Sousa v. Langlois
| Decision Date | 22 January 1964 |
| Docket Number | No. 10393,10393 |
| Citation | 196 A.2d 838,97 R.I. 196 |
| Parties | Jesse SOUSA v. Harold V. LANGLOIS, Warden. Ex. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Jesse Sousa, pro se.
J. Joseph Nugent, Atty. Gen., Corinne P. Grande, Special Counsel, for respondent.
This is, in form, a petition for a declaratory judgment brought pursuant to the provisions of G.L.1956, as amended by chap. 30 of title 9 and praying, in effect, that the petitioner be accorded the benefits of the 'good time' provisions contained in P.L.1960, chap. 112. It was heard by a superior court justice, who denied the petitioner's prayer on the grounds that the declaratory judgment statute is inapplicable to criminal matters, and, if applicable, the petitioner was not entitled to the benefits of chap. 112. It is before us on the petitioner's bill of exceptions, the sole exception being to said decision.
In Newport Amusement Co. v. Maher, 92 R.I. 51, 166 A.2d 216, we pointed out that the proper remedy for appellate review on a petition for a declaratory judgment was by claim of appeal and not by a bill of exceptions. Thereafter, on March 12, 1963, the superior court promulgated rule 98, which provides, inter alia: 'For all procedural purposes, including appellate procedure, the distinction between law and equity in respect of petitions for declaratory judgment is abolished, and procedure including appellate procedure in respect of such petition shall follow the course of equity.'
The instant petition was brought November 20, 1961, some eleven months after our decision in Newport Amusement Co. but approximately one year and a half before the promulgation of rule 98. For the reasons that his petition was brought a substantial period in time prior to the promulgation of rule 98, that petitioner is an inmate of the adult correctional institution where he is serving several concurrent twenty-five year sentences for robbery, that he has brought this petition as a vehicle to test his civil rights, that he has asked this court to consider his petition in substance rather than form, and that he is not presently represented here by counsel, we are disposed in the light of all these circumstances to consider his appeal without regard to the form in which it has been presented.
This is not to say, however, that we will not hereafter insist that the rules of proper pleading and procedure be observed, whether the matter be civil or criminal in nature.
It appears from the record that petitioner was sentenced on October 29, 1947 to serve twenty-five years on each of seven indictments for robbery, the sentences, however, to run concurrently. At the time sentence was imposed, G.L.1938, chap. 55, § 18, governed deductions from prisoners' sentences for good behavior. It provided in pertinent part that where the sentence imposed was for a period in excess of five years, a prisoner could earn a reduction of five days for each month of good behavior.
By the provisions of P.L.1960, chap. 112, sec. 1, 'good time' credits were increased from five to ten days for each month of good behavior where the sentence imposed was in excess of ten years. Section 2 provides: 'This act shall take effect upon its passage and all acts and parts of acts in consistent herewith are hereby repealed.'
The petitioner contends that the language in sec. 2 demonstrates an intention by the legislature to make the amendment applicable to sentences imposed prior to the effective date thereof.
The superior court justice, holding that there is some question as to whether the declaratory judgment statute was applicable for the purpose of declaring rights, status, and other legal relations in criminal matters, and further that petitioner's contention that he was entitled to the benefits of said chap. 112 had been adversely decided by this court in Opinion to the Governor, 91 R.I. 187, 162 A.2d 814, refused to grant the relief for which petitioner prayed.
Whether in a proper case chap. 30 of...
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...to such supplemental relief as may be necessary to effectuate an entered declaratory order. See § 9-30-8; Sousa v. Langlois, 97 R.I. 196, 199, 196 A.2d 838, 840 (1964). Accordingly, because the Bandonis may be entitled to other forms of relief besides monetary damages and because the Legisl......
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