Riley v. Parke, s. 87-SC-63-
| Decision Date | 25 November 1987 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 87-SC-63-,87-SC-120-I,s. 87-SC-63- |
| Citation | 740 S.W.2d 934 |
| Parties | Paul RILEY, Appellant, v. Al PARKE, Warden, Appellee. John WILLS, Appellant, v. Al PARKE, Warden, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
C. McGehee Isaccs, Dept. of Public Advocacy, Frankfort, for appellant riley.
C. McGehee Isaccs, Dept. of Public Advocacy, Frankfort, for appellant Wills.
Linda Cooper, Barbara W. Jones, Corrections Cabinet, Office of Gen. Counsel, Frankfort, for appellee.
On January 16, 1981, Appellant Riley was convicted of first-degree armed robbery in Woodford Circuit Court, and sentenced to serve twenty-five years' imprisonment. On January 16, 1985, Appellant Wills was convicted of receiving stolen property in the Fayette Circuit Court and of being a persistent felony offender in the second degree. He was sentenced to serve ten years in prison. At the times of their convictions, both men were on parole from previous offenses. Both judgments were silent as to whether the former and present prison terms should run consecutively or concurrently. Pursuant to KRS 533.060(2), the Corrections Cabinet set the sentences to run consecutively. The appellants filed habeas corpus actions in Oldham Circuit Court pursuant to KRS 419.020, contending the Corrections Cabinet was improperly calculating their sentences. These were denied by the Oldham Circuit Court, and affirmed by the Kentucky Court of Appeals.
The issue to be decided by this appeal is whether the Corrections Cabinet exceeded its authority in setting the appellants' sentences to run consecutively. We hold that it did not.
Appellants contend that there is a conflict between KRS 532.110(2) and KRS 533.060(2). KRS 532.110(2) provides:
(2) If the court does not specify the manner in which a sentence imposed by it is to run, the sentence shall run concurrently with any other sentences which the defendant must serve.
However, KRS 533.060(2) states:
(2) When a person has been convicted of a felony and is committed to a correctional facility maintained by the corrections cabinet and released on parole or has been released by the court on probation, shock probation, or conditional discharge, and is convicted or enters a plea of guilty to a felony committed while on parole, probation, shock probation, or conditional discharge, such person shall not be eligible for probation, shock probation, or conditional discharge and the period of confinement for that felony shall not run concurrently with any other sentence. (Emphasis added).
Thus, appellants maintain that since their judgments are silent as to whether they should run consecutively or concurrently, the conflict should be resolved to run their sentences concurrently, notwithstanding KRS 533.060(2). Appellants argue that by setting the sentences to run consecutively, the Corrections Cabinet wrongfully thwarted the wishes of the trial court. They claim that the trial courts knew their silence would result in concurrent sentences; thus, changing the order to consecutive sentences invaded the scope of the court's authority.
We disagree. Although there facially appears to be a conflict...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Cardwell v. Com., No. 1997-SC-0258-DG.
...In other words, the statute deprived the trial court of the discretion to run Cardwell's sentences concurrently. See Riley v. Parke, Ky., 740 S.W.2d 934, 935 (1987). In Riley, as in the case at bar, the written judgment was silent as to whether the appellants' sentences were to be run concu......
-
Brewer v. Com., 95-SC-468-DG
...533.040(3) has not been addressed previously, prior cases, such as Devore v. Commonwealth, Ky., 662 S.W.2d 829 (1984), and Riley v. Parke, Ky., 740 S.W.2d 934 (1987), have noted the General Assembly's clear intention in enacting KRS 533.060(2) to provide stiff penalties in the form of conse......
-
Peyton v. Com.
...commits a singular subsequent felony, it becomes unreasonable when dealing with multiple count subsequent felonies. See Riley v. Parke, 740 S.W.2d 934, 935 (Ky.1987) (the Court stated that pursuant to KRS 533.060(2), conviction for a singular subsequent felony offense should be run consecut......
-
Williams v. Com., 90-CA-2736-MR
...KRS 532.110, which allowed some concurrent or consecutive sentences for convictions of multiple offenses. We also note that Riley v. Parke, Ky., 740 S.W.2d 934 (1987), and Devore v. Commonwealth, Ky., 662 S.W.2d 829 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 836, 105 S.Ct. 132, 83 L.Ed.2d 72 (1984), ha......