Riddle v. Brevard County Bd. of Public Instruction

• Decision Date: 06 December 1973
• Docket Number: No. 43795,43795
• Parties: Grace T. RIDDLE, Petitioner, v. BREVARD COUNTY BOARD OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION et al., Respondents.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 557

286 So.2d 557

Grace T. RIDDLE, Petitioner, v. BREVARD COUNTY BOARD OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION et al., Respondents.

No. 43795.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Dec. 6, 1973.

Edward J. Richardson of Saxon & Richardson, Melbourne, for petitioner.

John G. Rooney of Sands, Smalbein, Eubank, Johnson, Rosier & Bussey, Cocoa, for respondents.

CARLTON, Chief Justice:

On petition for writ of certiorari, we review herein an order of the Industrial Relations Commission which reversed an order of a Judge of Industrial Claims which awarded petitioner compensation and medical benefits. Florida Constitution, Article V, Section 3(b)(3), F.S.A. We reverse and remand this cause to the Industrial Relations Commission for reinstatement of the Judge's order.

The petitioner, while employed by the respondent, injured herself in the course of her duties when she attempted to catch a falling cash register on December 7, 1970. Petitioner told her supervisor of the accident that same day and showed her the small bruise on her leg. According to the petitioner, she also injured her back, but she thought it was only a small strain and she made no mention of it. By the end of December, 1970, petitioner's back had started to give her more pain, so she visited her family doctor. His treatment on two occasions alleviated the pain. Petitioner claimed that her back pain returned within a few months and, over the summer when the school she works at was closed, that it got progressively worse. In September, 1971, after school had started again, her family doctor referred her to a specialist and hospitalized her. She had a laminectomy performed, which has partially cured her problem.

Both the family doctor and the specialist testified that the attempted catching and picking up of the cash register could have caused the herniated disc from which the petitioner had been suffering. The specialist testified that if the claimant had so injured herself in the cash register accident, the injury could have been almost instantly disabling or it could have followed a gradual course of increasing pain and disability, as it apparently did. Both doctors stated that the petitioner did not relate any history of an industrial accident until after she was hospitalized for the surgery.

Two fellow employees testified as to various complaints made to them by the petitioner concerning back and leg pains for several months following the December 7, 1970, accident. However, the petitioner's supervisor testified that the petitioner reported the accident to her on the date it occurred and showed her a small bruise on her leg, but did not mention any back pain. The supervisor also said that it was only after school resumed the following September that the claimant again mentioned pains in her legs--but again, not her back. The supervisor also related a statement made to her by the petitioner a few days after entering the hospital to the effect that her doctor had told her that her back injury was caused by picking up something heavy and that the only thing that she could think of was the cash register she had picked up from the floor some nine months before. The supervisor said that during this conversation she told the petitioner that she would see the principal of the school about 'filing a claim' for her.

The Judge of Industrial Claims held that the back injury was causally related to the industrial accident and was compensable. The Industrial Relations Commission reversed in this respect. The Commission reviewed briefly some of the evidence relating to causation and stated that, 'The absence of any Clear and convincing evidence indicating causal connection between the claimant's employment and her injury compels us to reverse the Judge's finding' as to causation. (Emphasis supplied.) The test, however, is not whether there is any 'clear and convincing' evidence, but whether there is any competent and substantial evidence to support the Judge's finding. Meadows v. Curly's Trash Service, Inc., 244 So.2d 417 (Fla.1971). In this case, there was such competent and substantial evidence. The testimony of both doctors, while far from conclusive, indicated that the injury could have been caused by the accident. The petitioner's own testimony regarding the development of her symptoms supported such a conclusion, and the petitioner's testimony in this respect was corroborated by that of her fellow employees.

Regarding the role of the Industrial Relations Commission in reviewing findings of a Judge of Industrial Claims, we wish to reiterate what we said in Feinberg v. St. Francis Hospital, 149 So.2d 541 (Fla.1963):

'In determining whether or not there is competent substantial evidence that accords with logic and reason to support the findings of the (Judge of Industrial Claims), the full Commission is bound by these principles: (1) The Workmen's Compensation Act should be liberally construed and all doubts resolved in favor of the workingman; (2) the claimant is not bound by the preponderance rule or the rule which requires proof to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt and while the claimant may not recover on mere speculation or conjecture, if the proof furnishes a reasonable basis for an inference that the injury resulted from an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, it is sufficient. (Citation omitted.)'

When, as in the instant case, a claimant establishes on the basis of competent and substantial evidence that an industrial accident is a logical cause for his injury, it is the responsibility of the employer or carrier, to defeat an award of compensation, to show that another cause was more logical and consonant with reason. Carraway v. Armour and Company, 156 So.2d 494 (Fla.1963). In this case, no other logical cause was shown.

The Judge of Industrial Claims also held that the petitioner had notified her employer, through her supervisor, of the accident on the date it occurred. He then found that:

'. . . in accordance with the rules set forth in Stoner v. Hialeah Race Course, Fla., 218 So.2d 448, and numerous other decisions, the Claimant notified her Employer within a reasonable time after she became aware of the nature, seriousness, and probable compensable character of her injuries during her hospitalization in September and October, 1971, so as to say that the Claimant acted as a reasonable and prudent person under the circumstances and facts of this claim. Also, I find that the Employer/Carrier offered no testimony or evidence tending to prove that the Employer/Carrier was prejudiced in any way by the facts and manner of this claim.'

The Industrial Relations Commission correctly noted that this issue (of notice) is governed by Fla.Stat. § 440.18, F.S.A., which provides, in part:

'(1) Notice of an injury or death in respect to which compensation is payable under this chapter shall be given within thirty days after the date of such injury or death:

(4) Failure to give such notice shall not bar any claim under this chapter:

(a) if the employer (or his agent in charge of the business in the place where the injury occurred) or the carrier had knowledge of the injury or death and the commission determines that the employer or carrier has not been prejudiced by failure to give such notice; or

(b) if the commission excuses such failure on the ground that for some satisfactory reason such notice could not be given; nor unless objection to such failure is raised before the commission at the first hearing of a claim for compensation in respect of such injury or death. . . .'

The Commission also correctly noted that our opinion in Escarra v. Winn Dixie Stores, 131 So.2d 483 (Fla.1961), directs the proper application of Fla.Stat. § 440.18, F.S.A., and its notice requirements. The Commission held: 'The record does not show that the employee prosecuted her claim with the degree of diligence that an ordinary, prudent person would have exercised under the same or...