Riggs v. State

• Decision Date: 15 December 2005
• Docket Number: No. SC05-133.,SC05-133.
• Citation: 918 So.2d 274
• Parties: Norris RIGGS, Jr., Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

918 So.2d 274

Norris RIGGS, Jr., Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. SC05-133.

Supreme Court of Florida.

December 15, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, Bruce P. Taylor, Assistant Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, FL, for Petitioner.

Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, Robert J. Krauss, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Bureau Chief, Tampa Criminal Appeals, Marilyn Muir Beccue and Richard M. Fishkin, Assistant Attorney Generals, Tampa, FL, for Respondent.

CANTERO, J.

In this case, we explore some of the parameters of the exigent circumstances exception to the search warrant requirement. Specifically, we consider how the exception applies when authorities find a child wandering alone around an apartment complex. We review State v. Riggs, 890 So.2d 465 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), which expressly and directly conflicts with Eason v. State, 546 So.2d 57 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). In both cases, authorities found a young child wandering alone. Fearing that its caretaker might be suffering a medical emergency, they entered a nearby apartment. In both cases, they found marijuana in plain view. In this case, the Second District upheld the warrantless entry as reasonable under the circumstances, whereas in Eason the First District concluded that the police violated the Fourth Amendment. We granted review to resolve the conflict. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.; Riggs v. State, 900 So.2d 554 (Fla.2005) (granting review). For the reasons explained below, we agree with the Second District that exigent circumstances justified the entry in this case and approve that decision. We disapprove Eason to the extent it conflicts with this opinion.

I. FACTS

In the middle of a January night, two sheriff's deputies were summoned to an apartment complex in Mulberry, Florida. A four-year-old girl had been seen wandering there, naked and alone. When the deputies arrived at about 3 a.m., they found the girl in the company of local residents. She was disoriented and "had no idea where she had wandered out of." The deputies decided to search the complex door by door for her caretakers. As one later testified, they were "concerned about the welfare of the parents [and] obviously we're also concerned about any type of child abandonment or anything like that."

The apartment complex stood three stories high, and contained as many as fifty apartments. Upon reaching the second floor, the deputies noticed that every door on that level appeared closed, except for one. According to one deputy, "that [door] was standing slightly ajar, and it was just obvious that somebody had come out of there or somebody had left it open, and that was possibly where the child had come out of." Through a small opening, the deputies could see light inside the apartment. They pounded loudly on the door at least three dozen times, identifying themselves as police officers. Although some neighbors stepped outside during the commotion, no one inside the apartment responded.

Concerned that "something had happened to the child's caregiver and that maybe there was a medical concern in there," the deputies entered the apartment. Once inside, they continued calling out, again without response. On a coffee table in the living room, they noticed a plastic cigar tube containing some seeds (later determined to be marijuana). They then entered three rooms in succession. The first contained nothing unusual. The second contained seven potted marijuana plants with a fluorescent light suspended above them. In the third was the petitioner Norris Riggs, along with a woman later identified as the girl's babysitter. After his arrest, Riggs confessed to growing the marijuana.

The State charged Riggs with manufacturing cannabis and possessing drug paraphernalia. Riggs pled not guilty and moved to suppress the evidence, claiming it was the fruit of an unreasonable search. At the suppression hearing, the State argued that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry. Without making detailed findings of fact, the trial judge followed a First District decision: "So, it appears to me that the court's holding in Eason is based on the lack of exigent circumstances, that the child at that point was safe and there was no exigent circumstances to require them going in there. I'm going to find that Eason controls, and I will grant the motion to suppress all of the evidence."

The facts in Eason were similar. Again a young child was found wandering through an apartment complex. There, the lost boy was younger (two or three years old), and the encounter occurred later in the morning (8 a.m.). Eason, 546 So.2d at 58. The officers followed the boy to a specific apartment, where he pointed to a partially open door and said something to the effect of, "Mommy's in there." Id. Upon knocking and receiving no reply, the officers entered. They found the boy's caretakers in a room containing marijuana and associated paraphernalia. The First District, overruling the trial court, held that the entry violated the Fourth Amendment. It explained:

[The officer] admitted that prior to entering Eason's apartment he saw no evidence that the child had been, or was going to be, physically or mentally abused, saw no evidence that medical intervention was necessary, and saw no evidence of a murder or robbery. [He] also testified that, upon his arrival at the apartment complex, the child appeared to be in the care of a responsible adult. We must conclude, therefore, that the state did not satisfy its burden of proving that the officers had reasonable grounds to believe exigent circumstances existed....

Id. at 58-59.

Chief Judge Smith dissented. He argued that the majority should have focused on the safety of the child's mother, not the child himself. Id. at 59 (Smith, C.J., dissenting). According to the dissent, "this episode developed substantially beyond a mere `lost child' incident when the officers were led by the child to the partially open door and were told, `Mommy's in there.'" Id. at 61. Because the mother could have been suffering a medical emergency, Chief Judge Smith concluded that the officers "need[ed] to act" and that it would have been illogical for them to walk away from the scene. Id.

On appeal in this case, the Second District rejected the majority's reasoning in Eason and agreed with the dissent. See Riggs, 890 So.2d at 467. The Second District explained that "[t]he officers believed it was their duty to see that the child's caregiver was not incapacitated and justifiably entered the residence." Id. The district court accepted that belief as reasonable under the circumstances. Id. at 467-68. It therefore reversed the trial court's order granting Riggs's motion to suppress. Id. at 468.

Riggs sought review in this Court based on express and direct conflict with Eason. Although the two decisions recite the same principles of Fourth Amendment law, we have jurisdiction because of the Second District's "application of a rule of law to produce a different result in a case which involves substantially the same facts as a prior case." Mancini v. State, 312 So.2d 732, 733 (Fla.1975) (citing Nielsen v. City of Sarasota, 117 So.2d 731 (Fla.1960)). We granted review, Riggs, 900 So.2d at 554, and now resolve the conflict by approving the district court's decision.

II. ANALYSIS

We must decide whether exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry of Riggs's apartment. In determining that issue, we (A) explain the standard of review, (B) summarize the exigent circumstances doctrine, and (C) discuss medical emergencies in particular. Finally, in section (D), we apply the law to the facts of this case.

A. Standard of Review

When reviewing rulings on motions to suppress, we "accord a presumption of correctness . . . to the trial court's determination of historical facts, but [we] independently review mixed questions of law and fact that ultimately determine constitutional issues." Fitzpatrick v. State, 900 So.2d 495, 510 (Fla.2005) (quoting Nelson v. State, 850 So.2d 514, 521 (Fla.2003) (quoting Connor v. State, 803 So.2d 598, 608 (Fla.2001))). In this case, the trial court granted the motion to suppress after determining one historical fact — that the unattended girl was "safe" when the deputies entered the apartment. That finding, which neither party disputes, is entitled to a presumption of correctness. The remainder of our review must be independent and therefore de novo.

B. The Warrant Requirement and the Exigent Circumstances Exception

The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly identified "physical entry of the home [as] the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) (quoting United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972)). Throughout the Supreme Court's caselaw, "the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant." Id. at 590, 100 S.Ct. 1371. As the preceding sentence suggests, however, a well-established exception exists for "the sort of emergency or dangerous situation, described in our cases as `exigent circumstances,' that would justify a warrantless entry into a home for the purpose of either arrest or search." Id. at 583, 100 S.Ct. 1371.

When the government invokes this exception to support the warrantless entry of a home, it must rebut the presumption that such entries are unreasonable. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984). To do so, it must demonstrate a "grave emergency" that "makes a warrantless search imperative to the safety of the police and of the community." Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 191, 110 S.Ct 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990). An entry is considered "impe...