Ricklefs v. Ricklefs

• Decision Date: 05 August 2003
• Docket Number: No. WD 61598.,WD 61598.
• Citation: 111 S.W.3d 541
• Parties: John Lester RICKLEFS, Appellant, v. Nancy Carol RICKLEFS, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

111 S.W.3d 541

John Lester RICKLEFS, Appellant, v. Nancy Carol RICKLEFS, Respondent.

No. WD 61598.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

August 5, 2003.

Gwen A. Edwards, Kansas City, for appellant.

Nancy Carol Ricklefs, Kansas City, pro se.

Before ROBERT G. ULRICH, P.J., JAMES M. SMART and THOMAS H. NEWTON, JJ.

ROBERT G. ULRICH, P.J.

John Ricklefs appeals the judgment of the trial court modifying the January 5, 1994, judgment that dissolved his marriage to Nancy Ricklefs and compelled him to pay child support in the amount of $750 per month for two of his children. He claims that the trial court erred by not eliminating his obligation to pay child support for his daughter from January 1, 1996, to June 16, 1998, and for his son from January 1, 2000, to the time of trial in April 2002 through a credit of $25,680 to his child support arrearage because the children attended post secondary educational institutions after they attained eighteen years of age but failed to provide him with documentation of their successful attendance as required by section 452.340.5.¹ Mr. Ricklefs also claims that the trial court erred in not eliminating his obligation to pay child support for his daughter from June 16, 1998, the day she turned twenty-two years old, through a credit of $4,158 to his child support arrearage. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded to the trial court with directions.

Mr. Ricklefs filed a motion to modify the January 5, 1994, judgment that dissolved his marriage and required him to pay child support for his then two minor children, Darcie and Justin, born of the marriage. A third child was emancipated at the time of the dissolution. Mr. Ricklefs is in arrearage for child support and sought a credit for child support sums representing amounts due after the two children became eighteen years old and until they turned twenty-two years old and for child support sums representing amounts due after Darcie turned twenty-two years old. Following a hearing on Mr. Ricklefs' motion, the trial court found that Darcie was born June 16, 1976, was emancipated as of June 1998, and that no additional child support be paid for her. The court also found that Justin was born October 19, 1980, and, among the court directives, it ordered that Mr. Ricklefs pay the sum of five-hundred dollars a month, retroactive to March 2001, as child support for the benefit of his son. The trial court did not credit Mr. Ricklefs' child support arrearage. This appeal followed.

The standard of review for a modification of a dissolution decree is the same as in any other court-tried case. Lueckenotte v. Lueckenotte, 34 S.W.3d 387, 397 (Mo. banc 2001). The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed on appeal "unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, or unless it is against the weight of the evidence, unless it erroneously declares the law, or unless it erroneously applies the law." Id. at 397 (quoting Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976)).

On appeal, Mr. Ricklefs claims that the trial court erred in not eliminating his child support obligation for his daughter from January 1, 1996, to June 16, 1998, and for his son from January 1, 2000, to the time of trial on April 17, 2002, because his children did not provide him the information required by section 452.340.5 to be entitled to support while attending a post secondary educational institution. Mr. Ricklefs also claims that the trial court erred in not eliminating his obligation to pay child support for his daughter from June 16, 1998, the day she turned 22 years old. He argues that the trial court misapplied the law by failing to grant him credit toward the arrearage that he owes for past unpaid child support in an amount representing the child support sum due for those periods of time.

Generally, child support payments may be terminated when the child on whose behalf they are paid reaches the age of eighteen. § 452.340.3; Lyons v. Sloop, 40 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Mo.App. W.D.2001). However, when the child enrolls in an institution of vocational or higher education by the October following graduation from secondary school and if certain requirements are met, the child is eligible for a continuation of benefits. § 452.340.5; Morton v. Myers, 21 S.W.3d 99, 105 (Mo. App. W.D.2000). Section 452.340.5 states, in pertinent part, that:

If the child is enrolled in an institution of vocational or higher education not later than October first following graduation from a secondary school or completion of a graduation equivalence degree program and so long as the child enrolls for and completes at least twelve hours of credit each semester, not including the summer semester, at an institution of vocational or higher education and achieves grades sufficient to reenroll at such institution, the parental support obligation shall continue until the child completes his or her education, or until the child reaches the age of twenty-two, which ever first occurs. To remain eligible for such continued parental support, at the beginning of each semester the child shall submit to each parent a transcript or similar official document provided by the institution of vocational or higher education which includes the courses the child is enrolled in and has completed for each term, the grades and credits received for each such course, and an official document from the institution listing the courses which the child is enrolled in for the upcoming term and the number of credits for each such course. (emphasis added)

This statute contemplates proof of eligibility for parental support on a term-by-term or semester-by-semester basis. In re Marriage of Kohring, 999 S.W.2d 228, 233 (Mo. banc 1999). Eligibility for support during the first semester of college may be established simply by proof of enrollment. Id. To remain eligible for continued child support after the first semester, the child must comply with the specified reporting requirements. Id. Specifically, the statute requires the child to provide each parent with a transcript provided by the institution showing: (1) the courses enrolled in; (2) the courses completed for each semester; (3) the grades and credits received for each completed course; and (4) a transcript from the institution listing for the upcoming semester: (a) the courses enrolled in and (b) the number of credits for each course. Morton, 21 S.W.3d at 106-07. A child's failure to comply with the statutory requirements in a semester relieves the parent of his obligation to provide child support during that semester. Kohring, 999 S.W.2d at 234; Lyons, 40 S.W.3d at 8. A child's failure to comply in one semester does not, however, relieve the parent of the responsibility for future payments if the statutory requirements are then met. Id.

At trial in this case, much evidence was introduced that Mr. Ricklefs had actual notice that his children were attending college. The family court commissioner noted in a letter post trial to the parties that the case of Weaver v. Kelling, 53 S.W.3d 610 (Mo.App. W.D.2001), deals with the notice requirements of section 452.377 regarding the relocation of the residence of a minor child. Section 452.377.2 requires a party to give notice of a proposed relocation of the residence of a child in writing by certified mail within a certain time period. Id. at 616. The facts in Weaver showed that the required written notice was not given, but the father did receive actual notice of the proposed relocation of the children and challenged the proposed relocation. Id. at 616-17. In finding that the father could not complain of the technical noncompliance with the statute, this court cited the general rule that one having actual notice is not prejudiced by and may not complain of the failure to receive statutory notice. Id. at 616 (citing Crawford v. Crawford, 986 S.W.2d 525, 528 (Mo.App. W.D.1999); Gateway Frontier Properties, Inc. v. Selner, Glaser, Komen, Berger & Galganski, P.C., 974 S.W.2d 566, 571 (Mo.App. E.D. 1998); Macon-Atlanta State Bank v. Gall, 666 S.W.2d 934, 940 (Mo.App. W.D.1984)).

The statutory notice rule in Weaver is not, however, controlling in this case. The purpose of the notice requirement in section 452.377.2 is to give a party entitled to custody or visitation of a child the opportunity to challenge the relocation of the child. Id. On the contrary, the reporting requirements of section 452.340.5 contemplate proof of eligibility for continued parental support after a child's eighteenth birthday. Kohring, 999 S.W.2d at 233. A parent's obligation to continue to provide support to a child over the age of...