Riggenbach v. Rhodes
Citation | 267 So.3d 551 |
Decision Date | 29 March 2019 |
Docket Number | Case No. 5D18-1889 |
Parties | Michael D. RIGGENBACH, M.D. and Orlando Orthopaedic Center, Petitioners, v. Chad A. RHODES, Respondent. |
Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
Thomas E. Dukes, III, and Wilbert R. Vancol, of McEwan, Martinez, Dukes & Hall, P.A., Orlando, for Petitioners.
Margaret E. Kozan, of Margaret E. Kozan, P.A., Winter Park, and Daniel C. Elkins, of Law Offices of Elkins & Freedman, Boca Raton, for Respondent.
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
We grant Respondent's motion for rehearing only to the extent that it correctly points out that Respondent challenged the constitutionality of the controlling 2013 amendments to Chapter 766 in his opposition to Petitioners' motion to dismiss and challenged it again in his motion for reconsideration. However, each time the trial court ruled on Petitioners' motion to dismiss, it declined to rule on the constitutional issues that Respondent had raised and argued below. In all other respects, Respondent's motion for rehearing is denied. Accordingly, we withdraw our previous opinion and substitute the corrected opinion in its place.
Petitioners, Dr. Michael Riggenbach and Orlando Orthopaedic Center, have sought certiorari review of an order denying their motion to dismiss Respondent Chad Rhodes' medical malpractice lawsuit. Petitioners moved to dismiss because Rhodes' presuit written expert report, from a physician who specializes in plastic surgery, offered opinions regarding the medical care provided by Dr. Riggenbach, who specializes in orthopedic surgery. Because Rhodes failed to comply with the requirement of sections 766.203, 776.202(6), and 766.102(5)(a), Florida Statutes (2014), that he provide a written medical expert opinion from a specialist in the same specialty as the defendant health care provider, the complaint should have been dismissed, unless those statutory provisions are found to be unconstitutional for the reasons previously asserted by Respondent.
We grant the petition, quash the trial court's order, and remand with instructions for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Those further proceedings shall first include a ruling on whether Respondent properly placed the State on notice of his constitutional challenge and, if he did, then a second ruling on whether the "same specialty" requirement is unconstitutional. If the trial court denies Respondent's constitutional challenge on procedural or substantive grounds, it shall dismiss Respondent's complaint with prejudice.
After suffering injuries to his right wrist, Rhodes sought treatment from Dr. Riggenbach, who was employed by Orlando Orthopaedic Center. In March 2014, Dr. Riggenbach performed wrist surgery involving insertion of an anchoring mechanism which allegedly was improperly seated and became lost in Rhodes' wrist. Rhodes' medical malpractice complaint alleged that Dr. Riggenbach was negligent in performing this surgery, which resulted in the need for additional surgery and treatment, and ultimately caused permanent injury to Rhodes' wrist.
Pursuant to section 766.106(4), Rhodes served Petitioners with a presuit notice of intent to initiate litigation for medical negligence. The presuit notice included a verified written medical expert opinion ("expert affidavit")—signed by Drew Kreegel, M.D., a board certified plastic surgeon and otolaryngologist—to corroborate that reasonable grounds existed to initiate the medical malpractice claim.
After objecting during the presuit period, Petitioners moved to dismiss the later-filed medical malpractice complaint because Dr. Kreegel's expert affidavit was not authored by a physician who practiced in the same specialty as Dr. Riggenbach. Petitioners supported their third motion to dismiss the complaint by providing an affidavit of Dr. Riggenbach that stated he was a board certified specialist in orthopedic surgery, and that the procedures he performed on Rhodes were orthopedic and did not include any plastic surgery. Rhodes responded by arguing that Dr. Kreegel's practice and training qualified him to render the opinions set forth in the expert affidavit and supported that argument with another affidavit from Dr. Kreegel describing the types of hand surgery he had performed in the past.
An evidentiary hearing was held during which Dr. Kreegel testified that he had performed the same type of surgery that Rhodes underwent approximately five to eight times during the previous three years. Dr. Kreegel described his practice as including plastic reconstructive and hand surgery. He admitted on cross-examination that he never represented to anyone that he specialized in orthopedic surgery. Petitioners' motion to dismiss was granted. However, on rehearing before a different judge, Rhodes successfully argued that the trial court had the inherent authority to consider whether Dr. Kreegel, by virtue of his experience, could be considered to be engaged in the same specialty as Dr. Riggenbach. The successor judge found that both Dr. Kreegel and Dr. Riggenbach were engaged in the same specialty, and entered an order denying Petitioners' motion to dismiss.
"Although orders denying motions to dismiss are generally not reviewable by writ of certiorari, Florida courts have created an exception and permit certiorari review when the presuit requirements of the [Florida Medical Malpractice Act] are at issue." Holmes Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Dumigan , 151 So.3d 1282, 1284 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) ; accord Rell v. McCulla , 101 So.3d 878, 879–83 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) ; Oken v. Williams , 23 So.3d 140, 144 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (), quashed on other grounds by Williams v. Oken , 62 So.3d 1129 (Fla. 2011). A nonfinal order allowing a plaintiff to proceed with litigation when the plaintiff has not complied with the presuit statutes results in material injury to the defendant that cannot be cured on appeal. See Cent. Fla. Reg'l Hosp. v. Hill , 721 So.2d 404, 405 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). Therefore, the order on rehearing denying Petitioners' motion to dismiss based on non-compliance with presuit requirements is appropriate for certiorari review.
Prior to July 2013, the presuit statute authorized opinion testimony from an expert witness against the defendant doctor who practiced in "the same or similar specialty " as the defendant doctor. § 766.102(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (2012) (emphasis added). The phrase "similar specialty" was defined as a specialty that included the evaluation and treatment of the medical condition that was the subject of the medical negligence claim. Id. The 2012 version of section 766.102 also allowed the trial court to determine whether the expert was qualified on grounds other than those specified in the statute. Id. § 766.102(14).
In Oliveros v. Adventist Health Systems/Sunbelt Inc. , the Second District determined that the trial court could consider the expert's experience as a medical evacuation flight surgeon in order to admit his testimony, although he was testifying against an emergency room physician. 45 So.3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). The Second District found that under the then-existing version of section 766.102, the emergency medicine experience of the proposed expert witness was sufficient to admit his testimony, as it fell under the "grounds other than the qualifications in this section" language, which in 2010 was found in section 766.102(12).
In 2013, the legislature amended the statutory definition of "medical expert" to require that only a practicing specialist in the "same specialty" as the defendant health care provider could offer expert opinions on the care provided by the defendant specialist.1 The version as amended in 2013, including the modification referring to "same specialty" expert witnesses, remains unchanged today, and governs this medical malpractice claim, which arose in 2014. The statute provides in pertinent part:
§ 766.102(5), Fla. Stat. (2014) (emphasis added).
"The interpretation of a statute is a purely legal matter and therefore subject to the de novo standard of review." Kephart v. Hadi , 932 So.2d 1086, 1089 (Fla. 2006). When construing a statute, we strive to effectuate the Legislature's intent. See, e.g. , Borden v. E.-European Ins. Co. , 921 So.2d 587, 595 (Fla. 2006) (). To determine that intent, we look first to the statute's plain language. Id. at 595. "[W]hen the statute is clear and unambiguous, courts will not look behind the statute's plain language for legislative intent or resort to rules of statutory construction to ascertain intent." Id. (quoting Daniels v. Fla. Dep't of Health , 898 So.2d 61, 64 (Fla. 2005) ).
Florida courts have previously decided that "same specialty" is to be taken literally and is not synonymous with physicians with different specialties providing similar treatment to the same areas of the body. For example, in Clare v. Lynch , the...
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