Riley v. Department of Environmental Management, C.A. No. PC 04-0987 (RI 4/27/2005)

• Decision Date: 27 April 2005
• Docket Number: C.A. No. PC 04-0987.
• Parties: STEVEN RILEY v. RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, and FREDERICK J. VINCENT, in his capacity as interim director of the RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

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STEVEN RILEY v. RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, and FREDERICK J. VINCENT, in his capacity as interim director of the RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT

C.A. No. PC 04-0987.

Superior Court of Rhode Island.

Filed: April 27, 2005.

DECISION

INDEGLIA, J.

Before this Court is an appeal from a decision of the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management (D.E.M.), denying Appellant Steven Riley a commercial fishing license with certain finfish and shellfish endorsements. Appellant has also presented a motion for declaratory relief requesting that this Court declare G.L. 1956 § 12-2.1-5(1)(ii) and Rule 7 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Management of Marine Fisheries (Rule 7) unconstitutional, and order that Appellant be given the requested multi-purpose fishing license. Jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15 and G.L. 1956 § 9-30-1.

FACTS AND TRAVEL

Appellant Steven Riley (Riley) sought and was denied a commercial fishing license. Riley applied for a principal effort commercial fishing license with shellfish/quahog and restricted finfish endorsements under G.L. 1956 § 20-2.1-5. The Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management (D.E.M.) denied his request based on the statutory language of § 20-2.1-5 that allowed only those who had such licenses as of December 31, 2002 (the end of the previous year) to obtain the license again, essentially prohibiting any new applicants from receiving said license.¹ Riley was granted a commercial fishing license with lobster, non-quahog shellfish, and non-restricted finfish endorsements. Riley admitted that he had not possessed any commercial fishing licenses since the early 1970s. Additionally, Rule 7 states that there were no new principal effort licenses with quahog or restricted finfish endorsements available in 2003. Riley received the initial denial on February 27, 2003 and on March 9, 2003 timely filed a request for reconsideration with the Commercial Fishing License Review Board.²

On May 21, 2003, Riley timely filed a notice of appeal to the Administration Adjudication Division (A.A.D.) requesting a hearing; however, on or about June 6, 2003, the A.A.D. remanded the matter to the Commercial Fishing License Review Board for a hearing, which took place on July 21, 2003. On August 2, 2003, in a letter which stated that Riley had failed to meet the standard set for the in § 20-2.1-2.1(b), Riley was denied at the Commercial Fishing License Review Board as well. On or about August 20, 2003, the D.E.M. gave its final denial to Riley.

On January 21, 2004, the parties presented oral argument before Chief Hearing Officer Kathleen Lanphear, who granted D.E.M.'s motion for summary judgment on January 26, 2004. Riley then filed the instant appeal in this Court, arguing that he has a fundamental right to choose his occupation and, as such, cannot be denied the commercial fishing license, and that the statute violates equal protection and due process principles. He further argued that the Hearing Officer's decision was arbitrary and capricious and finally that the statute and Rule 7 violates the Sherman Act. The Rhode Island Attorney General's Office informed Riley on March 10, 2004 that it would not intervene unless the Court felt such an intervention to brief constitutional issues would be helpful. However, the Attorney General's Office reserved the right to reconsider and intervene upon appeal.³ A decision is herein rendered.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Declaratory Judgment

The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (Declaratory Act), G.L. 1956 § 9-30-1 et seq., grants the Superior Court "power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not relief is or could be claimed." The Declaratory Act also provides that the Superior Court may grant additional affirmative relief "based on the declaratory judgment `whenever necessary or proper' provided subsequent `supplementary proceedings' are brought pursuant thereto." Capital Properties, Inc. v. State, 749 A.2d 1069, 1080 (R.I. 1999) (citing §§ 9-30-8, 9-30-12; Sousa v. Langlois, 97 R.I. 196, 199, 196 A.2d 838, 841 (1964)). Section 9-30-2 provides in part, that

"any person . . . whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract, or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder."

The purpose of the Declaratory Act is "to facilitate the termination of controversies." Capital Properties, Inc., 749 A.2d at 1080. The decision to issue a declaratory judgment lies within the trial justice's broad discretion. Cruz v. Wausau Ins. Co., 866 A.2d 1237, 1240 (R.I. 2005); Sullivan v. Chafee, 703 A.2d 748, 751 (R.I. 1997) (citing Woonsocket Teachers' Guild Local Union 951 v. Woonsocket Sch. Comm., 694 A.2d 727, 729 (R.I. 1997)). Section 9-30-12 provides that the Declaratory Act should be "liberally construed and administered." See also Taylor v. Marshall, 119 R.I. 171, 180, 376 A.2d 712, 716-17 (1977) (stating existence of alternate methods of relief, including administrative, do not preclude declaratory judgment).

Administrative Appeal

Judicial review of contested agency decisions is governed by G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15(g) which provides:

"The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:

(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;

(4) Affected by other error of law;

(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or

(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion."

The reviewing court is precluded from substituting its judgment for that of the agency regarding witness credibility or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact. Costa v. Registry of Motor Vehicles, 543 A.2d 1307, 1309 (R.I. 1988); Carmody v. Rhode Island Conflict of Interest Comm'n, 509 A.2d 453, 458 (R.I. 1986). This Court's review is limited to determining whether substantial evidence exists to support the agency's decision. Newport Shipyard v. Rhode Island Comm'n for Human Rights, 484 A.2d 893 (R.I. 1984). "Substantial evidence . . . means such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, and means an amount more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance." Caswell v. George Sherman Sand & Gravel Co., Inc., 424 A.2d 646, 647 (R.I. 1981) (citing Apostolou v. Genovesi, 120 R.I. 501, 508, 388 A.2d 821, 824-25 (1978)). This Court will "reverse factual conclusions of administrative agencies only when they are totally devoid of competent evidentiary support in the record." Milardo v. Coastal Resources Management Council, 434 A.2d 266, 272 (R.I. 1981). In deference to the agency, this Court "must uphold the agency's conclusions when they are supported by any legally competent evidence in the record." Rocha v. State Public Utilities Comm'n, 694 A.2d 722, 725 (R.I. 1997) (quoting Rhode Island Public Telecommunications Authority v. Rhode Island Labor Relations Bd., 650 A.2d 479, 485 (R.I. 1994)).

When an agency promulgates regulations pursuant to specific authority granted by the General Assembly, "the regulations are legislative rules that carry the force and effect of law and enjoy a presumption of validity." Parkway Towers Assoc. v. Godfrey, 688 A.2d 1289, 1293 (R.I. 1997); see also Newport Court Club Assocs. v. Town Council of Town of Middletown, 800 A.2d 405, 409 (R.I. 2002) (quoting Rhode Island Depositors Economic Protection Corp. v. Brown, 659 A.2d 95, 100 (R.I. 1995)). "To determine whether a rule is to be classified as legislative or interpretive, one must consider the power assigned to the administrative agency. If a statute expressly delegates power to interpret and define certain legislation to an agency, regulations promulgated pursuant to that power are legislative rules having the force of law." Lerner v. Gill, 463 A.2d 1352, 1358 (R.I. 1983) (citing Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416 (1977)); see also In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 732 A.2d 55, 69 (R.I. 1999). "Legislative rules are valid if they are within the power granted by the General Assembly, are issued pursuant to proper procedure, and are reasonable as a matter of due process." Id. at 1258; see also, Parkway Towers, 688 A.2d at 1293.

If the regulation is challenged on constitutional due process or equal protection grounds and does not infringe upon a fundamental constitutional right or implicates a suspect class, the regulation must be rationally related to furthering a legitimate state interest in order to be upheld. Newport Court Club Assocs., 800 A.2d at 415; Rhode Island Depositors Economic Protection Corp. v. Brown, 659 A.2d 95, 100 (R.I. 1995); In re Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives, 519 A.2d 578, 583 (1987). Only if a regulation is "without any reasonable basis and . . . purely arbitrary" will it be found unconstitutional under this standard. Rhode Island Depositors Econ. Prot. Corp., 659 A.2d at 100.

ANALYSIS

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE STATUTE AND RULE

At the outset, Riley argues that he has a fundamental right to pursue a livelihood, which is protected by his right to life, liberty, and property under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Riley further posits...