State v. Yee

• Decision Date: 14 October 2015
• Docket Number: No. 3D14–369.,3D14–369.
• Parties: The STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Rafael YEE, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

177 So.3d 72

The STATE of Florida, Appellant,

v.Rafael YEE, Appellee.

No. 3D14–369.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Oct. 14, 2015.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Keri T. Joseph, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.

Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Brian L. Ellison, Assistant Public Defender, for appellee.

Before WELLS, EMAS and SCALES, JJ.

SCALES, J.

The State of Florida appeals the trial court's order granting the motion of Rafael Yee, defendant below, to suppress all physical evidence discovered by the police officers conducting a warrantless search of the home Yee was renting. In light of the facts specific to this case, we reverse the trial court's suppression order because sufficient exigent circumstances justified the search.

I. Facts

On March 8, 2012, the police received a 7:00 a.m. phone call from a concerned neighbor reporting a "busted open" rear window in a house located in Miami (the "House"). The neighbor, who watched the House while its owners were out of town, informed the responding officer, Carl James, that the window was not broken the night before. Officer James called for a police canine, and a second officer, Stephanie Collazo, arrived on the scene with the requested canine.

At the hearing on Yee's motion to suppress, Officer James testified that nothing about the scene indicated imminent danger or emergency circumstances. He testified that he observed, however, that both the window and the window frame were pulled open and that there was broken glass on the ground on the inside and outside of the window. These observations, Officer James testified, gave him "the impression that someone had burglarized the house and that [the broken window] was the entry into the house."

Officer Collazo made similar observations, noticing a broken window, a pried off or damaged window-frame, and broken glass on the ground. Based on these circumstances, she testified that "[t]here is an assumption that there could possibly be someone inside" the House. Under this assumption, and with the police unable to locate either the owner or the occupant of the House, Officer Collazo and her canine climbed through the broken window, and she immediately announced her presence in the House.¹

Receiving no response, Office Collazo released the police canine, which was trained to detect both human occupants and narcotics. At one point during Officer Collazo's clearing of rooms within the House, the canine sat in front of a closed, unlocked bathroom door, consistent with its training to sit in order to indicate the presence of narcotics. Officer Collazo opened the door to the bathroom and pulled back shower curtains, revealing the presence of cannabis plants. After ensuring no one was present in the House, she exited, and notified the dispatcher that the House was clear of human occupants and was a possible "grow house."

Officer James and several other officers subsequently entered the House. A short while later, a detective arrived and, being informed of a possible "grow house," the detective prepared a search warrant, which was executed and resulted in the recovery of numerous cannabis plants.

During the officers' search of the House, Yee arrived at the scene, as he was renting the House from its owners. After receiving Miranda warnings, Yee indicated that he lived in the House and owned the cannabis plants. Consequently, Yee was arrested.

Yee was charged with one count of possession of cannabis pursuant to section 893.135, Florida Statutes (2014). Prior to trial, Yee's counsel moved to suppress the physical evidence of the cannabis as well as Yee's statements made to the police. Yee argued that the police did not have a sufficient exigency to enter the House without a warrant, and thus, that the initial entry into the House constituted an illegal search.

On February 5, 2014, after conducting an evidentiary hearing on Yee's motion, the trial court granted Yee's motion to suppress.² The State appealed.

II. Standard of Review

In a case involving an order granting a motion to suppress, the standard of review is mixed. While the trial court's factual findings come clothed with a presumption of correctness, we conduct a de novo review of "mixed questions of law and fact that ultimately determine constitutional issues." Riggs v. State, 918 So.2d 274, 278 (Fla.2005) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Brown v. State, 152 So.3d 619, 622 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014).

III. Analysis

Both the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution guarantee the rights of Florida citizens to be secure in their homes against unreasonable searches and seizures. As a general rule, "[a] warrantless search of a home is per se unreasonable and thus unconstitutional." Seibert v. State, 923 So.2d 460, 468 (Fla.2006) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454–55, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) ).

An exception for exigent circumstances exists, where "police may enter a residence without a warrant if an objectively reasonable basis exists for the officer to believe that there is an immediate need for police assistance for the protection of life or substantial property interests." Seibert, 923 So.2d at 468 (citing Rolling v. State, 695 So.2d 278, 293–94 (Fla.1997) ).

Florida's seminal case on the subject of exigent circumstances in the context of a potential burglary is Guin v. City of Riviera Beach, 388 So.2d 604 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). In Guin, a police officer, during a burglary investigation, checked a building with an open wooden latch and a door standing ajar. After calling his supervisor, he entered the building without a warrant, "in the belief that ... [a] burglary had occurred or was taking place...." Id. at 605. After a police inquiry of a neighbor led the officer to the nearby residence of the building's owner, the officer knocked on the door of the residence and received no response. As the officer approached another door, he saw an open window, a pushed-out screen, and a slightly ajar door, leading him to believe a burglary was in progress. The police again entered the premises without a warrant. In both of these instances of warrantless entry, the Fourth District held that "[t]he possibility that the burglary was in progress and the thief within the premises constituted sufficient exigent circumstances to excuse the requirement of a search warrant." Id. at 606.

Subsequent cases with similar factual situations have upheld warrantless police searches. Davis v. State, 834 So.2d 322 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) ; State v. Haines, 543 So.2d 1278 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) ; State v. Mann, 440 So.2d 406 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).

In Davis, a concerned citizen reported to the police that the front door of his neighbor's residence was open and that the neighbor's dog was wandering in the street, indicating a possible burglary. Davis, 834 So.2d at 325. Police officers found signs of forced entry and announced their presence without receiving a response. Suspecting a burglary, the officers entered the home without a warrant.

The court in Davis upheld the police officer's initial entry as a legal search; the court concluding that "the police may enter a home to investigate a suspected burglary" and "the circumstances presented a compelling need for immediate action." Id. at 327–28.

In Haines, a neighbor called the police to investigate a possible burglary because the owner of the residence was out of town, "the front door ... was standing open approximately four to five inches[,][i]t was 8:00 p.m.; and no lights were on inside." Haines, 543 So.2d at 1279. After police officers arrived, they opened the door, announced themselves and, receiving no response, entered the residence.

The court in Haines reversed the trial court's suppression of incriminating evidence in the residence, concluding that the search was legal and that the police conducted the search for a possible burglar, not for contraband. Id.

In Mann, an officer noticed a bent-out window screen during an "undercover surveillance operation" at a resort complex that had experienced recent burglaries. Mann, 440 So.2d at 407. Upon closer inspection, the officer observed that the front door's lock had been tampered with and the door itself was unlocked. Id.

The court in Mann reversed the trial court's determination that there was not probable cause for the police to enter the house, holding that the officer's need to investigate the possible burglary was sufficient and "the officer's immediate entry without a warrant was justified under the exigent circumstances exception...." Id. at 408 (citing United States v. Estese, 479 F.2d 1273 (6th Cir.1973) ).

The facts in the instant case mirror the facts in the cases cited above: in each instance, physical indications of forced entry into a residence led a police officer to a reasonable belief that a burglary either was in progress or had recently occurred.

In the instant case, the neighbor noted that the House's window was not shattered the night before when the neighbor inspected the house. At the scene, the police officers witnessed broken glass on both the inside and outside of the rear window, as well as a damaged window frame. Although Officer James testified at the suppression hearing that the scene did not indicate an emergency situation, he had an impression that there had been a recent burglary. Officer Collazo assumed that there was an ongoing burglary, or one had very recently occurred, and she surmised that someone could be inside the House.³ The police called the owner of the House, received no answer, and were otherwise unable to locate the owner or occupant. The officers' clear intent in entering the House was not to seize contraband, but to investigate a burglary.⁴

We appraise the actions of the police for reasonableness. See Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 398, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006) ("Because the Fourth Amendment's ultimate touchstone is ‘reasonab...