Richter v. Union Pacific R. Co.

• Decision Date: 15 July 2008
• Docket Number: No. ED 90090.,ED 90090.
• Citation: 265 S.W.3d 294
• Parties: Roger E. RICHTER, Appellant, v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, et al., Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

265 S.W.3d 294

Roger E. RICHTER, Appellant, v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, et al., Respondent.

No. ED 90090.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division One.

July 15, 2008.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied August 12, 2008.

Application for Transfer Denied October 28, 2008.

Ronnie L. White, Thomas E. Schwartz, St. Louis, MO, David L. Blunt, Paul Slocomb, Edwardsville, IL, for appellant.

Thomas E. Cook, Heath H. Hooks, Crystal M. Campbell, Belleville, IL, for respondent.

KENNETH M. ROMINES, Judge.

Introduction

Roger Richter appeals from the judgment of the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis dismissing his common law negligence claim against Union Pacific Railroad for injuries suffered when a chair he was using at work collapsed. The trial court further determined that it lacked authority to reinstate Richter's Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) claim after Richter had voluntarily dismissed with prejudice that count under Missouri Supreme Court Rule 67.02(a). Our decision as to the latter hinges on our interpretation of the words "a civil action" used in Rule 67, and we agree with the trial court that one count of a multi-count petition can indeed constitute a civil action. As regards Richter's common law negligence claim, we agree that the trial court properly dismissed the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Union Pacific was Richter's statutory employer. We affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

Respondent Union Pacific Railroad hired Michener-Gaines Associates in January 2002 to provide personnel to staff Union Pacific's Response Management Communications Center in St. Louis, Missouri. The contract between the two companies stated that while the employees of Michener-Gaines would work at Union Pacific's facility, Michener-Gaines would be responsible for supervision and all hiring and firing decisions concerning those employees. Additionally, the contract required Michener-Gaines to maintain workers' compensation and employers' liability insurance.

Appellant Roger Richter worked for Michener-Gaines as a communications specialist in Union Pacific's Response Management Communications Center. On 9 December 2003, while working at the center, Richter sat in a chair which unexpectedly collapsed, injuring his back and neck. Richter filed for and received workers' compensation benefits for this incident. Later, on 3 May 2004, Richter filed a petition in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis against both Union Pacific and Steelcase, Inc., the manufacturer of the chair that collapsed. Richter filed a Second Amended Petition on 6 February 2007, which included five counts: Count I against Union Pacific under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA); Count II against Union Pacific alleging common law negligence; Count III a products liability claim against Steelcase; and Counts IV and V punitive damages claims against Union Pacific and Steelcase, respectively.

Following discovery, Union Pacific moved on 20 February 2007 to dismiss Counts I, II, and IV of Richter's petition. Richter filed a Memorandum in Opposition on 16 March 2007, and the parties met with Judge David on 19 March 2007. The court set a trial date of 9 April 2007, and stated it would hear argument on Union Pacific's Motion to Dismiss at that time. On 6 April, Richter filed a Notice of Dismissal, voluntarily dismissing his FELA claim with prejudice. The case was reassigned to Judge Riley, and on 9 April the parties appeared. At that time, they argued Union Pacific's motion to dismiss the remaining counts. The court took a recess in order to review the motion, during which time Richter filed a motion to withdraw his previous dismissal of his FELA count. When the court reconvened, it found that it had no jurisdiction to reinstate Richter's FELA claim because the court lost jurisdiction once Richter voluntarily dismissed the claim with prejudice. The court also granted Union Pacific's Motion to Dismiss, finding that Union Pacific was Richter's statutory employer and therefore workers' compensation was Richter's exclusive remedy.

Richter raises two points on appeal. First, he argues that the trial court erred in concluding that Richter's voluntary dismissal of his FELA claim was effective under Rule 67.02 and the court lacked jurisdiction to reinstate it. Next, Richter argues that the trial court erred in finding that Union Pacific was Richter's statutory employer and thus erred in dismissing Richter's common law claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Voluntary Dismissal Under Rule 67.02

Standard of Review

The interpretation of Rule 67.02 in this case is a purely legal question, and thus we review it de novo. See Smith v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 87 S.W.3d 266, 271 (Mo. App. W.D.2002).

Discussion

Rule 67.02(a) provides that "a civil action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of the court anytime" prior to either the swearing in of the jury or the introduction of evidence at a bench trial. Once a plaintiff has voluntarily dismissed an action under this rule, it is as if the suit had never been filed. State ex rel. Rosen v. Smith, 241 S.W.3d 431, 432-33 (citing Liberman v. Liberman, 844 S.W.2d 79, 80 (Mo.App. E.D.1992)). Thus, the trial court has no power to reinstate a claim that has been so dismissed. Liberman, 844 S.W.2d at 80 (citing Emigh Eng'g Co. v. Rickhoff, 605 S.W.2d 173, 174 (Mo.App. E.D.1980)). Acting under this line of cases, the trial court found that it was without jurisdiction to reinstate Richter's FELA claim once he had voluntarily dismissed it with prejudice.

The key phrase at issue is "civil action." We must decide whether a voluntary dismissal of one count of a multi-count petition can qualify as dismissal of a "civil action" under Rule 67.02(a), requiring no court order. We hold that it can.

There is no Missouri case which has directly addressed the meaning of "civil action" for purposes of Rule 67.02(a). In fact, even a general definition of "civil action" is lacking in our precedent. In McCormack Baron Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., our Supreme Court pointed out that the rules use various terms when referring to a lawsuit, including "claim," "cause of action," and "civil action." 989 S.W.2d 168, 172 (Mo. 1999). The court defined both "claim" and "cause of action" as nearly the same thing: a common group of operative facts giving rise to a lawsuit. Chesterfield Vill., Inc. v. City of Chesterfield, 64 S.W.3d 315, 318 (Mo.2002) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1312 (7th ed.1999)). Both terms refer to the entire lawsuit, including separate legal theories. Id. Richter argues that the same definition applies to a "civil action," though no case has so held.

We interpret Supreme Court Rules using principles similar to those that guide our interpretation of state statutes. State ex rel. Vee-Jay Contracting Co. v. Neill, 89 S.W.3d 470, 471-72 (Mo.2002). We determine the intent of the Supreme Court by looking to the plain and ordinary meaning of the language in the rule. Id.; State ex rel. USAA Cas. Ins. Co. v. David, 114 S.W.3d 447, 448 (Mo.App. E.D.2003). In absence of statutory definitions, we may derive the plain and ordinary meaning from a dictionary and by considering the context of the entire statute in which it appears. State ex rel. Burns v. Whittington, 219 S.W.3d 224, 224 (Mo. banc 2007). In construing a statute, we also avoid an interpretation that would lead to oppressive, unreasonable, or absurd results. Elrod v. Treasurer of Mo. as Custodian of Second Injury Fund, 138 S.W.3d 714, 716 (Mo. banc 2004).

First, Chesterfield Village cited Black's Law Dictionary for the definitions of "claim" and "cause of action," finding that they were quite similar. Id. However, Black's defines a "civil action" as "an action brought to enforce, redress, or protect a private or civil right." Black's Law Dictionary 32 (8th ed.2004). Under this definition, a civil action does not necessarily encompass all legal bases for suit arising from a common set of operative facts, as do the other terms. Furthermore, the cases above defined "claim" and "cause of action" in the context of the doctrine of res judicata, which rightly must apply to a common set of operative facts. None of the cases purported to establish a definition for those terms which applied beyond that context. And even if they do, the fact remains that "civil action" has not been defined.

Beyond the dictionary definition, we look to the context of the rule, which includes both the surrounding rules using the term "civil action," and the legal context: voluntary dismissal in previous cases, even before the existence of Rule 67.02. First, we construe a rule in harmony with surrounding rules. State ex rel. Keeling v. Randall, 386 S.W.2d 67, 68 (Mo.1964). Other rules make clear by their terms when all counts of a petition are included. Rule 51 refers to "the entire civil action" at least three times when prescribing the procedure for changing venue. Rule 51.04(a), (g); Rule 51.045(c) (emphasis added). Even within the context of Rule 67 it becomes clear that a "civil action" can be one count: Rule 67.03 states that "a defendant may move for an involuntary dismissal of the civil action for lack of jurisdiction...." Certainly it is possible that a defendant would have a valid argument that the court lacks jurisdiction over one count yet not over the others. In that case, using Richter's interpretation of the rule, the defendant would have to move to dismiss all counts, undoubtedly in some instances forcing the defendant's motion to be frivolous as to some counts. This result is illogical; thus in our avoidance of reaching absurd results, we cannot hold Richter's interpretation of the rule to be correct.¹

Additionally, the practice of a plaintiff dismissing one count of many in his petition was endorsed by our Supreme Court over a century ago. See Holliway v....