Riojas v. State

• Decision Date: 16 July 1975
• Docket Number: No. 49616,49616
• Citation: 530 S.W.2d 298
• Parties: Pablo RIOJAS, Jr., Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 298

530 S.W.2d 298

Pablo RIOJAS, Jr., Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 49616.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

July 16, 1975.

Dissenting Opinion on Rehearing Dec. 10, 1975.

Gene A. Garcia, Rockport, for appellant.

John H. Flinn, Dist. Atty., Sinton, Jim D. Vollers, State's Atty., and David S. McAngus, Asst. State's Atty., Austin, for the State.

OPINION

ROBERTS, Judge.

This is an appeal from a felony conviction for possession of marihuana. The jury assessed punishment at five years' imprisonment.

On February 6, 1974, James Russell, a Rockport police officer, received information from a confidential informant that the appellant was in possession of marihuana at his residence. The informant told Russell that he had seen Riojas in the house with a sizeable quantity of marihuana.

After receiving this information, Russell began a surveillance of the appellant's house. As a result of the informant's tip and the surveillance, Russell was able to present the following affidavit to the magistrate:

'I James Russell, do solemnly swear that heretofore, on or about the 6 day of February, A.D. 1974, in the City of Rockport Aransas County, Texas, one Paul Riojas, and person or persons whose names iNDentities and descriptions are unknown to affiant did then and there unlawfully possess and does at this time unlawfully possess a narcotic drug and dangerous drug, to-wit: Marijuana in residence, and motor vehicles being described as one story wood framed house, gray with white trim and motor vehicle with 1973 Texas LicIEnce Plates HTS--464 Black over red GTO and a Plymouth Roadrunner, JSK--161 located 1126 Cedar Street Rockport, ArNaSas County Texas in the City of Rockport, Aransas County, Texas, which said residence is possessed, occupied, under the control and charge of Paul Riojas, and person or persons whO names, identities and descriptions are unknown to affiant

'MY BELIEF OF THE AFORESAID STATEMENT IS BASED ON THE FOLLOWING FACTS:

'I haveR been iMFormed of the foregoing setout facts by a person, who I know to be reliable, credible, and trustworthy, who states the following facts: That Paul Riojas has a large quantity of Marijuana concealed in his residence at the above described location. That he (the informAt) had been to Paul Riojas residence within the past 48 hours and has personally seen Riojas with a number of Lids of Marijuana in his possession. That on that occasion Riojas told him (the informAt) that he kept 10 Lids of Marijuana in a cardboard shoe box in his bedroom closet, also he kept in a tin shed behind the residence several more lids of Marijuana.

'On the 6th day of February, 1974, between the hours of 5 and 7:00 P.M. I, an officer with 2 years experience in nORcATics investigation, along with one other experience nORcATic officer, set up a visual surveillance of the residence of Paul Riojas at the location described above and observed several persons known to myself and the other officers as users of nORcATics, enter the residence of Paul Riojas, remain there-in for approximately 5 minutes and then leave the premises.

'I received the information concerning the above described violation of law from the above referred to informant on this the 6th day of February, 1974.

'Wherefore, I ask that a warrant to search for and seize the said narcotic drug and dangerous drug at the above described premises be issued in accordance with the law in such cases provided.

/s/ James Russell'

The affidavit was sworn to before the magistrate, who then issued a warrant authorizing the search of the house and vehicles named in the affidavit. Russell and other officers then went to the house to execute the warrant. They found two marihuana cigarettes in appellant's bedroom, 11.3 grams of marihuana in a drawer in appellant's room, and some marihuana seeds in appellant's car. This marihuana found in the house and car weighed less than four ounces.

However, the officers At the same time searched a locked shed which was located on the premises approximately fifty feet from the house and fifteen feet from appellant's car. There they found 9.4 pounds of marihuana. Appellant's motion to suppress was overruled by the trial court, and all of the marihuana was introduced at the appellant's trial.

Appellant's first two grounds of error challenge the sufficiency of the affidavit and search warrant. In considering these grounds, we must first determine whether they were properly preserved for review.

Appellant's motion to suppress was heard and overruled on February 22, 1974. The case was tried on the merits some ten weeks later, on May second and third. At trial appellant failed to object to the introduction of the marihuana in evidence.

The issue is whether an objection is necessary to preserve error in the admission of evidence where a motion to suppress that evidence has been overruled by the trial court on a day prior to the first day of trial.

We necessarily begin our analysis with Article 40.09, Sec. 6(d)(3), Vernon's Ann.C.C.P., which provides:

'When the court hears objections to offered evidence out of the presence of the jury and rules that such evidence shall be admitted, then in that event such objections shall be deemed to apply to such evidence when it is admitted before the jury without the necessity of such objections being renewed in the presence of the jury.'

In Graves v. State, 513 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), this Court unanimously held this section to apply to pre-trial motions to suppress heard on the day of trial. Cf. Powers v. State, 456 S.W.2d 97 (Tex.Cr.App.1970). It is now contended that since the motion to suppress took place ten weeks before the appellant's trial, a different rule should apply.

Our holdings in Brazzell v. State, 481 S.W.2d 130 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), and Simpson v. State, 507 S.W.2d 530 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), are not in point. Those cases held only that motions In limine are not ordinarily sufficient to preserve error absent an objection at trial.

But motions to suppress--unlike motions In limine--are specifically authorized by statute: Article 28.01 of our Code of Criminal Procedure allows the trial court to set pre-trial hearings, at which time motions to suppress are to be determined. The holdings in Brazzell and Simpson are thus inapplicable to motions to suppress.

In Smith v. State, 468 S.W.2d 828, 830 (Tex.Cr.App.1971), this Court unanimously held that the timing of a pre-trial hearing rested within the sound discretion of the trial judge. A failure to apply our holding in Graves to the instant case would be to hold that a defendant should be penalized simply by the exercise of that discretion. We cannot agree that such a result is called for in light of the clear language of Article 28.01 and of Article 40.09, Sec. 6(d)(3). If a motion to suppress is not sufficient to preserve error, then what purpose can it possibly serve--unless we assume that trial judges never err? It would be just as logical to argue that a defendant must make oral as well as written objections to preserve error in the court's charge, despite the specific provision of Article 36.14, V.A.C.C.P., to the contrary.

In their published commentaries to Article 28.01 of our 1965 Code of Criminal Procedure, my brothers Morrison and Onion both noted that, for the first time, Texas procedure allowed the trial court to determine motions to suppress prior to trial. Judge Onion also observed that the most obvious asset of the new statute was its great potential for saving many previously-wasted hours during and immediately prior to trial. Clearly, this expeditiousness was also part of the Legislature's intent in enacting Article 28.01. To hold that error was not preserved by the motion in the instant cause would be to lose this time-saving feature of Article 28.01, since such motions would no longer be sufficient to preserve error.

We therefore hold that the overruling of Any pre-trial motion to suppress is sufficient to preserve error in the admission of the evidence made the basis of the motion to suppress. To do otherwise would violate the clear intent of our Legislature.

We turn to appellant's first ground of error which alleges that the search warrant was issued without probable cause. Appellant argues that the requirements of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), were not met in that the affiant lied to the magistrate and the magistrate failed to conduct an independent investigation of the affiant. We have often held that in determining the sufficiency of an affidavit we are limited to the four corners of the document itself. E.g., Collins v. State, 502 S.W.2d 743 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). The affidavit is substantially like the affidavit approved by this Court in Polanco v. State, 475 S.W.2d 763 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). We therefore hold that the marihuana taken from appellant's house and car was properly admitted into evidence. Cf. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969); see also Gonzales v. Beto, 425 F.2d 963 (5th Cir.), cert. den. 400 U.S. 928, 91 S.Ct. 194, 27 L.Ed.2d 189 (1970), and Polanco v. Estelle, 507 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied --- U.S. ---, 96 S.Ct. 101, 46 L.Ed.2d 78 (1975). Also, appellant admitted possession of the marihuana found in his bedroom. See Jaramillo v. State, 504 S.W.2d 853, 855 (Tex.Cr.App.1974).

Appellant's second ground presents the more difficult question, namely, were the officers legally justified in searching the shed? However, the threshold issue is whether the appellant had standing to object to the admission of the marihuana found in the shed.

At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the appellant's father testified that he had rented the shed along with the house in which he lived with his son, the appellant.

The appellant also testified at the hearing. He stated that he had rented the shed some two months before his arrest to a man whose name he remembered only as 'La Mano...