White v. State

• Decision Date: 29 August 2008
• Docket Number: CR-07-0369.
• Citation: 4 So.3d 1208
• Parties: Reginald D'Andre WHITE v. STATE of Alabama.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

4 So.3d 1208

Reginald D'Andre WHITE v. STATE of Alabama.

CR-07-0369.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

August 29, 2008.

James O. Standridge, Tuscaloosa, for appellant.

Troy King, atty. gen., and James B. Prude, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.

SHAW, Judge.

Reginald D'Andre White was indicted in case no. CC-05-1060 for one count of trafficking in cocaine, a violation of § 13A-12-231(2), Ala.Code 1975, and in case no. CC-05-1751 for two counts of unlawful distribution of a controlled substance, violations of § 13A-12-211, Ala.Code 1975, and for three counts of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, violations of § 13A-12-212(a)(1), Ala.Code 1975. On December 7, 2005, pursuant to an "open-ended" plea agreement with the State, White pleaded guilty to the trafficking charge and to the two distribution charges. (R. 13.) In accordance with the plea agreement, White also pledged his assistance and/or testimony in the prosecution of other drug-related cases and promised to avoid incurring any new charges. In exchange, the three possession charges were dismissed and White's sentencing was postponed.

On October 17, 2006, White was arrested and charged with a new unrelated offense. Thereafter, the trial court set White's sentencing hearing on the pending drug charges for September 6, 2007. On September 5, 2007, White filed a motion to withdraw his previous guilty pleas to those offenses,¹ which was denied by the trial court. White was ultimately sentenced, as an habitual offender, to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the trafficking conviction and to life imprisonment for each of the two distribution convictions.² The trial court ordered the sentences for the two distribution convictions to run concurrently with each other, but consecutively to the sentence for the trafficking conviction.

White's sole contention on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his pleas. Specifically, he argues that his guilty pleas were not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently given because, he says, the trial court did not properly advise him of the applicable minimum and maximum sentencing ranges for the charges to which he pleaded guilty. He maintains that "the Ireland form filled out by [White's plea] counsel has an improper range of punishment circled for [the trafficking] charge and no range of punishment circled for the [distribution] charge[s]." (White's brief at p. 9.)

The record reflects that, during the guilty-plea colloquy, the following occurred:

"THE COURT: Sir, you have executed an explanation of rights and a plea of guilty form. And it appears on the back of these forms that that's your signature. Is that your signature (indicating)?

"[White]: Yes, sir.

"THE COURT: On each of the forms (indicating)?

"[White]: Yes, sir.

"THE COURT: Did you read these forms, including all the rights set forth in the forms?

"[White]: Yes, sir.

"THE COURT: Are you capable of reading and understanding the written English language?

"[White]: Yes, sir.

"THE COURT: Did your attorney go over the form with you?

"[White]: Yes, sir.

"THE COURT: Based upon your reading of the rights and his explanation of them, do you think you fully understand all of your rights in the form?

"[White]: Yes, sir.

"THE COURT: Have any questions about them at this time?

"[White]: No, sir."

(R. 4-5; emphasis added). In addition, both White and his appointed counsel participated in the following exchange, which subsequently occurred during the colloquy:

"THE COURT: Do you know what you're charged with in each case, sir?

"[White]: Yes, sir.

"THE COURT: [White's counsel], did you go over the range of punishment with him in each case?

"[White's counsel]: Yes, Your Honor.

"THE COURT: Now, in this one particularly—is that correct, sir—he went over the range of punishment with you?

"[White]: Yes, sir.

"THE COURT: And the enhancement aspect in that you have three prior felonies. And we'll address those in just a moment. But did he go over all that with you, sir?

"[White]: Yes, sir.

"THE COURT: Is that correct, [White's counsel]?

"[White's counsel]: Yes, sir.

"THE COURT: And you understand that this is an open-ended plea in that the Court will transcribe this plea today, it will be kept here confidential, and that there's a certain range that if you fulfill your obligations, it's one thing, if you fail to fulfill your obligations, it's something else. You understand that?

"[White]: Yes, sir."

(R. 8-9.) The trial court then advised White as to the appropriate fines and/or fees applicable to each charge to which White was pleading guilty and also discussed the possibility of reducing the charges against White if he adequately cooperated with law enforcement. The trial court further reminded White that, if he failed to appear at sentencing, it could "sentence [him] to the maximum amount under both cases under each count that [White was] pleading to," which White affirmatively indicated on the record that he understood. (R. 13.) During the discussion of White's prior felonies for sentencing purposes, the trial court again noted that White "said he's already been over the range of punishment." (R. 16.)

The record also contains two standard Ireland forms signed by White, his counsel, and the trial court—one for the trafficking charge and one for the two distribution charges. The standard Ireland form includes preprinted information setting out the basic sentencing ranges for all classes of felonies, as well as the various sentencing ranges for all classes of felonies under the Habitual Felony Offender Act ("the HFOA") based on the number and class of the prior convictions. The Ireland form for the distribution charges in this case properly designated both distribution offenses as Class B felonies, but did not specifically designate (such as with a circle or checkmark) which sentencing range was applicable to the charges. Nonetheless, the preprinted information on the form included the proper sentencing range upon conviction of a Class B felony for a defendant with three or more prior felony convictions—20 years' imprisonment to life imprisonment. The Ireland form for the trafficking conviction properly designated trafficking as a Class A felony, and the sentencing range for a Class A felony with three or more prior convictions, one or more of which was a Class A felony, is listed as mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, and is specifically designated on the form by a circle.

"`The Alabama Supreme Court and this Court "have consistently held that a defendant must be informed of the maximum and minimum possible sentences as an absolute constitutional prerequisite to the acceptance of a guilty plea." Ex parte Rivers, 597 So.2d 1308, 1309 (Ala.1991). It is well settled, moreover, that "if the appellant's sentence could be enhanced under any of the enhancement statutes, the appellant should be informed of the additional sentence he could receive under the applicable enhancement statute." Elrod v. State, 629 So.2d 58, 59 (Ala.Cr.App.1993), citing Rivers. Accord, White v. State, 616 So.2d 399 (Ala.Cr.App.1993); Looney v. State, 563 So.2d 3, 4 (Ala.Cr.App. 1989); Smith v. State, 494 So.2d 182 (Ala.Cr.App.1986).'

"Aaron v. State, 673 So.2d 849, 849-50 (Ala.Crim.App.1995). As this Court noted in White v. State, 888 So.2d 1288 (Ala.Crim.App.2004):

"`The law in Alabama is clear that the trial court's failure to correctly advise a defendant of the minimum and maximum sentences before accepting his guilty plea renders that guilty plea involuntary. In Ex parte Rivers, 597 So.2d 1308 (Ala.1991), as in the present case, the appellant was not advised, before he entered his guilty plea, of the minimum possible sentence. Citing Carter v. State, 291 Ala. 83, 277 So.2d 896 (1973), the Alabama Supreme Court reversed Rivers's conviction.

"`Carter v. State notes that subsequent to the United States Supreme Court case of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), it became established that the defendant must be informed of the maximum and minimum possible sentences as an absolute constitutional prerequisite to the acceptance of a guilty plea. Carter v. State, citing Jones v. State, 48 Ala.App. 32, 261 So.2d 451 (1972); Spidell v. State, 48 Ala.App. 24, 261 So.2d 443 (1972); People v. Ingeneri, 7 Ill.App.3d 809, 288 N.E.2d 550 (1972); People v. Buck, 7 Ill.App.3d 758, 288 N.E.2d 548 (1972); Cooper v. State, 47 Ala.App. 178, 252 So.2d 104 (1971), cert. denied, 287 Ala. 728, 252 So.2d 108 (1971). `Boykin stands for the proposition that a defendant is constitutionally entitled to have information concerning the range of punishment prescribed by the act to which he may be sentenced and the consequences of the conviction at the time he enters his guilty plea.' Coleman v. Alabama, 827 F.2d 1469, 1473 (11th Cir.1987)."

"`Rivers, 597 So.2d at 1309.'

"888 So.2d at 1290. `This Court has repeatedly held guilty pleas to be involuntary when a defendant was not properly informed of the minimum and maximum sentence he could receive.' Schartau v. State, 870 So.2d 770, 772 (Ala.Crim.App.2003). See also Ragland v. State, 883 So.2d 730 (Ala.Crim.App. 2003); Brooks v. State, 854 So.2d 643 (Ala.Crim.App.2003); Handley v. State, 686 So.2d 540 (Ala.Crim.App.1996); Peoples v. State, 651 So.2d 1125 (Ala. Crim.App.1994); Broaden v. State, 645 So.2d 368 (Ala.Crim.App.1994); and Jones v. State, 624 So.2d 676 (Ala.Crim. App.1992)."

Riley v. State, 892 So.2d 471, 474-75 (Ala. Crim.App.2004).

Rule 14.4, Ala.R.Crim.P., provides, in pertinent part:

"(a) Colloquy With Defendant. In all minor misdemeanor cases, the execution of a form similar to Form C-44B will be sufficient and no colloquy shall be required. In all other cases, except where the defendant is a corporation or an association, the court shall not accept a plea of guilty without first addressing the...