Riggins v. Housing Authority of Seattle

• Decision Date: 06 May 1976
• Docket Number: No. 43854,43854
• Citation: 549 P.2d 480,87 Wn.2d 97
• Parties: Hazel Jean RIGGINS, through her guardian ad litem, Bertha Jenkins, and all others similarly situated, Respondent, v. The HOUSING AUTHORITY OF SEATTLE et al., Appellants.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 97

87 Wn.2d 97

549 P.2d 480

Hazel Jean RIGGINS, through her guardian ad litem, Bertha Jenkins, and all others similarly situated, Respondent, v. The HOUSING AUTHORITY OF SEATTLE et al., Appellants.

No. 43854.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

May 6, 1976.

LeSourd, Patten, Fleming & Hartung, Dwayne E. Copple, Rodney J. Waldbaum, Seattle, for appellants.

Legal Services Center, Barbara A. Isenhour, Seattle, for respondent.

HUNTER, Associate Justice.

The Housing Authority of Seattle appeals from a summary judgment based on stipulated facts entered by the parties. The facts as pertinent to this appeal are the following.

The appellant Housing Authority of Seattle administers a federally assisted, low rent housing program. Prior to 1974, it did not consider age in determining eligibility and, in fact, it undoubtedly rented to some minors who were eligible for public housing. In 1974, however, it formally considered whether or not under applicable federal regulations it should be entering into leases with minors. Since that time, appellant's policy has been to deny the applications of minors, pending their attainment of the age of 18 years. This policy was not adopted pursuant to the provisions contained in the Washington Administrative Procedure Act (WAPA) RCW 34.04.

When respondent Hazel Jean Riggins applied for public housing on February 10, 1975, she was a 17-year-old minor and, except for her age, was eligible for public housing. ¹ Based on the policy described above, the appellant denied respondent's application.

On March 5, 1975, the respondent filed an action for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The summary judgment subsequently entered in favor of respondent specifically held (1) that the appellant Housing Authority of Seattle is a state 'agency' subject to the Washington Administrative Procedure Act (WAPA), and (2) since appellant's policy of uniformly denying public housing to minors, who except for age were otherwise eligible for public housing, involved 'rule-making' within WAPA, the policy was void because its adoption did not conform with WAPA requirements.

Appellant raises three arguments in this appeal. It first argues that it is not an 'agency' as defined in RCW 34.04.010(1) and thus not subject to WAPA. Second, even if it is such an 'agency,' it still is not subject to the procedural requirements of WAPA because it was not engaged in 'rule-making,' as defined in RCW 34.04.010(2), when it adopted its minimum age policy. Lastly, appellant suggests that in any event, RCW 35.82.070(8) of the Housing Authorities Law exempts it from the provisions of WAPA. We need not consider appellant's last two arguments, however, because we agree with appellant that it is not an 'agency' as defined in RCW 34.04.010(1).

The definition of 'agency' contained in RCW 34.04.010(1) is the only definition that is relevant to the application of WAPA. The only issue is whether the appellant Housing Authority of Seattle comes within this specific definition. Applying the definition of 'agency' in RCW 34.04.010(1) is basically a matter of statutory interpretation. In applying and interpreting the definition, it is our object to give effect to the intention of the legislature. See State v. Sponburgh, 84 Wash.2d 203, 210, 525 P.2d 238 (1974). In this regard, definitions of state 'agencies' made in other contexts and for other purposes are available, and they may be helpful in illustrating possible definitions. These definitions, however, in no way determine or control the meaning of 'agency' for purposes of WAPA.

For purposes of WAPA, 'agency'

means any State board, commission, department, or officer, authorized by law to make rules or to adjudicate contested cases, except those in the legislative or judicial branches.

(Italics ours.) RCW 34.04.010(1). We feel that this definition clearly indicates the legislature intended WAPA to apply only to State boards, commissions, departments, and officers, I.e., only to those government entities clearly involved in Statewide programs. This statutory language itself indicates that the legislature intended the definition to have a narrow application.

In addition, other legislation, in which 'agency' is defined much more broadly and completely, demonstrates that the legislature could set out less narrow definitions when it desired to do so. For example, in the Housing Cooperation Law, RCW 35.83, the legislature defined an analogous term, 'state public body' to mean 'any city, town, county, municipal corporation, commission, district, authority, other subdivision or public body of the state.' RCW 35.83.020(3). A more striking example is found in RCW 42.17.020(1), enacted some time after WAPA, where the legislature specifically defined 'agency' to include 'all state agencies and all local agencies.' It more particularly defined 'stage agency' in the statute to include 'every state office, public official, department, division, bureau, board, commission, or other state agency.' The definition of 'local agency' is equally particular and complete.

'Local agency' includes every county, city, city and county, school district, municipal corporation, district, political subdivision, or any board, commission or agency thereof, or other local public agency.

RCW 42.17.020(1).

The definition of 'state agency' in RCW 42.17.020(1) parallels the definition of 'agency' in RCW 34.04.010(1) as to state boards, commissions, departments, and officers (officials). The inclusion of a specific definition of 'local agency' in RCW 42.17.020(1), the later enacted statute, indicates the legislature felt that the broad definition of 'state agencies,' without more, did not encompass these 'local agencies.' We believe the legislature meant what it said when it defined 'agency' in RCW 34.04.010(1) for the purpose of WAPA as 'any state board, commission, department or officer.' The legislature did not intend this definition to include local agencies, like those listed above, that are not concerned with statewide programs or that are not part of a statewide system. Cf. Evergreen State Builders, Inc. v. Pierce County, 9 Wash.App. 973. 979 n. 3, 516 P.2d 775 (1973). The legislature did intend to include agencies that are clearly 'state' in nature and not excluded from the WAPA. Cf. Department of Highways v. Washington Environmental Council, 82 Wash.2d 280, 283, 510 P.2d 216 (1973) (Shorelines Hearings Board); State ex rel. Dawes v. State Highway Comm'n, 63 Wash.2d 34, 40, 385 P.2d 376 (1963); Herrett Trucking Co. v. Washington Public Serv. Comm'n, 58 Wash.2d 542, 544, 364 P.2d 505 (1961).

Turning to the appellant Housing Authority of Seattle, we note that it is an entity set up pursuant to RCW 35.82.030 of the Housing Authorities Law. This statutory section, however, is only enabling legislation. A housing authority cannot function 'until or unless the governing body of the city or the county, as the case may be, by proper resolution shall declare . . . that there is need for an authority to function in such city or county.' RCW 35.82.030. In addition, the 'area of operation' for any housing authority is limited to 5 miles from the territorial boundaries in the case of a city and the county boundary in the case of a county. RCW 35.82.020(6). There are a number of housing authorities throughout the state and each is...