Richardson v. State
| Decision Date | 19 February 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. A04A0212.,A04A0212. |
| Citation | 265 Ga. App. 711,595 S.E.2d 565 |
| Parties | RICHARDSON v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Jonathan R. Melnick, Atlanta, for appellant.
Daniel J. Porter, Dist. Atty., David K. Keeton, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.
A Gwinnett County jury found Willie Richardson guilty of rape and aggravated sexual battery. He appeals, claiming that the trial court erred in permitting the introduction of his statement to the police and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. For the reasons that follow, we affirm Richardson's conviction.
Following the sexual acts Richardson perpetrated against the female victim, she reported the incident to the police. Investigation corroborated portions of the victim's version of the event, including Richardson's admissions to at least two other people that he had sex with the victim while she was highly intoxicated. Investigation also showed that the victim suffered a laceration in her vaginal area and bruising around her arms as a result of Richardson's acts.
Further investigation of Richardson's admissions to others showed that Richardson believed his sexual encounter with the victim was consensual; that the victim had indicated she wanted to have sex with Richardson when she "raised up, turned around" and made her body available for a sexual encounter; and that during the sex act, the victim suddenly "freaked out" and "just went berserk."
Based upon these investigations, Gwinnett County Police Officer T. Benning contacted Richardson by telephone and asked him to come into the station for an interview. Although Richardson believed the sex act with the victim was consensual, he had heard from others that the victim had "told the police that [he] raped her and beat her." Richardson agreed to talk to the police, but could not go to the station immediately. Benning made an appointment to speak with Richardson the next morning. That afternoon, Benning obtained warrants for Richardson's arrest on the charges of rape and sexual battery. At trial, Benning testified that he intended to arrest Richardson on the warrants, but not until after Richardson had given a statement.
After making his misleading statement, Benning escorted Martin to a waiting area. On the way there and out of earshot of Richardson, Benning told Martin that he intended to arrest Richardson.
Thereafter, during the interview, Richardson agreed to give a taped statement; his statement corroborated the admissions he had earlier made to others, i.e., that the victim, although intoxicated, had physically indicated to him that she desired a sexual encounter; that she did so by deliberately positioning her body so as to be available for a sexual encounter; and that thereafter, during the sex act, the victim "just went crazy, started hollering and [he] couldn't tell—just you raped me." Richardson stated that he immediately stopped the sex act and "was trying to fight her off ... to block where she was swinging at [him] trying to hit [him]"; he stated that he drove her directly to a friend's apartment.
It is uncontested that, during the course of the interview, Officer Benning never gave Richardson the impression that he was under arrest or in police custody. On the interview tape, Richardson specifically apparently stated he did not believe he was in custody or under arrest. The evidence is equally undisputed that, unbeknownst to Richardson, he was not free to leave the station and he was to be placed under arrest on the outstanding warrants after he gave his statement. Held:
1. Richardson first challenges the admission of his taped statement made without benefit of Miranda. This claim of error requires consideration of several issues inherent in any claim involving Miranda and the admission of an allegedly involuntary statement.
The instant case gives this Court the opportunity to reaffirm the longstanding, objective principle that "[a] policeman's unarticulated plan has no bearing on the question whether a suspect was `in custody' at a particular time; the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation,"2 i.e., whether "a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have understood the situation to constitute restraint on freedom of movement of the degree which the law associates with a formal arrest."3
Here, it is plain—and uncontested—that at the time he gave his statement, Richardson did not believe he was in custody or under arrest. And, prior to the statement, Officer Benning never communicated to Richardson his intent to place him under arrest. 4
Save as they are communicated or otherwise manifested to the person being questioned, an officer's evolving but unarticulated suspicions do not affect the objective circumstances of an interrogation or interview, and thus cannot affect the Miranda custody inquiry. The threat to a citizen's Fifth Amendment rights that Miranda was designed to neutralize has little to do with the strength of an interrogating officer's suspicions.5
Thus, under circumstances similar to those presented here, it has been held that Miranda warnings are not required because the "compulsive" aspect of custodial questioning is not present.6
Nor are we troubled that Officer Benning had already obtained arrest warrants for Richardson. Probable cause to arrest, whether demonstrable by warrant or knowledge of an officer,7 does not require arrest and Miranda.8 "[T]he proper inquiry is whether [at the time of the statement] the individual was formally arrested or restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest, not whether the police had probable cause to arrest."9
We do, however, find specific circumstances surrounding the giving of Richardson's statement to be problematic. Our concerns go to the voluntary aspect of the statement and are raised by Officer Benning's deceptive act of informing Richardson that a decision had not been made as to whether he would be arrested and that such decision was dependent on "how the interview went."
The purpose of Miranda warnings are prophylactic in that they serve to insure that an in-custody statement is still voluntary and not compelled by circumstances. Certainly, then, the failure to communicate an officer's true intent with regard to taking a suspect into custody will not control the need for Miranda warnings, since the compulsive aspect of custody is not present so as to impact on the voluntary nature of the statement. It does not follow, however, that an officer's communication of a false intent engenders the same "voluntary" result.
To make a confession admissible, it must have been made voluntarily, without being induced by another by the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury.10
In that vein, 11 This principle, although well established, is not without exception. A reviewing court must examine the effect of any deceit upon the voluntariness of a confession.
Thus, while deceit may not on its own render a statement inadmissible (where not calculated to procure an untrue statement), we hold that in looking to the totality of the circumstances, the employment of deceit may result in the inadmissibility of a statement in those situations where the particular deception used, by constituting a "slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury" under OCGA § 24-3-50, has induced a party to confess, thereby rendering the confession involuntary.12
In this case, Officer Benning falsely represented that the decision to arrest and charge Richardson would hinge upon the content of his interview. This false representation was made based upon Benning's assessment that Richardson would be "intimidated" and might not speak freely if Benning "put him in custody where [the officer] would be forced to have to mirandize him making him even more intimidated about the interview." As such, Officer Benning's deceptive statement was made to induce Richardson to speak, to "tell [him] what happened." And, most importantly, implicit in Benning's statement is the false promise that Richardson would not be arrested and...
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