Rios-Jimenez v. Principi

Decision Date12 March 2008
Docket NumberNo. 06-2582.,06-2582.
Citation520 F.3d 31
PartiesMaribel RÍOS-JIMÉNEZ, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Anthony J. PRINCIPI, et al., Defendant, Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Glenn Carl James, with whom James Law Offices was on brief, for appellant.

Mariana E. Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States Attorney, and Nelson Pérez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief Appellate Division, were on brief, for appellees.

Before TORRUELLA, BALDOCK,* Circuit Judges, and SMITH,** District Judge.

SMITH, District Judge.

In this case, plaintiff-appellant Maribel Ríos-Jiménez ("Ríos-Jiménez") appeals the award of summary judgment to her former employer, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Anthony J. Principi, in his official capacity, on her claims for disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, and hostile work environment, pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. We conclude that summary judgment was properly granted as to each of Ríos-Jiménez's claims and affirm the decision of the district court.

I. BACKGROUND

We first sketch with some necessary detail the undisputed facts, as outlined by the district court. Ríos-Jiménez was employed at the San Juan Veterans Administration ("VA") Medical Center as a Medical Technician in the VA Nursing Service. In 2000, she applied for and received a temporary promotion to Health Technician with the VA Research and Development Service ("R & D Service"). In her new position, Ríos-Jiménez was assigned as Study Coordinator for a VA-funded diabetes study. Her duties and responsibilities included screening potential patients for eligibility, developing the initial database of patient information, conducting followup visits with patients according to a scheduling protocol, collecting data and completing study forms, recording and reporting adverse patient experiences, and performing other related duties as required by the needs of the study. Ríos-Jiménez was directly supervised by Dr. Julio Benabé, the Associate Chief of Staff for Research and Development and the study's principal investigator, and was required to work in cooperation with a study monitor and additional staff within the VA's Cooperative Studies Program Coordinating Center ("CSPCC").

By May 2001, Ríos-Jiménez had accumulated several absences for which she had not requested sick leave or compensatory time.1 Blanca Lebrón, the Administrative Officer for the R & D Service, questioned Ríos-Jiménez about her failure to comply with attendance and timekeeping requirements, and requested that Ríos-Jiménez submit an ex post accounting of her absences. Ríos-Jiménez submitted two forms. The first detailed the times, dates, and justifications for 51 hours of absence; the second accounted for 108 hours of absence without explanation of dates, times, or justifications. Both forms were signed by Dr. Benabé, who was Ríos-Jiménez's supervisor at the time. Although Dr. Benabé approved both forms, Lebrón did not accept Ríos-Jiménez's accounting for the 108 hours because it failed to provide details regarding the dates, times, and justifications for the absences. After being credited all her properly documented time, Ríos-Jiménez was left with 35 hours of unexplained absence.

Subsequently, two other employees in the study group complained that they had encountered difficulties in reaching Ríos-Jiménez. Dr. Madeline McCarren, the CSPCC's Biostatistician, complained that Ríos-Jiménez was not responsive to telephone calls, emails, or faxes, that she exhibited poor attendance on required conference calls, that she continued to make repetitive errors, and that the CSPCC staff was burdened with additional work as a result. Dr. Benabé also received an email from Dr. Carlos Abraira, Co-chairman of the diabetes study, in which Dr. Abraira described his recurring inability to contact Ríos-Jiménez and the issue of missing or incorrect data stemming from Ríos-Jiménez's failure to competently perform her duties. Based on these complaints, as well as Ríos-Jiménez's failure to comply with timekeeping requirements, Lebrón contacted the human resources department to inquire about terminating Ríos-Jiménez's temporary promotion. On September 18, 2001, Lebrón, Dr. Benabé and Dr. Edwin Mejías2 met with Ríos-Jiménez. At the meeting, Ríos-Jiménez produced two medical certificates documenting her treatment that month for anxiety, depression, and related disorders. She also produced a note from her psychiatrist stating that she was unable to work due to an emotional condition. As a result of this meeting, Lebrón informed the human resources department that it was not the right time to issue a termination letter to Ríos-Jiménez.

About a week after this meeting, Ríos-Jiménez submitted another medical certificate stating that she could continue to work provided that she was allowed a part-time schedule. Although she did begin to work part-time, her attendance continued to be erratic. Lebrón began to perform some of Ríos-Jiménez's duties, and discovered that she had a substantial amount of unfinished work stretching back over several months.3 Consequently, on October 17, 2001, Dr. Benabé asked Dr. Mejías to terminate Ríos-Jiménez's temporary promotion. That same day, Dr. Mejías sent a memorandum to Helen Nunci, the Human Resources Manager, requesting that Ríos-Jiménez's temporary promotion be terminated. Two days later, a second meeting between Ríos-Jiménez, Lebrón, Dr. Benabé, and Dr. Mejías was held in which Dr. Benabé informed Ríos-Jiménez of the decision to transfer her back to the Nursing Service.

On November 5, Ríos-Jiménez was inadvertently issued a proposed termination letter. The letter was rescinded on November 8 and replaced with a memorandum that informed Ríos-Jiménez that her temporary promotion had been terminated and that she would be returned to her former position. On November 16, the human resources department sent Ríos-Jiménez a memorandum explaining that a temporarily promoted employee could be returned to his or her former position at any time and that the employee has no right to appeal such a decision. Also on that day, Ríos-Jiménez was informed that the termination of her temporary promotion had been pushed back until November 30, and that she was expected to report to the Nursing Service effective December 3, 2001.

On November 6, 2001, the day after Ríos-Jiménez was given the proposed termination letter (but before it was rescinded), she sent a letter to Dr. Mejías in which she requested that she be "accommodated in a reasonable manner within [her] position given the circumstances of [her] emotional state." She did not attach any medical documentation to her request or specify what she believed to be a reasonable accommodation. On November 29, Ríos-Jiménez wrote to the human resources department, complaining that she had been subjected to disability discrimination. On December 4, in response to Ríos-Jiménez's complaint, Lebrón wrote to Ms. Nunci, the Human Resources Manager, to make the following points: (1) that she believed Ríos-Jiménez was not disabled; (2) that she repeatedly had to ask Ríos-Jiménez to comply with timekeeping requirements; (3) that she never threatened Ríos-Jiménez and specifically told her that any communications regarding termination of her temporary position would be made by the human resources department; (4) that she told Ríos-Jiménez that she had undertaken some of Ríos-Jiménez's duties in an attempt to keep the diabetes study on track; and (5) that she informed Dr. Benabé she would cease performing Ríos-Jiménez's duties if Ríos-Jiménez was kept on the project, since Ríos-Jiménez claimed to not need Lebrón's assistance and was unable to work with or communicate with Lebrón.

On January 4, 2002, Ms. Nunci notified Ríos-Jiménez that her request for an accommodation did not meet the criteria for a reasonable accommodation because it was based only on her assertion that she suffered from an unspecified emotional condition. Ríos-Jiménez then submitted a second request for an accommodation, this time accompanied by a medical certificate from a psychiatrist recommending that her work schedule be changed to a morning schedule for at least three to six months. That same day, Ms. Nunci informed Ríos-Jiménez that the information provided by her psychiatrist did not meet the criteria for reasonable accommodation. Ríos-Jiménez was subsequently returned to her former position and lower pay grade in the Nursing Service. To challenge the revocation of her temporary promotion, Ríos-Jiménez filed this action. The defendants moved for summary judgment on all of Ríos-Jiménez's claims, and the district court granted the motions across the board. Ríos-Jiménez now appeals.

The district court also dismissed Ríos-Jiménez's claims against co-defendants Blanca Lebrón and Dr. Julio Benabé, both of whom she had sued in their individual capacity, as well as her claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., the latter on the ground that the ADA does not provide for suits against the federal government. See Castro Ortiz v. Fajardo, 133 F.Supp.2d 143, 150-51 (D.P.R.2001); see also Feliciano-Hill v. Principi, 439 F.3d 18, 22 n. 1 (1st Cir.2006). Since Ríos-Jiménez has chosen not to contest these portions of the district court's decision, we need not address them.

II. DISCUSSION
A. The Summary Judgment Record on Review

As always, we review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, Cabán Hernández v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.2007), and construe the record in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Calvi v. Knox County, 470 F.3d 422, 426 (1st Cir.2006).

At the threshold, we must deal with a procedural decision of some import rendered by the district court. In deciding the appellee's motion to...

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