Richmond v. F-40 Restoration, LLC
| Decision Date | 18 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | 3:18-CV-01409 (KAD) |
| Citation | 467 F.Supp.3d 20 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | William Robert RICHMOND, Plaintiff, v. F-40 RESTORATION, LLC, Gullwing Motor Cars, Inc., Carini Carrozzeria, LLC, and Carini Consulting, LLC, Defendants. |
Mark H. Dean, Law Office of Mark H. Dean, Hartford, CT, Stephen Gehringer, Law Offices of Bruce Shaw, P.C., Willow Grove, PA, for Plaintiff.
Eric C. Hard, Cohen, Burns, Hard & Paul, West Hartford, CT, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OF DECSION RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This case represents one of those rare but unfortunate cases where although all parties ostensibly acted in good faith one is doomed to incur the losses occasioned by a bad actor, who is himself, not a party to the litigation. This action involves a claim for replevin of a rare 1934 Pierce Arrow coupe (the "Pierce Arrow") and a dispute as to its ownership. The plaintiff, William Robert Richmond, moves for summary judgment on his claim for replevin arguing that there are no triable issues of fact concerning his ownership interest in the Pierce Arrow or his right to immediate possession. (ECF No. 54.) The defendants, F-40 Restoration, LLC (d/b/a F-40 Motorsports), Gullwing Motor Cars, Inc., Carini Carrozzeria, LLC (d/b/a F-40 Motorsports), and Carini Consulting, LLC (collectively, the "Defendants"), who each claim an interest in the Pierce Arrow, disagree that there are no genuine issues of material fact concerning who has superior title to the Pierce Arrow. For the reasons set forth below, Richmond's motion for partial summary judgment as to Count One of the Amended Complaint is GRANTED.1
Robert Richmond is an antique car collector who resides in Australia. (Plf.’s SMF at ¶ 1.) In or about 2009, Richmond was referred to Gary Dicso for restoration work in the United States. (Richmond Dep. at 8–9, Ex. J to Def.’s SMF, ECF No. 59.) Richmond hired Dicso to help him purchase, restore, and prepare for shipment approximately nineteen vehicles during the course of their relationship. (Id. at 11–12.)
In 2010, Richmond discovered through an advertisement that the Pierce Arrow was for sale in the United States. (Plf.’s SMF at ¶ 7.) Richmond paid Dicso to inspect the Pierce Arrow and negotiate a purchase price with its seller, Glenn C. Gould, III. (Id. at ¶¶ 8, 13.) During these negotiations, Dicso never represented to Gould that he was the one purchasing the Pierce Arrow and, in fact, told Gould that Richmond was the purchaser. (Id. at ¶¶ 10–11.)3 Gould and Dicso negotiated a $98,000 purchase price for the vehicle, which Richmond agreed to pay. (Id. at ¶¶ 13–14.) Richmond paid the entire purchase price directly to Gould via wire transfer. (Id. at ¶ 16.) After the monies were received by Gould, Dicso, at Richmond's direction, transported the Pierce Arrow to his workshop and put it in storage. (Id. at ¶ 17.)
Over time, the business relationship between Richmond and Dicso deteriorated until Richmond sued Dicso in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey on September 29, 2016. (Id. at ¶ 18.) That action was stayed on February 8, 2017 when Dicso filed for bankruptcy. (Id. at ¶ 19.) During the bankruptcy proceeding, Dicso did not claim an ownership interest in any of Richmond's vehicles and he testified during a meeting of creditors that the Pierce Arrow belonged to Richmond. (Id. at ¶¶ 20–21.)
Nonetheless, in June of 2017, Dicso, without Richmond's knowledge, contacted Gullwing Motors, Inc. ("Gullwing") to see if it was interested in purchasing the Pierce Arrow. (Id. at ¶ 22.) During the negotiations, Gullwing's owner, Peter Kumar, consulted with Wayne Carini, a nationally known expert in collector motor vehicles, to determine the value of the Pierce Arrow. (Id. at ¶ 23.) Carini appraised the Pierce Arrow as being worth between $100,000 and $120,000. (Id. at ¶ 24.) Kumar negotiated a purchase price of $62,500, which was memorialized in the form of a signed bill of sale on July 6, 2017. (Id. at ¶ 25.) Gullwing paid a $10,000 deposit to Dicso pending his production of title to the Pierce Arrow. (Kumar Dep. at 32, Ex. P. to Plf.’s Mem., ECF No. 54.) To obtain title, Dicso located a copy of the Pierce Arrow's 1949 registration through a third party. (Plf.’s SMF at ¶ 26.) On July 24, 2017, Dicso applied for a certificate of ownership from the New Jersey Department of Motor Vehicles and received title to the Pierce Arrow in his own name. (Id. at ¶ 27.) Thereafter, Kumar paid the remainder of the purchase price and retrieved the Pierce Arrow and title from Dicso. (Id. at ¶ 28; see also Dicso Dep. at 17–18, Ex. K to Def.’s SMF, ECF No. 60.)
On August 9, 2017, Gullwing sold the Pierce Arrow to Carini Carrozzeria LLC (d/b/a F40 Motorsport) ("F-40") for $110,000. (Plf.’s SMF at ¶ 30.) Around this time, RM Auctions, Inc. (d/b/a RM Sotheby's) ("Sotheby's") learned of Carini's recent purchase and became interested in acquiring the Pierce Arrow from him, as it had a client who was seeking this particular vehicle to complete his collection. (Def.’s SMF at ¶¶ 8–9; see also Carini Dep. at 43–44, Ex. Y to Plf.’s SMF, ECF No. 54-3.) Not wishing to sell the Pierce Arrow, as he intended to restore it himself, Carini demanded $250,000 for it. (Def.’s SMF at ¶ 8; see also Carini Dep. at 44–45.) To his surprise, Sotheby's agreed to purchase the vehicle for that price. (Def.’s SMF at ¶ 8; see also Exs. U–X to Plf.’s Mem., ECF No. 54; Plf.’s SMF at ¶ 31.) On October 10, 2017, Sotheby's sold the Pierce Arrow to its client for $275,000. (Plf.’s SMF at ¶ 32.)
On June 18, 2018, Dicso informed Richmond of the sale of the Pierce Arrow. (Id. at ¶ 29.) Richmond's counsel contacted the client who had purchased the Pierce Arrow from Sotheby's and informed him of Richmond's claimed ownership of the Pierce Arrow. (Def.’s SMF at ¶ 10.) Because of the dispute over ownership, the client wanted to return the Pierce Arrow to Sotheby's for reimbursement of the purchase price and his restoration expenses. (Plf.’s SMF at ¶ 33.) Sotheby's, F-40, and Gullwing agreed amongst themselves to return the vehicle and refund monies. (Id. at ¶ 34.) Richmond asked for the Defendants to allow him to retrieve the Pierce Arrow, but they refused his requests. (Id. at ¶ 37.)
F-40 is the current holder of the title procured by Dicso, and the Pierce Arrow is currently in its possession. (Def.’s SMF at ¶¶ 1–2.)
The standard under which courts review motions for summary judgment is well-established. "The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law," while a dispute about a material fact is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
Significantly, the inquiry being conducted by the court when reviewing of a motion for summary judgment focuses on "whether there is the need for a trial — whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Id. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505. As a result, the moving party satisfies his burden under Rule 56 "by showing ... that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case" at trial. PepsiCo, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co. , 315 F.3d 101, 105 (2d Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). Once the movant meets his burden, the nonmoving party "must set forth ‘specific facts’ demonstrating that there is ‘a genuine issue for trial.’ " Wright v. Goord , 554 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) ). "[T]he party opposing summary judgment may not merely rest on the allegations or denials of his pleading" to establish the existence of a disputed fact. Wright , 554 F.3d at 266 ; accord Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990). "[M]ere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts" will not suffice. Hicks v. Baines , 593 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2010) (citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). Nor will wholly implausible claims or bald assertions that are unsupported by evidence. See Carey v. Crescenzi , 923 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1991) ; Argus Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. , 801 F.2d 38, 45 (2d Cir. 1986). Anderson , 477 U.S. at 249–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citations omitted).
In determining whether there exists a genuine dispute as to a material fact, the Court is "required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought." Johnson v. Killian, 680 F.3d 234, 236 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2003) ). "In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the district court's function is not to weigh the evidence or resolve issues of fact; it is confined to deciding whether a rational juror could find in favor of the non-moving party." Lucente v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp. , 310 F.3d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 2002).
Replevin is a statutory remedy under Connecticut law codified at Section 52-515 of the Connecticut General Statutes. Cornelio v. Stamford Hosp. , 246 Conn. 45, 49, 717 A.2d 140 (1998) (). In order to prevail on a claim of replevin, ...
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