Rickert v. State , A08–2269.
| Decision Date | 23 March 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. A08–2269.,A08–2269. |
| Citation | 795 N.W.2d 236 |
| Parties | Jeremy Grant RICKERT, Respondent,v.STATE of Minnesota, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Syllabus by the court
1. To determine whether a petition for postconviction relief invokes an exception to the two-year statute of limitations under Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4 (2010), a court may consider a previously-filed motion for an extension to file the petition.
2. The petition for postconviction relief invoked and satisfied the requirements of an exception under Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(5) (2010), to the two-year time-bar for filing a petition.
3. When a defendant enters a valid guilty plea to an offense alleged to have occurred after the effective date of a sentencing statute, ambiguities in the factual basis regarding the date of offense do not trigger the rule announced in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004).
Reversed.
David W. Merchant, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Melissa Sheridan, Assistant State Public Defender, Eagan, MN, for respondent.Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN; and Patrick J. Ciliberto, Scott County Attorney, Todd P. Zettler, Assistant County Attorney, Shakopee, MN, for appellant.
In August 2006 respondent Jeremy Grant Rickert pleaded guilty to first-degree criminal sexual conduct for multiple acts that occurred on or about 2003 through 2006. The district court accepted Rickert's guilty plea and imposed the presumptive 144–month sentence and the 10–year conditional release mandated by Minn.Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 6 (2010). Rickert did not file a direct appeal. Subsequently, Rickert filed a petition for postconviction relief arguing that the 10–year conditional release term violated the rule announced in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). The postconviction court denied Rickert's petition on the ground that it was time-barred under Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a) (2010), and upheld the 10–year conditional release term. The court of appeals reversed the sentence on the ground that it violated Blakely and remanded the case for additional fact-finding. We granted review. Because we conclude that the petition satisfied an exception to the time-bar under Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b) (2010), and that there was no violation of the rule announced in Blakely v. Washington, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals.
In June 2006 Rickert was charged in Scott County District Court with three counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a) (2010), and one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(a) (2010). The complaint alleged, among other things, that through his relationship with a college friend, Rickert gained access to the college friend's stepson, T.J.P., and that Rickert began sexually assaulting T.J.P. in 2003. In mid-April 2006, the college friend discovered Rickert sexually assaulting T.J.P. at the friend's home.
On August 16, 2006, Rickert pleaded guilty to a charge of first-degree criminal sexual conduct that “[o]n or about 2003 through 2006,” he intentionally engaged in sexual penetration with T.J.P. The State dismissed the remaining charges. As part of the factual basis for his guilty plea, Rickert admitted that he engaged in sexual penetration with T.J.P. “on a number of occasions, between the time periods of 2003 and 2006.” Rickert also acknowledged that he was subject to 10 years of conditional release and asked the court to follow the guilty plea petition. The district court accepted Rickert's guilty plea, entered judgment of conviction on first-degree criminal sexual conduct, and sentenced him to 144 months in prison. The court also imposed the 10–year conditional release term mandated by section 609.3455, subdivision 6, for crimes committed on or after August 1, 2005. Rickert did not file a direct appeal.
In April 2008, the State Public Defender's Office (SPDO) requested a transcript of the plea hearing, but the SPDO did not receive the transcript until August 14, 2008, which was four days before the postconviction statute of limitations expired under section 590.01, subdivision 4(a). On August 20, 2008, Rickert filed a motion for a two-month extension to file a petition for postconviction relief. Rickert argued that the extension should be granted in the interests of justice under section 590.01, subdivision 4(b)(5), or alternatively that the two-year time bar was unconstitutional. Before the State had an opportunity to respond, the district court granted the motion. Subsequently, the State filed a memorandum arguing that the petition was untimely and that the subdivision 4(b)(5) exception did not apply.
Rickert then filed a postconviction petition arguing that the 10–year conditional release term of his sentence violated the rule announced in Blakely v. Washington. After considering the parties' arguments, the postconviction court denied Rickert's petition as untimely under section 590.01, subdivision 4. Additionally, the court concluded that the conditional release term is part of the statutorily mandated sentence and does not require additional fact-finding, and therefore the imposition of the 10–year conditional release term did not violate Blakely.
The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the imposition of the 10–year conditional release term without Rickert's admission of criminal sexual conduct after August 1, 2005, violated Blakely. Rickert v. State, No. A08–2269, 2009 WL 4910026, at *3–4 (Minn.App. Dec. 22, 2009). Accordingly, the court of appeals remanded to the postconviction court for additional fact-finding regarding the sentencing issue. Id. at *4. The court did not address the timeliness of Rickert's petition. Id. at *2–3.
The State petitioned for review of two issues. First, did the court of appeals err when it failed to determine that Rickert's postconviction petition was timely before it considered the merits of the petition? Second, does the Minnesota Constitution guarantee a defendant the right to one review of his conviction? We granted the State's petition for review.
On appeal, we must consider (1) whether Rickert's petition for postconviction relief is time-barred, (2) whether Rickert's sentence violates the rule announced in Blakely v. Washington, and (3) whether the statute of limitations in section 590.01, subdivision 4, is unconstitutional.
We first address whether Rickert's petition for postconviction relief is time-barred. The State argues that Rickert's petition for postconviction relief is time-barred under Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a), and that Rickert failed to raise any of the exceptions to the time-bar set forth in Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b).
When reviewing the decision of the postconviction court, we review questions of law de novo. Arredondo v. State, 754 N.W.2d 566, 570 (Minn.2008). Our review of factual findings is limited to determining whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the findings of the postconviction court. Leake v. State, 737 N.W.2d 531, 535 (Minn.2007).
Minnesota Statutes § 590.01, subd. 1 (2010), provides that when direct appellate relief is not available, a person convicted of a crime who claims that the requirements of the statute are met “may commence a proceeding to secure relief by filing a petition in the district court” for postconviction relief. Id. A petition for postconviction relief is subject to a two-year statute of limitations. Id., subd. 4(a). Specifically, “[n]o petition for postconviction relief may be filed more than two years after the later of: (1) the entry of judgment of conviction or sentence if no direct appeal is filed; or (2) an appellate court's disposition of petitioner's direct appeal.” Id. As a result, a petition for postconviction relief filed after the two-year statute of limitations runs is generally time-barred. Stewart v. State, 764 N.W.2d 32, 34 (Minn.2009).
Rickert pleaded guilty to first-degree criminal sexual conduct on August 16, 2006, and judgment of conviction and sentence were entered the same day. Pursuant to subdivision 4(a), the two-year time limitation for Rickert to file a petition for postconviction relief expired on August 18, 2008.1 Rickert did not file his petition until October 15, 2008, and therefore, unless Rickert asserts and establishes an exception to the statute of limitations under subdivision 4(b), his petition is time-barred. See Stewart v. State, 764 N.W.2d 32, 34 (Minn.2009).
The procedural facts of this case are unusual. Both parties urge the court to address the constitutional issue, but for different reasons. The State argues that the constitutional issue is squarely before us because Rickert's petition was untimely and none of the subdivision 4(b) exceptions apply. Rickert asks the court to address the merits of his claim that he has a constitutional right to one substantive appeal of his conviction. But Rickert's position on the timeliness of the petition and the interests-of-justice exception under subdivision 4(b)(5) is vague and equivocal. Specifically, in the postconviction court, Rickert expressly asserted the interests-of-justice exception in subdivision 4 to obtain an extension from the court to allow a late-filed petition. Thus, the interests-of-justice exception was asserted before the postconviction court. On appeal, Rickert ambiguously states that the postconviction court “may” have correctly ruled that the petition was untimely “despite” the court's extension of time pursuant to subdivision 4(b)(5). Rickert does not admit that the petition is untimely or that none of the subdivision 4(b) exceptions are applicable.
We conclude that the question of whether the petition is untimely and whether Rickert's late-filed petition satisfies the interests-of-justice exception under subdivision 4(b)(5) is squarely...
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