Ricker v. Mercedes-Benz Georgetown
| Citation | 191 N.E.3d 1179 |
| Decision Date | 02 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21AP-43 |
| Parties | James G. RICKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MERCEDES-BENZ OF GEORGETOWN et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Court of Appeals (Ohio) |
On brief: Law Offices of James P. Connors, and James P. Connors, Columbus, for appellant. Argued: James P. Connors.
On brief: Weston Hurd LLP, Matthew C. Miller, and Tina Y. Rhodes, Cleveland, for appellees. Argued: Matthew C. Miller.
DECISION
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, James G. Ricker, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granting the Civ.R. 12(B)(2) motion to dismiss filed by defendants-appellees Mercedes-Benz of Georgetown ("MBG"), Group 1 Automotive, Inc. ("Group 1"), and Sterling McCall Group ("Sterling McCall") (collectively, "defendants"). For the reasons which follow, we reverse and remand the case for further proceedings.
{¶ 2} On August 17, 2020, plaintiff filed a complaint in the trial court asserting claims for violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, negligent and/or intentional misrepresentation and fraud, and breach of contract. The complaint arose from a contract between plaintiff and MBG for the sale of a Mercedes Benz E450 automobile. MBG is a motor vehicle dealership located in Georgetown, Texas, and is a wholly owned subsidiary of Group 1. Group 1 is an international automobile retailer with its principal place of business in Houston, Texas. Group 1 owns and operates several automobile dealerships in Houston, Texas under the trade name "Sterling McCall Group."
{¶ 3} On October 13, 2020, defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. Defendants alleged that they did not live in Ohio, own or occupy property in Ohio, or have any connection to Ohio. Defendants stated that, although Group 1 owns automobile dealerships throughout the United States, Group 1 did not "own or operate any dealerships in Ohio." (Mot. to Dismiss, Steve Sonsik Hwang Aff. at ¶ 13.)
{¶ 4} Plaintiff filed a memorandum contra defendants’ motion to dismiss on November 6, 2020 and submitted his personal affidavit with the memorandum. Defendants filed a reply in support of their motion to dismiss on November 11, 2020.
{¶ 5} The complaint and plaintiff's affidavit demonstrate that plaintiff's daughter leased a vehicle from MBG in Texas. During the lease transaction, plaintiff's daughter mentioned to a MBG sales agent that her father "might be interested in purchasing an E450 Mercedes automobile." (Memo Contra Mot. to Dismiss, James G. Ricker Aff. at ¶ 2.) The sales agent asked plaintiff's daughter for plaintiff's contact information. Sometime later, plaintiff "received a phone call from the [MBG] sales agent" at plaintiff's home in Hilliard, Ohio. (Ricker Aff. at ¶ 3.) The MBG sales agent informed plaintiff that she had spoken to his daughter and wanted to sell him a vehicle; plaintiff told the sales agent he was interested in purchasing the E450 automobile. The sales agent informed plaintiff that MBG did not have the E450 vehicle, but "that they could find it for [plaintiff] and sell it to [him]." (Ricker Aff. at ¶ 3.) The MBG sales agent "called [plaintiff] again" and stated she had located the vehicle, but she needed to speak to her manager regarding the sale price. (Ricker Aff. at ¶ 4.) Plaintiff then received a call from the MBG sales manager, who told plaintiff that MBG "had located and lined up a car to sell [plaintiff] from Houston, but that [MBG] had to ‘trade’ a car in order to make the deal happen." (Ricker Aff. at ¶ 5.) During their phone conversation, the MBG sales manager "gave [plaintiff] a verbal price for the vehicle which was acceptable to [plaintiff]." (Ricker Aff. at ¶ 5.) The sales manager then "called [plaintiff] again and told [plaintiff] that [they] had a deal." (Ricker Aff. at ¶ 5.)
{¶ 6} MBG mailed a contract to plaintiff regarding the sale of the vehicle. Plaintiff signed the contract at his home in Ohio and mailed the contract back to MBG in Texas.1 Pursuant to the instructions in the contract, plaintiff wired the purchase price of $75,000 from his bank in Ohio to "Sterling McCall T" in Texas on June 10, 2020. ) MBG then "called [plaintiff], again at [his] home," and asked that he pay the balance due on the transaction by credit card. (Ricker Aff. at ¶ 7.) Plaintiff paid the balance of $1,831.31 "by credit card over the phone from [his] home." (Ricker Aff. at ¶ 7.)
{¶ 7} Sometime thereafter, MBG contacted plaintiff and informed him they would not complete the transaction or deliver the vehicle, as MBG would not "mak[e] enough money on the transaction." (Ricker Aff. at ¶ 9.) Defendants eventually refunded "most" of the purchase price to plaintiff. (Ricker Aff. at ¶ 10.) Plaintiff located and purchased the E450 vehicle from another dealership, at a price which was $6,000 more than the agreed upon sale price with MBG. Plaintiff averred MBG was the "entity that [he] was told was conducting the transaction," that MBG was also "apparently known as Group 1," and that he had paid the purchase price to an entity named Sterling McCall. (Ricker Aff. at ¶ 12.)
{¶ 8} On January 4, 2021, without holding an evidentiary hearing, the trial court issued a decision granting defendants’ motion to dismiss. Regarding MBG, the court concluded that MBG had transacted business in Ohio for purposes of Ohio's long-arm statute, but that Ohio's exercise of jurisdiction over MBG would offend the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The court noted that it was plaintiff's daughter who "initiated the transaction between Plaintiff and MBG," and found, relying on Austin Miller Am. Antiques, Inc. v. Cavallaro , 10th Dist. No. 11AP-400, 2011-Ohio-6670, 2011 WL 6835024, that a "single transaction for the purchase of a motor vehicle from MBG by Plaintiff did not result in minimum contacts with Ohio required by the Due Process Clause." (Decision at 8.) Finding it lacked personal jurisdiction over MBG, the court also concluded it lacked personal jurisdiction over Group 1 and Sterling McCall.
{¶ 9} Plaintiff appeals and assigns the following sole assignment of error for our review:
The trial court erred by granting Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(2).
{¶ 10} Plaintiff's sole assignment of error asserts the trial court erred by granting defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff contends the trial court erred by finding that Ohio's exercise of jurisdiction over MBG would violate MBG's right to due process.
{¶ 11} "Personal jurisdiction is a question of law that appellate courts review de novo." Kauffman Racing Equip., L.L.C. v. Roberts , 126 Ohio St.3d 81, 2010-Ohio-2551, 930 N.E.2d 784, ¶ 27. When a defendant files a Civ.R. 12(B)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the trial court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Id ., citing Fallang v. Hickey , 40 Ohio St.3d 106, 107, 532 N.E.2d 117 (1988).
{¶ 12} If the court determines a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction without an evidentiary hearing, "the plaintiff need only establish a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction, which requires sufficient evidence to allow reasonable minds to conclude that the trial court has personal jurisdiction."
Cavallaro at ¶ 7. In the absence of an evidentiary hearing on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, "the court must view the allegations in the pleadings and the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and make all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Simmons v. Budde , 10th Dist., 2015-Ohio-3780, 38 N.E.3d 960, ¶ 7, citing Kauffman Racing at ¶ 27. Accord Cavallaro at ¶ 7, quoting Wilkerson Shoe Co. v. Natl. Super Mkts., Inc. , 10th Dist. No. 94APE01-116, 1994 WL 386097 (July 26, 1994) (); Goldstein v. Christiansen , 70 Ohio St.3d 232, 236, 638 N.E.2d 541 (1994). If a plaintiff produces sufficient evidence to allow reasonable minds to conclude the trial court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant, "then the trial court could not dismiss the complaint without holding an evidentiary hearing." Benjamin v. KPMG Barbados , 10th Dist. No. 03AP-1276, 2005-Ohio-1959, 2005 WL 995589, ¶ 27.
{¶ 13} To determine whether Ohio has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, a court must engage in a two-step analysis. Ed Map, Inc. v. Delta Career Edn. Corp. , 10th Dist. No. 18AP-712, 2020-Ohio-358, 2020 WL 556254, ¶ 9 ; U.S. Sprint Communications Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Mr. K's Foods, Inc. , 68 Ohio St.3d 181, 183, 624 N.E.2d 1048 (1994). First, the court must determine whether Ohio's long-arm statute and applicable Civil Rule confer personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant. Goldstein at 235, 638 N.E.2d 541. Second, if the statute and rule confer jurisdiction, the court must determine whether exercising jurisdiction comports with the nonresident defendant's right to due process of law pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Goldstein at 235, 638 N.E.2d 541.
{¶ 14} Ohio's long-arm statute, R.C. 2307.382, and the complementary Civil Rule, Civ.R. 4.3, authorize a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, and provide for service of process to effectuate that jurisdiction, when the cause of action arises from the nonresident "[t]ransacting any business in this state." R.C. 2307.382(A)(1) ; Civ.R. 4.3(A)(1) ; Goldstein at 235, 638 N.E.2d 541. As the trial court found MBG was transacting business in Ohio...
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