Robinson v. Gerard

• Decision Date: 11 January 1993
• Docket Number: No. 91-3496,91-3496
• Citation: 611 So.2d 605
• Parties: 18 Fla. L. Week. D312 Brenda A. ROBINSON and John S. Robinson, Appellants, v. Christopher W. GERARD and Paul B. Wayment, Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 605

611 So.2d 605

18 Fla. L. Week. D312

Brenda A. ROBINSON and John S. Robinson, Appellants, v. Christopher W. GERARD and Paul B. Wayment, Appellees.

No. 91-3496.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

First District.

Jan. 11, 1993.

Wood, Atter & Coleman, P.A., Jacksonville, Larry Klein and Randy D. Ellison of Klein & Walsh, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellants.

Ada Hammond and Brian E. Currie of Taylor, Day & Rio, Jacksonville, for appellees.

ERVIN, Judge.

Appellants/plaintiffs appeal a final judgment entered in a personal injury action arising from an automobile accident, in which the court, based upon the jury's verdict, found appellees/defendants not liable for any damages. Appellants assert that the trial court erred in refusing to give their requested instructions regarding violation of statutes proscribing unlawful speed and following another vehicle too closely, in that competent, substantial evidence supports the instructions requested. We agree, reverse the judgment, and remand the case for new trial.

On February 17, 1986, defendant Gerard was driving defendant Wayment's Jeep in the right-hand lane of the Fuller Warren Bridge, a four-lane highway spanning the St. Johns River in Jacksonville, Florida. Gerard testified that he was driving approximately 50 miles per hour, two to three car lengths behind a large truck which obscured his vision of traffic in that lane. The truck suddenly swerved into the left lane, thereby making Gerard suddenly aware that several vehicles in the right lane in front of him had come to a standstill. Gerard, unable to turn the Jeep into the left lane because of traffic conditions, immediately applied the brakes, but the Jeep skidded and struck the rear of the last of several vehicles stopped behind a stationary recreational vehicle. The collision caused a chain reaction: the vehicle Gerard struck was propelled into the rear of the car stopped in front of it, which in turn collided with appellant Brenda Robinson's vehicle, causing injury to both her and her automobile.

Defendant Wayment's testimony paralleled that of Gerard regarding the events transpiring just before the accident, with a few exceptions. Wayment, a passenger in the Jeep at the time of the incident, stated that Gerard had accelerated to no more than 45 miles per hour, and that the Jeep was following between three to five car lengths behind the vehicle in front of it, which he identified as a light-colored van.

Plaintiff Brenda Robinson testified that the posted speed limit on the bridge is 45 miles per hour.

Based upon the above evidence, the plaintiffs requested the following jury instructions, as an adaptation of Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Civil) 4.11:

Florida Statute Sec. 316.0895 FOLLOWING TOO CLOSELY states:

"The driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicles and the traffic upon, and the conditions of, the highway."

Violation of this statute/ordinance is evidence of negligence. It is not, however, conclusive evidence of negligence. If you find that a person alleged to have been negligent violated such a traffic regulation, you may consider that fact, together with the other facts and circumstances, in determining whether such person was negligent.

* * * * * *

Florida Statute Sec. 316.183 UNLAWFUL SPEED states:

"No person shall drive a vehicle on a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions, and having regard to the actual and potential hazards, then existing. In every event, speed shall be controlled as may be necessary to avoid colliding with any person, vehicle, or other conveyance or object on or entering the highway in compliance with legal requirements and the duty of all persons to use due care."

Violation of this statute/ordinance is evidence of negligence. It is not, however, conclusive evidence of negligence. If you find that a person alleged to have been negligent violated such a traffic regulation, you may consider that fact, together with the other facts and circumstances, in determining whether such person was negligent.

Although the trial court denied the above requests, it did give plaintiffs' requested instruction, as modified, on special hazards as follows:

Florida Statute 316.185 states in part: "When special hazards exist or may exist with respect to other traffic or by reason of other roadway conditions, speed shall be decreased as may be necessary to avoid colliding with any person, vehicle or other conveyance on the street in compliance with legal requirements and the duty of all persons to use due care."

Now, violation of this statute is evidence of negligence. However, it is not conclusive evidence of negligence. And if you find that a person alleged to have been negligent violated such a traffic regulation, you may consider that fact together with the other facts and circumstances in determining whether such a person was negligent.

In denying the two requested instructions, the lower court commented that it considered the instructions given adequately covered the requested instructions. ¹ In regard to the unlawful speed instruction in particular, the court apparently agreed with the defendants' arguments that Section 316.183(1), Florida...