Ringo v. Gulf States Utilities Co.

Decision Date18 May 1978
Docket NumberNo. 8115,8115
Citation569 S.W.2d 31
PartiesThomas Lee RINGO, Appellant, v. GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY, Appellee.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Waldman & Smallwood, Beaumont, for appellant.

Larry L. Germer, Beaumont, for appellee.

CLAYTON, Justice.

Plaintiff below, Thomas Lee Ringo, filed this suit against Gulf States Utilities Company, for personal injuries resulting from various acts of negligence.

On January 31, 1975, plaintiff (then sixteen years of age) was working in the course and scope of his employment with Sparks Industrial Service, Inc., at his employer's place of business when he was caused to suffer a severe electrical shock and resulting injuries to his body.

Plaintiff was engaged in cleaning and painting railroad cars for his employer, and, in order to gain access to the inside of the railroad cars, he had to put a ladder into the opening on top of said cars. He lifted an aluminum ladder to fit it into the opening at the top of the car, and the ladder came near or into contact with an uninsulated electrical wire which had been strung by Gulf States across the lot on which plaintiff was working.

Defendant Gulf States filed a general denial and thereafter filed a third party action against plaintiff's employer, Sparks Industrial Service, Inc., and a cross action against plaintiff. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, and from this judgment plaintiff appeals.

By deposition testimony it is shown that upon the premises occupied by plaintiff's employer, Sparks, a line of railroad tracks was extended in the latter part of 1974, and several months later a new line was built parallel to this track. Sparks, the owner, was aware that the extension of the existing line would cause the tracks to go under high voltage electric lines. Because this work was contemplated, Sparks called Gulf States and had them raise the line over the first track that was extended. The line was raised in response to his request. At the time this request was made of Gulf States, Sparks did not know that he was to build the second track, and the second track was never mentioned to Gulf States. The injury to plaintiff occurred while working on the boxcar on this new track.

The question before this court is whether or not the summary judgment proof establishes as a matter of law that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Gibbs v. General Motors Corp., 450 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Tex.1970); Smith v. Ortman-McCain Co., 537 S.W.2d 515, 518 (Tex.Civ.App. Austin 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

Plaintiff contends that a material fact issue is presented as to whether defendant breached a statutory duty by placing its power line below the required height. According to plaintiff's brief, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 1436a, § 1 (Supp.1978) requires the height of the lines, for the voltage involved here, to be twenty-eight feet. This height requirement is not challenged by defendant. In the record is an undated chart entitled "Clearance Check 4-W Primary Service," which lists various heights for the wires crossing over the railroad tracks here involved. This chart shows that at several points over the tracks, the wires were below the twenty-eight feet. However, this chart does not clearly indicate the height of the wires at the point of the accident. Sparks, in his deposition, estimated the height of the wire or line at ten feet above the top of the boxcar, which he said was fifteen feet high. This evidence presents and raises a genuine fact issue as to the height of the electric lines. Defendant practically concedes this point in its brief wherein it is stated, ". . . for purposes of this Motion for Summary Judgment, it may be assumed that fact issues might have existed establishing negligence. This is of no significance since the statute in question and provisions as to responsibility would not come into play unless there were an issue of negligence on the part of the utility company."

The real thrust of defendant's argument as to its defense to plaintiff's cause of action and the proper granting of the summary judgment is that plaintiff is barred from recovery by the provisions of Tex.Rev.Civ.Ann art. 1436c (Supp.1978) (hereinafter referred to as the Act), which provides as follows:

"Sec. 7(b). If a violation of this Act results in physical or electrical contact with any high voltage overhead line, the person, firm, corporation, or association violating the provisions of this Act shall be liable to the owner or operator of such high voltage line for all damage to such facilities and for all liability incurred by such owner or operator as a result of any such contact."

It is defendant's contentions that plaintiff, having caused the ladder with which he was working to come in contact with the high voltage lines, violated Art. 1436c, § 3. Defendant further contends that because of such violation, the plaintiff, under the provisions of Art. 1436c, § 7(b), quoted above, would be liable to defendant for any liability incurred by defendant. Thus, defendant argues, in the event that defendant is found to be negligent and found to be liable to plaintiff, defendant would be entitled by virtue of the statute (Art. 1436c, § 7(b) ) to recover back from plaintiff the amount of its liability. Defendant further argues that, in order to avoid this circuitry of action, plaintiff should as a matter of law be denied recovery from defendant in the first instance.

To determine if plaintiff has violated Art. 1436c, we must look at all of the provisions of the statute. Sec. 3 of Art. 1436c provides:

"Unless danger against contact with high voltage overhead lines has been effectively guarded against pursuant to the provisions of Section 6 of this Act, no person, firm, corporation, or association shall require any employee to perform and no person, firm, corporation, or association shall, individually or through an agent or employee, perform any function or activity upon any land, building, highway, or other premises if at any time during the performance of any function or activity, it is possible that the person performing the function or activity shall move or be placed within six feet of any high voltage overhead line or if it is possible for any part of any tool, equipment, machinery, or material used by such person to be brought within six feet of any high voltage overhead line during the performance of any such function or activity."

Sec. 6 of Art. 1436c provides:

"When any person, firm, or corporation desires to temporarily carry on any function, activity, work, or operation in closer proximity to any high voltage overhead line than permitted by this Act, the person or persons responsible for the work to be done shall promptly notify the operator of the high voltage line. The work shall be performed only after satisfactory mutual arrangements have been negotiated between the owner or the operator of the lines or both and the person or persons responsible for the...

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    • June 28, 1982
    ...with [the utility company] and no authority to bind his employer ... in an agreement to pay the expenses Ringo v. Gulf States Utilities Co., 569 S.W.2d 31, 34 (Tex.Civ.App.1978). for any work to be done in [clearing the We disagree with the court of appeals' holding that reasonable men coul......
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    ...et seq. is to "insure the safety of persons engaged in activities near high voltage lines." Ringo v. Gulf States Util. Co., 569 S.W.2d 31, 35 (Tex.Civ.App.--Beaumont 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The purpose of the indemnification provision, § 752.008, is to place liability for losses resulting......
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