Richardson v. United States
| Decision Date | 22 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | 1:09CR138-SA-DAS |
| Parties | MCKINLEY RICHARDSON MOVANT v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA RESPONDENT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
This matter comes before the court on the motion of McKinley Richardson to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The government has responded to the motion, and the matter is ripe for resolution. For the reasons set forth below, the instant motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence will be denied.
The writ of habeas corpus, a challenge to the legal authority under which a person may be detained, is ancient. Duker, The English Origins of the Writ of Habeas Corpus: A Peculiar Path to Fame, 53 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 983 (1978); Glass Historical Aspects of Habeas Corpus, 9 St. John's L.Rev 55 (1934). It is “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law of England,” Secretary of State for Home Affairs v. O'Brien, A.C. 603, 609 (1923), and it is equally significant in the United States. Article I, § 9, of the Constitution ensures that the right of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, except when, in the case of rebellion or invasion public safety may require it. Habeas Corpus, 20 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Deskbook § 56. Its use by the federal courts was authorized in Section14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Habeas corpus principles developed over time in both English and American common law have since been codified:
Section 28 U.S.C. § 2255 permits an inmate serving a sentence after conviction of a federal crime “to move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). As with the writ of habeas corpus, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254, a § 2255 motion sets forth only four bases on which a motion may be made: (1) the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States; (2) the court was without jurisdiction to impose the sentence; (3) the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum sentence; or (4) the sentence is “otherwise subject to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Thus, a prisoner must claim either a constitutional violation or want of subject matter jurisdiction to invoke 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In the absence of constitutional or jurisdictional defects, a federal prisoner may invoke § 2255 only if the error constitutes “a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185 (1979).
The district court must first conduct a preliminary review of a section 2255 motion, and “[i]f it plainly appears from the motion, any attached exhibits, and the record of the prior proceeding that the moving party is not entitled to relief, the judge must dismiss the motion.” Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings, Rule 4(b). If the motion raises a non-frivolous claim to relief, the court must order the Government to file a response or to take other appropriate action. Id. The judge may then require the parties to expand the record as necessary and, if good cause is shown, authorize limited discovery. Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings, Rules 6-7.
After reviewing the government's answer, any transcripts and records of prior proceedings, and any supplementary materials submitted by the parties, the court must decide whether an evidentiary hearing is warranted. Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings, Rule 8. Under the statute, an evidentiary hearing must be held unless “the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). However, the court need not hold an evidentiary hearing if the prisoner fails to produce “independent indicia of the likely merit of [his] allegations.” United States v. Edwards, 442 F.3d 258, 264 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Cervantes, 132 F.3d 1106, 1110 (5th Cir. 1998)).
Ultimately, the petitioner bears the burden of establishing his claims of error by a preponderance of the evidence. See Wright v. United States, 624 F.2d 557, 558 (5th Cir. 1980). For certain “structural” errors, relief follows automatically once the error is proved. See Burgess v. Dretke, 350 F.3d 461, 472 (5th Cir. 2003). For other errors at the trial court level, the court may grant relief only if the error “had substantial and injurious effect or influence” in determining the outcome of the case. Brecht v. Abrahmson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993); see also United States v. Chavez, 193 F.3d 375, 379 (5th Cir. 1999) (). If the court finds that the prisoner is entitled to relief, it “shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b).
On February 10, 2010, Richardson pled guilty to Count One of the Indictment, which charged conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute an amount in excess of fifty (50) grams of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A). PSR, ¶ 3. According to section 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), the minimum term of imprisonment is ten (10) years and the maximum term is life. PSR, ¶ 134.
Richardson was held accountable for 425.83 grams of cocaine base, which resulted in a base offense level of 32. PSR, ¶15. His criminal history was substantial, resulting in a total 19 criminal history points and a criminal history level VI. PSR, ¶70.
He was classified as a career offender within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. PSR, ¶ 23.
A career offender designation elevated his base offense level to 37. PSR, ¶ 23.
United States Sentencing Guideline section 4B1.1 mandates a career offender designation under the following circumstances:
Richardson's Presentence Report (“PSR”) predicated his career offender designation on three prior controlled substance offenses:
Richardson's career offender designation resulted in a base offense level of 37. PSR, ¶ 23. With a three (3) point reduction for acceptance of responsibility, his total offense level was 34. PSR, ¶ 25. With a criminal history category six (6), his guideline range was 262 to 327 months. PSR, ¶ 135. No U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 motion was filed.
On October 26, 2010, Richardson was sentenced to 300 months imprisonment. Judgment, (Doc. 153). He did not appeal his conviction. He filed an Expedited Motion for Compassionate Release, which this court denied on June 26, 2020, (Doc. 89).
The limitations period for filing a § 2255 motion is one year. 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The one-year period runs from “the latest of”:
See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f); United States v Jackson, 470 Fed.Appx. 324, 327 (5th Cir. 2012).
Mr Richardson did not file a direct appeal; as such, to be timely, his § 2255 motion should have been filed within one year after the 14-day period for filing a direct appeal has expired (14 days after entry of the judgment of conviction). United States v. Plascencia, 537 F.3rd 385, 388 (5th Cir. 2008); See Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(i). The court entered its judgment on October 28, 2010. As Richardson did not seek a direct appeal, excluding weekends and legal holidays, his conviction became final 14 days later on November 17, 2010. The statute of limitations for filing a § 2255 motion expired one year later, on November 17, 2011. He filed the instant motion to vacate on December 6, 2019, some eight years after the deadline expired; as such, the motion is untimely...
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