Ridinger v. State, 69190
| Decision Date | 21 December 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 69190,69190 |
| Citation | 341 N.W.2d 734 |
| Parties | John D. RIDINGER, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Raymond E. Rogers, Asst. Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., Lona Hansen, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Stephen J. Petersen, County Atty., for appellee.
Considered en banc.
This is an appeal by petitioner John D. Ridinger from the district court's summary dismissal of his application for postconviction relief. He contends dismissal was improper since a genuine issue of material fact was raised by his application and thus an evidentiary hearing was required. Essentially, his contention depends on whether the term "reconsideration" as used in Iowa Code section 902.4 is ambiguous. We find it is not and affirm.
Ridinger had judgment and sentence entered against him for burglary in the second degree in violation of Iowa Code sections 713.1 and 713.3 (1981). Because no appeal was taken, we will confine our discussion to the basic facts underlying his present contentions. On September 21, 1981, a plea of guilty was entered and the plea agreement was disclosed to the court as required by Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 9. In pertinent part, the agreement provides: "In the event defendant is sentenced to serve a term in prison, the State will recommend reconsideration of sentence provided that defendant's conduct in prison is exemplary, i.e., no infraction of rules other than housekeeping or custodial rules." On October 12, Ridinger was sentenced to imprisonment for a term not to exceed ten years.
On December 11, Ridinger applied for reconsideration of his sentence pursuant to section 902.4. On February 8, 1982, the sentencing judge conducted an evidentiary hearing on reconsideration. Ridinger appeared with counsel and presented evidence. The State resisted a change in the sentence and presented evidence concerning defendant's past record. This evidence was unrelated to his conduct in prison and was received over an objection that the State's action was, in fact, a resistance to reconsideration in violation of the terms of the plea agreement. Following the hearing, the sentencing court ruled that "after reconsideration the sentence previously imposed on October 12, 1981, should continue."
On March 1, Ridinger filed an application for postconviction relief based upon the events that transpired at the reconsideration hearing. In his petition he claims the State resisted reconsideration of the sentence in violation of its agreement.
In response to petitioner's request for postconviction relief, the sentencing judge entered an order under Iowa Code section 663A.6 of its intent to dismiss the application. It noted applicant's claim that the State's resistance at the reconsideration amounted to misconduct and pointed out that this issue had been raised at the reconsideration hearing. The ruling further indicated Ridinger did not ask that his plea be set aside and provided further grounds for dismissal. Upon notice of the court's intent to dismiss, Ridinger amended his application and requested the court to set aside his plea. Additionally, he requested that the sentencing judge recuse himself because of prejudice toward Ridinger and reiterated the claim that the State violated the plea bargain. No additional facts were set out. The sentencing judge recused himself and the matter was handled thereafter by another judge.
As indicated by the district court ruling, Ridinger basically insists an agreement to recommend reconsideration is an agreement to recommend his release from prison. In dismissing this action, the district court found no material issue of fact. It reasoned that the State agreed to recommend reconsideration of the sentence, and the sentence subsequently was reconsidered. It did not credit petitioner's claim that reconsideration meant the State would advocate Ridinger's release from prison.
Summary disposition by notice of the court's intent to dismiss pursuant to section 663A.6 is not proper where a material issue of fact exists. Watson v. State, 294 N.W.2d 555, 557 (Iowa 1980). This particular postconviction disposition is analogous to our summary judgment procedure provided in Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure 237-240. Boge v. State, 309 N.W.2d 428, 430 (Iowa 1981). "Whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, so as to preclude summary disposition, turns on whether reasonable minds could draw different inferences and reach different conclusions from them." Id. Here the question narrows to whether additional facts are required to interpret the plea agreement. In other words, to whether an evidentiary hearing is required.
Interpretation involves the ascertaining of the meaning of words and is a legal rather than a factual issue unless extrinsic evidence is required at the trial level. Fashion Fabrics of Iowa, Inc. v Retail Investors Corporation, 266 N.W.2d 22, 25 (Iowa 1978). An examination of the pleadings and record does not reveal any facts suggesting Ridinger was misinformed by either his trial counsel or the county attorney concerning the meaning of the plea agreement. Specifically, the petitioner did not allege he was induced to plead guilty by a promise that the State would recommend a favorable disposition at his reconsideration hearing. Thus, an evidentiary hearing was not required and summary dismissal was proper, absent an apparent ambiguity in the language of the plea agreement.
We think objectively that reasonable minds could not reach different inferences from the quoted terms of the plea bargains. The common understanding of the term "reconsideration" is the act of considering again or anew. Here, petitioner was given an opportunity to have his sentence reconsidered. The fact he subjectively disagrees with the plain meaning of the agreement, without more, does not establish its ambiguity. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sanbulte, 302 N.W.2d 104, 108 (Iowa 1981). Where the...
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