toilet and wash bowl for each eight (8) inmates [citing 103 Code Mass.Regs. § 972.03(3) ]. 6. From housing inmates in any area where there is not at least one shower for each fifteen (15) inmates [citing 103 Code Mass.Regs. § 972.07(2) ]. 7. From housing inmates in the 18th floor day room [citing 103 Code Mass.Regs. § 972.6]. 8. From housing inmates in the 20th floor day room [citing 103 Code Mass.Regs. § 972.06]. 9. To reduce the total population of the jail as follows: (a) To 260 immediately, (b) To 240 within sixty days of the issuance of this order, (c) To 220 within one hundred twenty days of the issuance of this order, (d) To 200 within one hundred eighty days of the issuance of this order, (e) Transfer all inmates who may be transferred under the provisions of M.G.L. c. 276, § 52A, (f) Remand those inmates with parole violations behind bail to the custody of the parole board, 6 (g) Work with the courts and other agencies to establish a pretrial diversion program whereby prisoners will be conditionally released while awaiting trial, (h) Release eligible inmates to halfway houses."

1. Violation of State regulations. In their brief, the plaintiffs argue that relief should be granted solely because the conditions at the jail violated State regulations. Nothing in the record before us indicates that the plaintiffs argued below that the regulatory violations, by themselves, were sufficient grounds for an injunction. The judge also did not base his decision solely on the fact that regulations had been violated. Indeed, at oral argument, the plaintiffs' counsel conceded that the judge's order was not based solely on the regulations, because, as plaintiffs' counsel noted, the judge "did not order literal compliance with the regulations." In these circumstances, it is inappropriate for us to decide the case solely on the basis of the regulatory violations. "The theory of law on which by assent a case is tried cannot be disregarded when the case comes before an appellate court for review." Santa Maria v. Trotto, 297 Mass. 442, 447, 9 N.E.2d 540 (1937).

The plaintiffs also appear not to seek literal compliance with the regulations. For example, they have not objected to the sections of the judge's order that permit housing in multiple-occupancy areas, despite the fact that the regulations prohibit entirely the housing of pretrial detainees in multiple-occupancy areas. See 103 Code Mass.Regs. § 972.03. The plaintiffs' counsel also said in oral argument that "literal compliance with the State regulations would probably require the closing down of this facility." Nothing before us indicates that the plaintiffs have ever sought such a result. The plaintiffs give us no guidance on how to base our decision on the regulations when literal compliance is not, apparently what they seek. Thus, as in Michaud v. Sheriff of Essex County, 390 Mass. 523, 526-527, 458 N.E.2d 702 (1983), we are faced with a case in which it would be inappropriate to render a decision purely on the basis of the violation of regulations.

We do, however, accord the regulations some weight in our consideration of the constitutional issues because "State regulations governing conditions of confinement reflect current standards of decency against which we measure alleged [constitutional] violations." Id. at 527, 458 N.E.2d 702. We note, however, that "the mere failure to conform to State minimum standards does not per se establish a constitutional violation. Certainly such standards may be designed to provide conditions of incarceration far better than those constitutionally mandated." Strachan v. Ashe, 548 F.Supp. 1193, 1202 (D.Mass.1982). 7

2. Due process. Unlike convicted prisoners, who may be punished as long as the punishment is not "cruel and unusual" under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, pretrial detainees may not be punished at all. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n. 16, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1872 n. 16, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). "[U]nder the Due Process Clause, a [pretrial] detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law." Id. Accordingly, "the dispositive inquiry is whether the challenged condition, practice, or policy constitutes punishment " (emphasis added). Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 583, 104 S.Ct. 3227, 3231, 82 L.Ed.2d 438 (1984). This inquiry turns on whether the conditions of confinement are "reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective.... [I]f a restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal--if it is arbitrary or purposeless--a court...

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