Ridley v. Safety Kleen Corp.

• Decision Date: 30 May 1996
• Docket Number: No. 86280,86280
• Parties: 21 Fla. L. Weekly S232 Harold RIDLEY, et ux., Petitioners, v. SAFETY KLEEN CORPORATION, etc., Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 934

693 So.2d 934

21 Fla. L. Weekly S232

Harold RIDLEY, et ux., Petitioners, v. SAFETY KLEEN CORPORATION, etc., Respondent.

No. 86280.

Supreme Court of Florida.

May 30, 1996.

Opinion Denying Rehearing March 27, 1997.

William D. Hall, Jr. of Barrett, Hoffmann & Hall, Tallahassee, and Gordon D. Cherr of McConnaughhay, Roland, Maida & Cherr, P.A., Tallahassee, for Petitioners.

Francis J. Carroll, Jr. of Boehm, Brown, Rigdon, Seacrest & Fischer, P.A., Daytona Beach, for Respondent.

Jack W. Shaw, Jr. of Brown, Obringer, Shaw, Beardsley & DeCandio, Jacksonville, for Florida Defense Lawyers Association, Amicus Curiae.

Wendy F. Lumish and Paul L. Nettleton of Popham, Haik, Schnobrich & Kaufman, Ltd., Miami, for Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., Amicus Curiae.

ANSTEAD, Justice.

We have for review a decision of the First District Court of Appeal passing upon the following question certified to be of great public importance:

IF EVIDENCE IS PRESENTED CONCERNING A VIOLATION OF SECTION 316.614, FLORIDA STATUTES, "THE FLORIDA SAFETY BELT LAW," AND THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT THE VIOLATION CONTRIBUTED TO THE INJURIES SUFFERED BY THE PLAINTIFF, SHOULD FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTION 4.11 (VIOLATION OF TRAFFIC REGULATION AS EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE) BE GIVEN?

Safety Kleen Corp. v. Ridley, 666 So.2d 913, 916-17 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (on motions for rehearing and clarification). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We answer the certified question in the affirmative and approve the district court decision. We further hold that a claim that a plaintiff failed to wear a seat belt and that such failure was a contributing cause of plaintiff's damages should be raised as an affirmative defense of comparative negligence.

FACTS AND COURT PROCEEDINGS TO DATE

On August 31, 1992, Harold Ridley, while driving his pickup truck, and his daughter Tabitha, who was a passenger in the truck, were involved in an intersection collision with a service truck being operated by an employee of Safety Kleen Corporation.

On February 16, 1993, Mr. Ridley sued the Safety Kleen Corporation and Calhoun County. It was alleged that the Safety Kleen vehicle had proceeded into the intersection over the word "STOP" painted on the roadway, and that Calhoun County was responsible for the maintenance of traffic control devices at the intersection where the accident occurred. In its answer, Safety Kleen raised Mr. Ridley's failure to use his seat belt as an affirmative defense to Ridley's claim for damages. Safety Kleen also filed a counterclaim against Mr. Ridley for property damage and other losses sustained by Safety Kleen in the accident and a cross-claim against Calhoun County. At trial, Safety Kleen requested but was denied an instruction on a Florida traffic statute requiring motorists to wear seat belts. Ultimately, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Ridleys. In the interrogatory verdict, the jury found Safety Kleen one hundred percent at fault for the accident. Neither Mr. Ridley nor Calhoun County was found comparatively negligent, and Mr. Ridley's failure to wear a seat belt was not found to have contributed to his injuries.

On appeal, the First District reversed and held that the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to give Safety Kleen's requested instruction on Florida's statutory seat belt law. Safety Kleen Corp. v. Ridley, 666 So.2d 913, 915 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). The court reasoned:

Because the jury was not told that violation of the seat belt statute constituted evidence of negligence, it was not adequately informed as to the law under all the circumstances. The requested instruction was not fairly covered by the other instructions and it was material to the issue in this case; thus, the refusal to instruct the jury as to this point cannot be considered harmless.

Id. (citation omitted). In response to several motions for rehearing and clarification, the First District issued a second opinion which (1) allowed the jury verdict to stand in Calhoun County's favor and dismissed it from this case, (2) upheld its initial reversal of the jury's verdict, and (3) certified the question of great public importance we have previously quoted. Safety Kleen Corp., 666 So.2d at 915-16.

LAW and ANALYSIS

Certified Question

We first directly address the certified question. We find Florida case law clearly supports the district court's conclusion that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the seat belt statute and the effect of its violation. ¹

Section 316.614, Florida Statutes (1995), provides in part:

(4) It is unlawful for any person:

(a) To operate a motor vehicle in this state unless each front seat passenger of the vehicle under the age of 16 years is restrained by a safety belt or by a child restraint device pursuant to s. 316.613, if applicable; or

(b) To operate a motor vehicle in this state unless the person is restrained by a safety belt.

(5) It is unlawful for any person 16 years of age or older to be a passenger in the front seat of a motor vehicle unless such person is restrained by a safety belt when the vehicle is in motion.

....

(10) A violation of the provisions of this section shall not constitute negligence per se, nor shall such violation be used as prima facie evidence of negligence or be considered in mitigation of damages, but such violation may be considered as evidence of comparative negligence, in any civil action.

§ 316.614(4), (5), (10), Fla.Stat. (1995). In turn, Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Civil) 4.11 ² provides:

Violation of [a traffic regulation] is evidence of negligence. It is not, however, conclusive evidence of negligence. If you find that a person alleged to have been negligent violated such a traffic regulation, you may consider that fact, together with the other facts and circumstances, in determining whether such person was negligent.

It is well established in Florida that a violation of a traffic regulation ordinarily constitutes evidence of negligence, and, when there is evidence of such a violation, the jury should be instructed on the effect of such a violation on the issue of negligence. See, e.g., Seaboard Coastline R.R. v. Addison, 502 So.2d 1241 (Fla.1987); Robinson v. Gerard, 611 So.2d 605 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Sotuyo v. Williams, 587 So.2d 612 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); City of Tamarac v. Garchar, 398 So.2d 889 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Menard v. O'Malley, 327 So.2d 905 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). In Addison, this Court explained:

At issue here is respondent's alleged violation of a statute, section 316.1575(1)(c), part of the Florida Uniform Traffic Control Law. Standard Instruction 4.11 was the instruction that should have been given by the trial court. This instruction tracks the established rule of law that a violation of a traffic regulation is evidence of negligence. When there is evidence of such a violation a party is entitled to a jury instruction thereon. This is simply a specific application of the equally established rule of law that a party is entitled to have the jury instructed upon his theory of the case when there is evidence to support the theory.

....

... When the trial judge fails to read or paraphrase the statute and inform the jury that a violation of the statute is evidence of negligence, the jury is given no guidance on either the requirements of the statute or what effect a violation of the statute should have on its deliberations.

502 So.2d at 1242 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Similarly, in Sotuyo, the First District pointedly declared:

[I]t cannot be presumed that the jury knows the statutory requirements or that the common sense of the jurors would dictate the appropriate behavior. The jury is entitled to guidance on the requirements of statutes and the effect a violation of a statute would have on its deliberations.

587 So.2d at 614. These holdings support a conclusion that the trial court erred in failing to inform the jury that a violation of the Florida traffic regulation mandating the use of seat belts constitutes evidence of negligence.

Section 316.614(10) of the seat belt statute may be somewhat confusing, but it expressly provides, consistent with the language of instruction 4.11, that "such violation [of the statute requiring the use of a seat belt] may be considered as evidence of comparative negligence in any civil action." From this discussion, two things are hopefully now clear: (1) Florida law requires the use of a seat belt, and (2) a violation of that law may be considered as evidence of negligence in a civil action.

We also agree with the district court that an instruction in the form of standard instruction 6.14, explaining to the jury that the use of a seat belt is an issue in the case, cannot act as a substitute for instruction 4.11 because they serve two different purposes. Standard instruction 4.11 advises the jury that a violation of the statute is evidence of, but not determinative of, plaintiff's negligence. Instruction 6.14, on the other hand, presents the ultimate issues to the jury of whether the plaintiff was comparatively negligent in failing to use a seat belt and, if so, whether and to what extent that negligence contributed to plaintiff's injuries. ³ Thus, the refusal to instruct the jury on this point cannot be considered harmless. Robinson, 611 So.2d at 608.

Evolution of the Seat Belt Defense ⁴

We also hold, consistent with the language of section 316.614(10), that the failure to wear a seat belt should be properly raised by alleging the failure and its contributing effect to a claimant's damages as an issue of comparative negligence. We acknowledge that there has been some confusion and misunderstanding as to the nature of the so-called seat belt defense and confusion as to the actions of this Court and the legislature on this issue. For that reason, we believe it may be helpful to review the development of the law on the use of seat belts.

The seat belt defense...