Richmond v. Coastal Bend Coll. Dist.
| Decision Date | 01 August 2012 |
| Docket Number | C.A. No. C–07–458. |
| Citation | 883 F.Supp.2d 705 |
| Parties | Elizabeth Ann RICHMOND, et al., Plaintiffs, v. COASTAL BEND COLLEGE DISTRICT, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Frederick J. McCutchon, Wood Boykin et al., Corpus Christi, TX, for Plaintiffs.
Phillip A. McKinney, P. McKinney and Associates, Corpus Christi, TX, for Defendants.
Plaintiffs allege that the Coastal Bend College District (“CBC” or “the College”), several of its administrators and the individual members of its board of directors unlawfully discriminated against them in their employment as teachers and violated civil rights extended to them by the United States Constitution and federal statutes. Pending before the Court are defendants' motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment (D.E. 33, 34, 35) to which plaintiffs have responded.
This matter was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B). In her memorandum to the Court, the Magistrate Judge recommended that plaintiff Shiner be allowed to proceed on her § 1983 free speech claim against defendants Brockman, Cantu, Martinez and Patton, her Title VII retaliation claim against CBC and her false imprisonment claims against CBC and also that plaintiff Millican be allowed to proceed on her Title VII claims against CBC and her § 1981 claim against Patton. The Magistrate Judge further recommended that all remaining claims be dismissed with prejudice (D.E. 96). Apparently pleasing no one, her recommendations received objections, including especially acrimonious ones by plaintiffs' counsel.
The Court has reviewed the Memorandum and Recommendations, the objections filed by both parties, and the subsequent briefing submitted by both parties and made a de novo review of the material on file. In addition, the Court held a hearing on the pending motions. For the following reasons, the Court adopts with modifications the Magistrate Judge's recommendations and grants in part and denies in part Defendants' motions to dismiss and for summary judgment.
Plaintiffs Elizabeth Ann Richmond,1 Marjorie Huff, Patricia Herrmann, Mildred C. Powell, Janet Shiner, Judith Petersen and Dixie Millican are Anglo women over the age of 40 who worked for CBC as instructors, administrators or both. All claim that they were victims of a plan on the part of the CBC administration to discriminate against older, Anglo, female employees in an effort “to turn the college into” a predominantly Hispanic institution.
Defendants John Brockman, Valeriano Cantu, Santos Ramirez, Kathlyn Patton and Alma Adamez (“the administration defendants”), were administrators at CBC during the relevant time period. Brockman was president of CBC from 1999 through his retirement in August, 2007. Cantu was Vice–President of Instructional Services (“VPIS”) from August 2005 through December 2007. Martinez became Vice–President of Student Services in 2003 and was responsible for personnel services and overseeing the accreditation requirements of the institution. Patton has been Director of Personnel Services at CBC since 1995. Her responsibilities include keeping employment records, and receiving general employee concerns, complaints of discrimination and contract non-renewal grievances. Adamez was either the Director of Educational Services or Director of Academic Programs at the College during the relevant time period. Defendants Paul Jaure, Grady C. Hogue, Jr., Louise W. Hall, R.W. Dirks, Emilia H. Dominguez, Carroll W. Lohse, and Fred Moron (“the board defendants”) were members of the CBC Board of Trustees during the relevant time period.
Plaintiffs claim the administration defendants developed a plan for controlling the College for their personal agenda, which was to make it a predominantly Hispanic institution. In furtherance of their plan, they targeted older, female, Anglo employees for termination, harassment and other discriminatory action. Each of the plaintiffs, with a few exceptions noted below, claims causes of action for race and gender discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (“ADEA”); and violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 and 1985. In addition, plaintiff Richmond asserts a state common law cause of action for invasion of privacy and Shiner asserts a common law cause of action for false imprisonment.
I. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper when the movant shows that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party asserting that a fact either cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by citing to particular parts of material in the record, or by showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
An issue is material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action. Lewis v. Univ. of Texas Med. Branch at Galveston, 665 F.3d 625, 630 (5th Cir.2011) (citing Daniels v. City of Arlington, 246 F.3d 500, 502 (5th Cir.2001)). The Court must examine “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In making this determination, the Court must consider the record as a whole by reviewing all pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions on file, drawing all justifiable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motions. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
The Court will not weigh the evidence or evaluate the credibility of witnesses. Caboni v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 F.3d 448, 451 (5th Cir.2002). In reviewing the evidence, “the court must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe, and should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmoving party as well as to the evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached.” Daniels, 246 F.3d at 502 (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000)). Conclusional allegations and unsubstantiated allegations may not be relied on as evidence by the nonmoving party. Carnaby v. City of Houston, 636 F.3d 183, 187 (5th Cir.2011). Summary judgment is appropriate if a reasonable jury could not return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 399 (5th Cir.2008) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505).
The party moving for summary judgment need not negate the elements of the nonmovant's case. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994). Rather, the movant need only demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the movant demonstrates there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmovant's case, the nonmovant must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356. After the nonmovant has been given an opportunity to raise a genuine factual issue, if no reasonable juror could find for the nonmovant, summary judgment will be granted. Caboni, 278 F.3d at 451.
The usual summary judgment burden of proof is altered in the case of a qualified immunity defense. See Michalik v. Hermann, 422 F.3d 252, 262 (5th Cir.2005). When a government official has pleaded the defense of qualified immunity, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish that the official's conduct violated clearly established law. Id. Plaintiff cannot rest on his pleadings; instead, he must show a genuine issue of material fact concerning the reasonableness of the official's conduct. Bazan v. Hidalgo County, 246 F.3d 481, 490 (5th Cir.2001).
II. Title VII, ADEA and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 Causes of ActionA. Plaintiff Millican
The Magistrate Judge recommended that Millican be allowed to proceed on her Title VII action against CBC and also on her § 1981 action against defendant Patton. At the hearing held in this matter, defendants conceded that fact issues preclude summary judgment on plaintiff Millican'sTitle VII claim based on race, but not on her § 1981 claim. Having reviewed the relevant pleadings and evidence, the Court adopts the findings of the Magistrate Judge and denies summary judgment on plaintiff Millican's Title VII claims and her § 1981 claim against defendant Patton. Summary judgment is entered for defendants on all of plaintiff Millican's remaining claims.
In addition, the Court determines that for purpose of convenience, to avoid prejudice and in order to proceed expeditiously and economically, plaintiff Millican's trial will be held separately from the other plaintiffs' trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b). The Court is aware that plaintiffs object to the severance of Millican's trial from the other plaintiffs' trial. The Court also is familiar with the law regarding joinder of claims and commonality of issues. However, as discussed more fully below, individual plaintiffs may not bring a “pattern or practice” claim in the Fifth Circuit and Millican will have to prove her cause of action using the appropriate Title VII framework. The only party common to Millican's and the other plaintiffs' law...
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