Ridgeway v. State, 1D04-3223.
Decision Date | 10 January 2005 |
Docket Number | No. 1D04-3223.,1D04-3223. |
Citation | 892 So.2d 538 |
Parties | Kevin J. RIDGEWAY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Nancy Daniels, Public Defender, P. Douglas Brinkmeyer, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Robert R. Wheeler, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Appellant challenges the trial court's retroactive application of the cost provisions of section 939.185, Florida Statutes (2004), arguing it violates federal and State Constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws. We affirm.
On July 1, 2004, pursuant to a negotiated plea, Appellant pled nolo contendere to an offense charged and committed in 1997. Coincidentally, on that same date, section 939.185, Florida Statutes (2004), became effective. See 2004 Fla. Laws ch. 265. That statute, entitled "Assessment of additional court costs," in pertinent part provides that, the "board of county commissioners may adopt an additional court cost, not to exceed $65, to be imposed by the court when a person pleads guilty or nolo contendere to, or is found guilty of, any felony, misdemeanor, or criminal traffic offense under the laws of this state." Id. Over Appellant's objection, the trial court construed the statute to be a mandatory, non-punitive civil remedy, and concluded its retroactive application to Appellant's 1997 criminal offense would not violate ex post facto prohibitions. The trial court was correct.
The constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws applies only to criminal legislation and proceedings. See Goad v. Dept. of Corr., 845 So.2d 880, 882 (Fla.2003). For ex post facto purposes, the categorization of legislation or proceedings as civil or criminal is a question of statutory construction. See id.; see also Dept. of Corr. v. Goad, 754 So.2d 95 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). Construction of a statute is a question of law, reviewed de novo. See Dixon v. City of Jacksonville, 774 So.2d 763, 765 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).
"In evaluating whether a law violates the ex post facto clause, a two-prong test must be applied: (1) whether the law is retrospective in its effect; and (2) whether the law alters the definition of criminal conduct or increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable." Gwong v. Singletary, 683 So.2d 109, 112 (Fla.1996); see also Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 441, 117 S.Ct. 891, 137 L.Ed.2d 63 (1997); Goad, 845 So.2d at 882 ( ).
A statutory change operates retrospectively when it applies to convicted offenders whose crimes were committed prior to the statute's effective date. See Gwong, 683 So.2d at 112. A civil remedy that does not constitute criminal punishment does not violate ex post facto prohibitions. See Goad, 845 So.2d at 884-885. A statute is not punitive, for purposes of determining whether it violates the ex post facto clause, merely because it can be applied in the context of a criminal case. See Goad, 754 So.2d at 98 ( ).
Moreover, monetary penalties have not been equated to criminal punishment. See id. Assessment of costs violates ex post facto prohibitions only when the length of an inmate's sentence can be increased by failure to pay the costs. See State v. Yost, 507 So.2d 1099 (Fla.1987) ( ); Johnson v. State, 502 So.2d 1291 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) ( ); but see Hayden v. State, 753 So.2d 720 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) ( ).
Applying these principles to section 939.185, Florida Statutes, the statute meets the first prong of the two-part test, because it applies upon sentencing to convicted offenders whose offenses were committed prior to the...
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