Riley v. State
Decision Date | 28 May 2004 |
Citation | 892 So.2d 471 |
Parties | Megale Garcia RILEY v. STATE of Alabama. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Susan Graham James, Montgomery, for appellant.
Troy King, atty. gen., and Hense R. Ellis II, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.
Megale Garcia Riley appeals the circuit court's summary denial of his Rule 32, Ala.R.Crim.P., petition for postconviction relief, in which he attacked his January 24, 2001, guilty-plea conviction for assault in the first degree and his resulting sentence, as a habitual offender, of life imprisonment. This Court affirmed Riley's conviction and sentence on direct appeal in an unpublished memorandum issued on February 22, 2002. Riley v. State (No. CR-00-2426), 854 So.2d 1219 (Ala.Crim.App.2002)(table). This Court issued a certificate of judgment on March 12, 2002.
Riley timely filed his Rule 32 petition on February 21, 2003. In his petition, Riley alleged, among other things, that his guilty plea was involuntary. After receiving a response from the State, the circuit court summarily denied Riley's petition in a written order on January 6, 2004.
On appeal, Riley contends that the circuit court erred in denying his Rule 32 petition because, he says, his guilty plea was involuntary. He argues that the trial court misinformed him of the minimum and maximum sentences he could receive — specifically, that the trial court informed him that the Habitual Felony Offender Act ("HFOA") would not apply, but that at the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment as a habitual offender. He maintains that had he known the HFOA would apply and he could be sentenced to life imprisonment, he would not have pleaded guilty.1 The State agrees that Riley's guilty plea was involuntary and that he is entitled to Rule 32 relief.
The record reflects that in August 2000, Riley was indicted for attempted murder. On January 24, 2001, Riley pleaded guilty to the lesser charge of assault in the first degree, as well as to one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, and one count of unlawful possession of marijuana.2 On May 1, 2001, Riley was sentenced for those convictions. For the assault conviction, Riley was sentenced, as a habitual offender with two prior felony convictions, to life imprisonment. For the unlawful-possession-of-a-controlled-substance conviction and the unlawful-possession-of-marijuana conviction, he was sentenced, without application of the HFOA, to five years' imprisonment. The two felony convictions used to enhance Riley's sentence for the assault conviction were April 6, 1999, guilty-plea convictions. The April 6, 1999, convictions were not used to enhance Riley's sentences for the unlawful-possession-of-a-controlled-substance conviction and the unlawful-possession-of-marijuana conviction because those crimes had occurred on January 30, 1999, before Riley had been adjudicated guilty on April 6, 1999. See, e.g., Craig v. State, (Ms. CR-02-0812, March 26, 2004)("prior conviction" for purposes of the Habitual Felony Offender Act, the defendant must have been adjudicated guilty before the present crime was committed). that to constitute a 3 Because the assault occurred on March 28, 2000, the April 6, 1999, convictions were used to enhance Riley's sentence on the assault conviction.
However, the transcript of the guilty-plea colloquy, which is contained in the Rule 32 record, reflects that Riley was improperly told that the HFOA would not apply to the assault conviction and that, therefore, the minimum sentence he could receive with application of the weapons enhancement in § 13A-5-6(a)(5), was 10 years' imprisonment, and the maximum sentence he could receive was 20 years' imprisonment. After the trial court ascertained what the various charges were against Riley, the following occurred:
(C. 103-05.)(Emphasis added.) In addition, the Ireland form,5 also contained in the Rule 32 record, does not indicate the sentencing range for the assault conviction.
In her response to Riley's Rule 32 petition, the assistant district attorney argued that although there was "some confusion" regarding the sentencing range for the assault conviction during the guilty-plea colloquy, there was "ample evidence" that Riley was "well aware" that he had two prior felony convictions and that the sentencing range for the assault conviction under the HFOA was 15 years to life. (C. 65.) In support of this assertion, the assistant district attorney attached to her response (1) a copy of a letter sent to Riley's trial counsel in August 2000, shortly after Riley was indicted, in which the State gave notice of its intent to invoke the HFOA, and (2) an affidavit submitted by Riley's trial counsel in which counsel averred that she had spoken with Riley on numerous occasions before his plea and had made it "very clear" to him that, with his prior convictions, Riley would receive a mandatory life sentence if he were convicted of the attempted-murder charge; that Riley "clearly understood" that the only way to avoid a mandatory life sentence was if the State would reduce the charge to assault; and that "Mr. Riley and his family were clear on the range of punishment that he was facing." (C. 115-16.)
Rule 14.4, Ala.R.Crim.P., provides, in pertinent part:
(Emphasis added.)
Aaron v. State, 673 So.2d 849, 849-50 (Ala.Crim.App.1995). As this Court noted in White v. State, 888 So.2d 1288 (Ala.Crim.App.2004):
888 So.2d at 1290. "This Court has repeatedly held guilty pleas to be involuntary when a defendant was not properly informed...
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