Fallang v. Hickey
| Decision Date | 21 December 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 87-1828,87-1828 |
| Parties | , 83 A.L.R.4th 999 FALLANG, Appellee, v. HICKEY; Long, Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Civ.R. 4.3(A)(3) authorizes assertion of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in a defamation action when publication of the offending communication occurs in Ohio.
2. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution permits the assertion of jurisdiction in a defamation action over a nonresident defendant who deliberately sends an allegedly defamatory letter into Ohio.
In June 1984, appellee David J. Fallang, M.D., and Michael S. Hickey, M.D., were surgeons at Middletown Regional Hospital. Fallang was Chairman of the Department of General Surgery while Hickey had recently been granted hospital privileges. It appears that Fallang became concerned about Hickey's surgical skills and brought his concerns to the attention of the hospital's president, James R. Flynn, and the Medical Executive Committee. As a result, Hickey's hospital privileges were limited and, later, temporarily suspended.
In an attempt to regain his hospital privileges, Hickey filed a complaint for injunctive and other relief. Soon thereafter, Hickey apparently distributed a packet of materials to local media organizations and certain members of the medical community. In the packet was a copy of a letter written by James M. Long III, M.D., to James Flynn. Long, a resident of South Carolina, had mailed copies of this letter from that state to Hickey and to two residents of the state of Texas. The letter allegedly contained a defamatory statement about Fallang.
Fallang brought suit against Hickey, Long and others. Fallang alleged invasion of privacy, intentional and negligent infliction of serious emotional distress, malicious prosecution, abuse of process and defamation.
Several of the defendants filed motions to dismiss based on Civ.R. 12(B). In particular, defendant Long moved for an order to dismiss on the grounds, inter alia, that: (1) the court lacked personal jurisdiction over Long; (2) the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; and (3) statutory immunity protected Long from suit based on the allegedly defamatory letter.
The court of common pleas sustained Long's motion to dismiss on the ground that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. Fallang appealed. The Court of Appeals for Butler County held that the court of common pleas erred in dismissing Fallang's defamation claim against Long on the ground that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over his person.
The cause is before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Jeffery E. Richards, for appellee.
Millikin & Fitton Law Firm, James E. Michael, Hamilton, and Gregory E. Hull, Dayton, for appellant.
The principal issue presented is whether Fallang established personal jurisdiction over Long. Because the trial court determined Long's Civ.R. 12(B)(2) motion to dismiss upon written submissions, Fallang needed only to make a prima facie showing that jurisdiction exists. 2A Moore, Federal Practice (1987), Paragraph 12.07[2.-2]. For the reasons that follow, we find that Fallang met his burden of showing the existence of personal jurisdiction. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
The determination of whether a state court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident is a two-step process. First, the court must look to the words of the state's "long-arm statute" or applicable civil rule to determine whether, under the facts of the particular case, jurisdiction lies. If it does, the court must decide whether the assertion of jurisdiction deprives the nonresident defendant of due process of law. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945), 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95.
In Ohio, Civ.R. 4.3(A)(3) permits the assertion of long-arm jurisdiction over nonresident defendants who commit " * * * tortious injury by an act or omission in this state * * *."
Long mailed his letter from South Carolina to Flynn, a resident of Ohio. Fallang's complaint alleges that the letter libeled him by falsely imputing an improper motive to his actions, thereby injuring his personal and professional reputation. The tort of libel occurs in the locale where the offending material is circulated (published) by the defendant to a third party. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. (1984), 465 U.S. 770, 777, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 1479, 79 L.Ed.2d 790. In the instant case, Long's letter was published in Ohio by virtue of its receipt through the mail. Thus, under the principle announced in Keeton, supra, the tort was committed in Ohio. The court of common pleas erroneously concluded that the tortious act occurred in South Carolina.
We hold that Civ.R. 4.3(A)(3) authorizes assertion of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in a defamation action when publication of the offending communication occurs in Ohio.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States permits the assertion of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only if the defendant has International Shoe Co., supra, 326 U.S. at 316, 66 S.Ct. at 158. In judging minimum contacts, the focus is on " * * * the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation * * *." Shaffer v. Heitner (1977), 433 U.S. 186, 204, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 2579, 53 L.Ed.2d 683. Jurisdiction lies where " * * * the defendant has 'purposely directed' his activities at residents of the forum, Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 [774, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 1478, 79 L.Ed.2d 790] (1984), and the litigation results from alleged injuries that 'arise out of or relate to' those activities, Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 [104 S.Ct. 1868, 1872, 80 L.Ed.2d 404] (1984)." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985), 471 U.S. 462, 472-473, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2182, 85 L.Ed.2d 528.
Long argues that his mailing of a single letter to Ohio was a "random, fortuitous contact." The pleadings belie this claim. Clearly, the mailing of the letter to Ohio was an intentional act by Long. It is this act which allegedly resulted in the claimed injury. The fact that Long's contact with Ohio consists of a single act is not conclusive. If it creates a "substantial connection" to the forum state, a single purposeful contact is enough to satisfy the requirements of due process. 1
Analysis of fundamental fairness depends to a degree on whether the forum state has a special interest in holding the defendant answerable on a claim arising out of an act which occurred in the forum state. Ohio, as the forum state herein, has a strong interest in redressing injuries that result from torts committed within Ohio. As stated in Keeton, supra, 465 U.S. at 776, 104 S.Ct. at 1479:
" ' ' Ohio's interest "* * * is not diminished simply because only one * * * [tort] is relied upon as the basis of jurisdiction." Southern Machine Co. v. Mohasco Industries, Inc. (C.A.6, 1968), 401 F.2d 374, 385.
A further consideration is that any injury to Fallang's reputation has occurred in Ohio. Thus, the alleged tort is best adjudicated in Ohio where most of the witnesses will be located.
Long argues that "it is neither convenient nor fair to require * * * [him] to defend himself in...
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