Ridgill v. Clarendon County

Decision Date13 December 1939
Docket Number14981.
Citation6 S.E.2d 766,192 S.C. 321
PartiesRIDGILL v. CLARENDON COUNTY et al.
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court

Charlton DuRant, of Manning, for appellant.

W C. Davis and J. G. Dinkins, both of Manning, for respondent.

BONHAM Justice.

The appellant is now, and was at the times mentioned herein, the Clerk of Court for Clarendon County. His compensation was derived from the fees and costs which he collected for the work done in the office. This method of payment continued up to March 1, 1931, when the General Assembly passed an act which placed the Clerk on a salary basis, and which salary was fixed and appropriated annually by the County Supply Bill. The Act (No. 152 of the Acts of 1931, p. 212) required the Clerk to pay to the County Treasurer for the use and benefit of the County, the fees and costs collected by him. This Act continued of force up to April 20, 1935, when it was declared to be unconstitutional. During this time the amount of the fees and costs collected by appellant and paid to the County Treasurer was $17,967.48. The amount of the salary paid to the Clerk under the provisions of the said Act during the same period, was $9,063.50.

The Act was declared to be unconstitutional, and after such declaration by this Court (see Salley v. McCoy , 182 S.C. 249, 189 S.E. 196) appellant brought this action to recover the amount of the fees and costs which he had paid into the County Treasurer.

In the meantime, the Sheriff of Clarendon County had brought action to recover the fees due him, which he had paid to the County Treasurer, as directed by the same Act. In that case, the Supreme Court held that the County was entitled to off-set the claim of the Sheriff for his fees by the amount which it had paid him for salary. Hence, in this action, the appellant asked judgment only for the difference between his claim for fees and the sum of the amount paid him for salary, to wit, $6,331.73.

But the defendants claim the right to deduct from plaintiff's claim, the further amount of the sums paid for clerical services in the Clerk's office for the years involved.

The trial Judge who heard the case sustained this plea of the defendants, and allowed judgment only for the balance after deducting the amount of salary paid the Clerk and that paid his assistants.

The plaintiff moved for a new trial, upon the ground that the Court erred in deducting the amounts paid for clerical help. The motion was refused.

Plaintiff appeals upon exceptions which make a single question, which counsel in their brief state as follows: "Where a Clerk of Court, entitled to fees and costs, is deprived of same by a void statute and salary substituted, should the Court offset against the amount due him not only the salary that he has received but also the amount appropriated for clerical help in his office ?"

Before the passage of the Act which required the Clerk to pay to the County Treasurer the fees and costs collected by him, and which put him on a salary, he was accustomed to employ his own help and fix the amount of their salary. The Act fixed the amount of his annual salary, and also fixed the amount to be paid his clerical help, and in the annual County Supply Bill made the appropriation for their payment.

The trial Judge, with the acquiescence of counsel held that only questions of law were involved in the case and, hence, announced that he would decide it as a matter of law. He said: "*** I am ready to make my decision. I think that under the Gamble case, clearly the amount of $4,403.36 should be deducted from $6,331.73, for the reason that it does not appear by any evidence at all that the Clerk of Court was in any way injured, or made any complaint by this money being paid to his help. ***"

$6,331.73 is the amount found to be due plaintiff after deducting the amount paid him for salary, and one other small claim withdrawn by him. $4,403.36 is the amount paid the clerical help. The balance between them is $1,928.37, and for this amount the Court awarded judgment for plaintiff.

The turning point in the case of Gamble v. Clarendon County, 188 S.C. 250, 198 S.E. 857, 858, was this: It was held that: "*** sheriff who accepted salary with full knowledge that it was tendered in full payment for his services and led county to believe that salary payments were being accepted in full payment, was estopped to reject county's claim of offset of salary items in sheriffs action to recover fees and costs" etc. Quoting syllabus 7.

Let it be borne in mind that in this present case, the County claims, and has been allowed to deduct from the Clerk's claim for fees and costs the full amount paid to him as salary, viz, $9,608.50, and it is now held by the judgment appealed from the remainder of what is due him for fees and costs illegally taken from him under an invalid statute, $4,403.36, not a cent of which was received by him, but which was paid to clerical help in the Clerk's office by the County itself under the authority of the Act enacted at the instance of the legislative delegation of the County.

And this action is taken on the ground that appellant is estopped to reject the County's claim.

Note the difference between the Gamble case and this one. Gamble received the money which the Court said he led the County to believe he accepted in full payment of his salary, and his silence thereabout estopped him to deny that he did receive it in full payment...

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3 cases
  • Gillespie v. Pickens County
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • May 27, 1941
    ... ... legislation. [197 S.C. 226] State v. Burns, 73 S.C ... 194, 52 S.E. 960; Gamble v. Clarendon County, 188 ... S.C. 250, 198 S.E. 857 ...          The ... four counties of Charleston, Greenville, Richland and ... Spartanburg are ... which can be inferred with any degree of reason from the ... evidence before me. Ridgill v. Clarendon County, 192 ... S.C. 321, 6 S.E.2d 766 ...           This ... claim is set up in the answer as a defense and also as a ... ...
  • Oswald v. Aiken County
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • December 7, 1983
    ...in accord with the law of this State. See Southern Railway Co. v. Day, 140 S.C. 388, 138 S.E. 870 (1926); Ridgill v. Clarendon County, 192 S.C. 321, 6 S.E.2d 766 (1939). Second, the County asserts the judge erred because he gave only a partial statement of the elements of estoppel when he r......
  • Foster v. Mallory
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • February 11, 1942
    ...and there is no proof whatever on that point. This same difference in the facts, as presented by the allegation and the proof, exists in the Ridgill case, The Circuit Judge in that case, with the acquiescence of counsel, held that only questions of law were involved, and decided it as a mat......

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