Riddle, In re

• Decision Date: 12 June 1962
• Docket Number: Cr. 7045
• Citation: 22 Cal.Rptr. 472,372 P.2d 304,57 Cal.2d 848
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 372 P.2d 304 In re George Edward RIDDLE on Habeas Corpus.

Page 472

22 Cal.Rptr. 472

57 Cal.2d 848, 372 P.2d 304

In re George Edward RIDDLE on Habeas Corpus.

Cr. 7045.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

June 12, 1962.

Rehearing Denied July 11, 1962.

E. M. Mannon, San Francisco, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for petitioner.

Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., John S. McInerny and Albert W. Harris, Jr., Deputy Attys. Gen., for respondent.

PETERS, Justice.

George Edward Riddle, an inmate of San Quentin Prison, has filed, in propria persona, a petition for habeas corpus in which he seeks his release because of the alleged cruelty of the prison custodial officers. He alleges that his head was split open as the result of an unprovoked clubbing by the prison guards. He also alleges that he has been kept isolated from other prisoners so that they could not learn of the extent to his injuries. These allegations were denied by respondent. As a result of these conflicts, and based on the allegations of the petition, an order to show cause was issued, counsel appointed for petitioner, and the Honorable J. T. B. Warne was appointed as referee to make the necessary factual determinations.

The allegations of the petition stated a good cause for relief by habeas corpus. The California courts have used the writ not only to test jurisdiction, but also to protect the fundamental basic rights of prisoners. Thus the writ has been used to examine allegations by prisoners that they were beaten (In re Cathey, 55 Cal.2d 679, 694, 12 Cal.Rptr. 762, 361 P.2d 426), or denied religious freedom (In re Ferguson, 55 Cal.2d 663, 12 Cal.Rptr. 753, 361 P.2d 417), or prevented from effectively communicating with counsel (In re Ferguson, supra, at p. 677; In re Qualls, 58 Cal.App.2d 330, 136 P.2d 341; In re Snyder, 62 Cal.App. 697, 217 P. 777; In re Rider, 50 Cal.App. 797, 195 P. 965), or the courts (In re Ferguson, supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 676, 12 Cal.Rptr. 753, 361 P.2d 417; In re Cathey, supra, 55 Cal.2d at pp. 695-696, 12 Cal.Rptr. 762, 361 P.2d 426; In re Chessman, 44 Cal.2d 1, 9, 279 P.2d 24; In re Robinson, 112 Cal.App.2d 626, 629, 246 P.2d 982; In re Malone, 112 Cal.App.2d 631, 246 P.2d 984).

If it were a fact that cruel, inhuman, or excessive punishment had been inflicted on petitioner it would have been an invasion of his fundamental constitutional rights, entitled to protection under both the federal and state Constitutions. The federal Constitution and the state Constitution prohibit the imposition of 'cruel and inhuman' punishments. ¹

In recognition of these constitutional rights, the Penal Code of California carefully restricts the prison authorities in the treatment of prisoners. Section 2650 provides: 'The person of a prisoner sentenced to imprisonment in the State prison is under the protection of the law, and any injury to his person, not authorized by law, is punishable in the same manner as if he were not convicted or sentenced.' The next section (2651) provides that: 'No punishment, except as may be authorized by the Director of Corrections, shall be inflicted and then only by the order and under the direction of the wardens. * * *' Sections 147 and 2653 both provide that one who is guilty of 'willful inhumanity oppression' toward a prisoner is subject to a fine or removal from office. Sections 673 and 2652 make it a misdemeanor to use any 'cruel, corporal or unusual punishment' upon a prisoner. Section 149 provides that: 'Every public officer who, under color of authority, without lawful necessity, assaults or beats any person, is punishable by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment in the state prison not exceeding five years or in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment.'

Of course, custodial officers may use reasonable force upon a prisoner to enforce proper prison regulations or 'where necessary to prevent a prisoner from doing bodily harm to a prison official.' (In re Ferguson, supra, 55 Cal.2d 663, 673, 12 Cal.Rptr. 753, 758, 361 P.2d 417, 422.) The courts are and should be reluctant to interfere with or to hamper the discipline and control that must exist in a prison. Petitions containing such charges must be carefully scrutinized and the facts carefully weighed with the thought in mind that they are frequently filed by prisoners who are keen and ready, on the slightest pretext, or none at all, to harass and to annoy the prison officials and to weaken their power and control. The prisoners include many violent and unscrupulous men who are ever alert to set law and order at defiance within or without the prison walls. The burden of proof is, of course, on the petitioner for the writ (In re Allen, 47 Cal.2d 55, 59, 301 P.2d 577; In re Berry, 43 Cal.2d 838, 846, 279 P.2d 18). To be entitled to any relief he must allege and prove that cruel, inhuman, or excessive punishment was inflicted upon him in violation of his fundamental and basic rights.

The petitioner did not sustain that burden. He alleges that custodial officers Stanley and Bukowatz, on April 29, 1961, without provocation brutally beat him and fractured his skull. The referee found that:

'1. * * * force was used against petitioner by prison correction officers Raymond W. Stanley and Bob Bukowatz on April 29, 1961 but that the facts and circumstances which occasioned the use of force are not as alleged by petitioner. I find that petitioner's statement of the facts are untrue.

'2. * * * said force was used for the purpose of making petitioner comply with prison regulations and direct orders of said correction officers. I further find that on the occasion in question that petitioner assaulted officer Stanley by striking him with his fists and kicking him and that as a result of such conduct on the part of petitioner it was reasonably necessary for Officer Stanley to use force in self-defense.

'3. * * * said force used was necessary to compel compliance by petitioner with prison regulations in each instance but that the amount of force used by correction officer Stanley in striking petitioner on the head with a baton is questionable as being fully justifiable.'

The referee then found that the petitioner was struck on the head 'with a baton,' which was a 20 inch by 1 1/2 inch club weighing 1 pound 6 1/2 ounces. He described the injury suffered in detail. The injury was a severe one a badly fractured skull necessitating brain surgery. It was first feared that the prisoner would die, but he has made a good convalescence. As a result of the operation, petitioner has an area about 3 inches long and about as wide as a lead pencil that is devoid of skull and only covered by scalp. This area may fill up with bone.

On the issue of isolating the prisoner the referee found:

'7. * * * that the petitioner has not been kept isolated from the other inmates since his release from the prison hospital, except that in January of 1962 petitioner was charged with maliciously ripping a stool seat, and concealing a metal tablespoon in his cell for which he was brought before the institutional disciplinary committee and given days in isolation.'

These findings are all supported by substantial evidence. But even though they are so supported they are not binding on this court. They are, however, entitled to great weight. (In re Martinez, 52 Cal.2d 808, 812, 345 P.2d 449; In re Allen, supra, 47 Cal.2d 55, 57, 301 P.2d 577; In re Mitchell, 35 Cal.2d 849, 855 221 P.2d 689; In re De La Roi, 27 Cal.2d 354, 364, 164 P.2d 10; In re Mooney, 10 Cal.2d 1, 17, 73 P.2d 554.)

In the present case an independent review of the record has been made. Such review not only justifies but impels the conclusion that the referee's findings are correct and that petitioner has not sustained the burden of proof imposed on him in such cases.

The petitioner testified that on April 29, 1961, he attended the afternoon movie; that there were no seats and he stood up during a short film; that when the second short started he walked toward an empty seat; that Officer Stanley approached and told him to get out; that he was then escorted by Officers Stanley and Bukowatz to the yard office; that there were two trusty inmates and six officials in the outer office; that Stanley and Bukowatz took him through the office to a small locker room; that upon request he gave Stanley his I. D. card and was then asked for his privilege card; that as he reached for this card Stanley hit him with the club, first on the head, then on the knee; that the two officers then stripped him and beat him with their fists about the face and body. He was then taken to the hospital. Petitioner denied striking Stanley or Bukowatz or otherwise provoking the attack.

The corroboration produced by petitioner was very weak. Inmate Harmon, after being assured that he would not be penalized for telling the truth, testified that petitioner was behind him in line as he proceeded into the movie hall; that he did not know whether Riddle got into the hall but some others behind him were admitted. Inmate Bushon testified that he started toward the movies with Harmon and Riddle on the day in question; that Stanley stopped Riddle at the door; that others in the line were admitted; that he thought he saw riddle hand Stanley his I. D. card. Other inmates saw Riddle being escorted across the yard by two officers, and testified that there was then no fighting.

A medical technical assistant testified that he was summoned to the yard office at about 3:30 p. m. on the day in question and saw Riddle with a head laceration that was bleeding; that Riddle told him he received the injury when 'he got into a beef with the bulls'; that he took Riddle to the hospital and summoned the medical officer; that the same day he examined Stanley and found that he had a swollen, reddened contusion of the chin, two loosened teeth, and abrasions on his left leg.

The operating physicians testified as to the nature of the injury, the medical and surgical...