Richardson v. State

• Decision Date: 17 April 1985
• Docket Number: No. 583S173,583S173
• Parties: Edward RICHARDSON, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 497

476 N.E.2d 497

Edward RICHARDSON, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).

No. 583S173.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

April 17, 1985.

Peter J. Visclosky, John R. Pera, Greco, Gouveia, Miller, Pera & Bishop, Merrillville, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen. of Ind., Theodore E. Hansen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

PRENTICE, Justice.

Following a trial by jury Defendant (Appellant) was convicted of murder, Ind. Code Sec. 35-42-1-1(1) (Burns 1979), and murder while committing robbery (felony murder), IC 35-42-1-1(2) (Burns 1979). The trial court properly merged the murder conviction into the felony murder conviction, and sentenced Defendant to an enhanced term of 50 years imprisonment. This direct appeal raises four (4) issues for our review, which we have renumbered and restated as follows:

(1) Whether the trial court erred in admitting Defendant's confession into evidence;

(2) Whether the trial court erred in admitting certain photographs of the victim into evidence;

(3) Whether Defendant was provided with effective assistance of counsel;

(4) Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction.

The evidence at trial revealed that during early November, 1981 Defendant and another began to plot the robbery of an elderly man. About 8:30 p.m., November 22, Defendant and his accomplice approached the victim's home in Hammond, told him they were having automobile trouble and asked to use his telephone. The victim previously had been acquainted with Defendant. Once inside, they beat and tried to choke the victim and left him unconscious. They ransacked the house, taking about $3,000.00 and other items. As they were leaving, Defendant or his companion cut the victim with a knife and thereby killed him.

Defendant, his accomplice, his accomplice's sister, Crystal Mullens, and another woman, Lisa Ingraham, eventually fled to Texas. However, prior to departing, Defendant told relatives and other persons about the incident and of his role in the robbery. After a warrant was issued, Defendant and his accomplice were arrested in Texas. Defendant waived extradition and gave a confession to two Hammond police officers before they returned him to Indiana.

ISSUE I

Defendant challenges the trial court's admission of his confession into evidence, claiming that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his rights not to incriminate himself and to have an attorney present during interrogation. See generally, Miranda v. Arizona, (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. Before a confession may be admitted into evidence the State must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the suspect intelligently and knowingly waived his rights not to incriminate himself and to have an attorney present. See, Chamness v. State, (1982) In this case Defendant contends that he was in a confused mental state when he was arrested in Texas, that the conditions at the jail there caused further emotional stress, and that he was hysterical throughout the meeting with the officers. Defendant emphasizes that he had been under psychiatric care periodically since 1973, and argues that the problems which led to this treatment diminished his capacity for knowing and intelligent conduct effecting a waiver of his constitutional rights. However, the officers who took the statement testified that Defendant initially said that he was willing to make a statement when they saw him briefly at the extradition hearing, and that at the start of the meeting Defendant told the officers he understood his rights because of his prior experiences in the juvenile justice system. The officers testified that they read Defendant the Miranda warnings at least twice and that he signed a written waiver before the statement was taken. They further testified that Defendant was very calm and cooperative throughout the meeting, until he started to break down as they finished, and one of the officers testified that they used no threats or force to obtain the statement. Under these circumstances, the trial court was warranted in finding that the confession was the product of Defendant's free will and intelligent deliberation rather than, as claimed by him, by an overpowering of his will wrought by coercive influences playing upon his emotional instability.

Ind., 431 N.E.2d 474, 476; Ortiz v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 549, 553, 356 N.E.2d 1188, 1191 and authorities cited. However, this Court will not reweigh the evidence in evaluating a trial court's decision to admit a confession, but will only determine whether the record includes sufficient evidence to sustain the trial court's ruling. Id., 265 Ind. at 553, 356 N.E.2d at 1191.

ISSUE II

Defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error by admitting certain photographs depicting how the victim appeared when police arrived at the scene of the crime and as he appeared immediately prior to the autopsy. We do not agree.

Such photographs are admissible if they provide relevant evidence and their relevance is not outweighed by their tendency to inflame and impassion the jury against the defendant. The question necessarily becomes one of balancing these concerns, and thus the trial court has broad discretion in determining whether such photographs should be admitted in a particular case. See, Webster v. State, (1981) Ind., 426 N.E.2d 1295, 1297-98; see also Akins v. State, (1981) Ind., 429 N.E.2d 232, 236.

Defendant contends that the State was allowed to introduce a repetitive series of inflammatory photographs which prejudiced the jury against him. As in Akins, supra, the photographs admitted here are "unpleasant to view as they depict the nature and extent of wounds of the decedent." Id., 429 N.E.2d at 236. Nevertheless, they demonstrate not only that the victim died of a knife wound, corroborating Defendant's confession and other testimony but also depict the condition of the house and thereby support the inference that the victim was killed during a robbery, as charged by the second count of the information. Moreover, the record reveals that the State agreed to withdraw several photographs that it had submitted originally, and the trial court, in an appropriate exercise of its discretion, excluded several that it determined would be unduly repetitive or prejudicial. We cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting photographs in this case.

ISSUE III

Defendant contends that he is entitled to a new trial because he did not receive minimally adequate representation by counsel, as required by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Sec. 13 of our State Constitution. However, this record demonstrates that he received We review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under the two-step test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, (1984) --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, and integrated into Indiana caselaw beginning with Lawrence v. State, (1984) Ind. 464 N.E.2d 1291, 1294-97. See also, e.g. Garren v. State, (1984) Ind., 470 N.E.2d 719, 724; Vickers v. State, (1984) Ind., 466 N.E.2d 3, 7-8; Kruckeberg v. State, (1984), Ind., 465 N.E.2d 1126, 1128-30. Under the first step, or "performance component," the defendant must demonstrate that the alleged acts or omissions by counsel fell outside the wide range of competent professional assistance. A strong presumption exists that counsel rendered adequate legal assistance. If the defendant satisfies step one of the test, he then must establish the second step, or "prejudice component," under which the defendant will be entitled to relief only if the reviewing court determines that counsel's errors had an adverse effect upon the judgment. Strickland, supra, --- U.S. at ----, 104 S.Ct. at 2066-70, 80 L.Ed.2d at 696-700; Lawrence, supra, 464 N.E.2d at 1294.

diligent and competent assistance from his trial counsel.

The Strickland court emphasized that "there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to ... address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one." Strickland, supra, --- U.S. at ----, 104 S.Ct. at 2069, 80 L.Ed.2d at 699; Kruckeberg, supra, 465 N.E.2d at 1129. In this case Defendant has not demonstrated that counsel's performance was outside the range of competent assistance.

Defendant cites several specific instances to support his position. First, he attacks trial counsel's decision, at the hearing to suppress the confession, not to call an officer who had been working at the Lake County Jail at the time Defendant was returned from Texas and incarcerated there the day after giving his confession. The officer testified during the hearing on Defendant's belated motion to correct errors, which raised the ineffective counsel issue, that when Defendant was admitted to the jail he was weeping, frightened and generally irrational. Defendant claims that, had this testimony been presented in support of the motion to suppress, it it would have established that he could not have been "rational" when he gave the confession, the day before the officer observed such behavior. However, trial counsel testified at the hearing upon the motion to correct errors, that Defendant had also told the officer about his involvement in the crime. Counsel stated that he did consider calling the officer but decided against it out of concern that the State would discover Defendant's inculpatory statement during cross-examination of him. Thus counsel's decision not to call the officer during the suppression hearing was a tactical determination.

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