Colon v. Mills, Civil No. 06-1461 (RLA).
Citation | 646 F.Supp.2d 224 |
Decision Date | 25 August 2009 |
Docket Number | Civil No. 06-1461 (RLA). |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Parties | Ruth Rivera COLON, Plaintiff, v. Karen G. MILLS, Administrator, U.S. Small Business Administration,<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL> Defendant. |
Daliah Lugo-Auffant, Esq., Perez Vargas & Lugo Auffant, San Juan, PR, Damaris Quiñones-Vargas, Esq., Cabo Rojo, PR, for Plaintiff/Petitioner.
A.U.S.A. Ginette L. Milanes, U.S. Attorneys Office, Torre Chardón, San Juan, PR, for Defendant/Respondent.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendant has moved the Court to enter summary judgment in these proceedings and to dismiss plaintiff's complaint. The Court having reviewed the arguments presented by the parties as well as the evidence submitted in support thereof hereby rules as follows.
Plaintiff filed the instant complaint alleging sex discrimination, retaliation and retaliatory harassment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) et seq. In essence, plaintiff claims that her two-day suspension and eventual termination from employment were due to gender (female) discrimination and retaliation. Additionally she alleges that she was subjected to retaliatory harassment.
Rule 56(c) Fed. R. Civ. P., which sets forth the standard for ruling on summary judgment motions, in pertinent part provides that they shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Sands v. Ridefilm Corp., 212 F.3d 657, 660-61 (1st Cir.2000); Barreto-Rivera v. Medina-Vargas, 168 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir.1999). The party seeking summary judgment must first demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact in the record. DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 306 (1st Cir.1997). A genuine issue exists if there is sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual disputes to require a trial. Morris v. Gov't Dev. Bank of Puerto Rico, 27 F.3d 746, 748 (1st Cir.1994); LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 841 (1st Cir.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1018, 114 S.Ct. 1398, 128 L.Ed.2d 72 (1994). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of a lawsuit under the governing law. Morrissey v. Boston Five Cents Sav. Bank, 54 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir.1995).
"In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view `the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.'" Poulis-Minott v. Smith, 388 F.3d 354, 361 (1st Cir.2004) (citing Barbour v. Dynamics Research Corp., 63 F.3d 32, 36 (1st Cir.1995)). Caban Hernandez v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.2007) (internal citation omitted italics in original).
Credibility issues fall outside the scope of summary judgment. "`Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.'" Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). See also, Dominguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 432 (1st Cir.2000) (); Simas v. First Citizens' Fed. Credit Union, 170 F.3d 37, 49 (1st Cir.1999) (); Perez-Trujillo v. Volvo Car Corp., 137 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir.1998) ( ); Molina Quintero v. Caribe G.E. Power Breakers, Inc., 234 F.Supp.2d 108, 113 (D.P.R.2002). Cruz-Baez v. Negron-Irizarry, 360 F.Supp.2d 326, 332 (D.P.R.2005) (internal citations, brackets and quotation marks omitted).
In cases where the non-movant party bears the ultimate burden of proof, he must present definite and competent evidence to rebut a motion for summary judgment, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 256-257, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 94 (1st Cir. 2001); Grant's Dairy v. Comm'r of Maine Dep't of Agric., 232 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 2000), and cannot rely upon "conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation". Lopez-Carrasquillo v. Rubianes, 230 F.3d 409, 412 (1st Cir.2000); Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir.1994); Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990).
Any testimony used in support of discriminatory motive in a motion for summary judgment setting must be admissible in evidence, i.e., based on personal knowledge and otherwise not contravening evidentiary principles. Rule 56(e) specifically mandates that affidavits submitted in conjunction with the summary judgment mechanism must "be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." Hoffman v. Applicators Sales and Serv., Inc., 439 F.3d 9, 16 (1st Cir. 2006); Nieves-Luciano v. Hernandez-Torres, 397 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2005); Carmona v. Toledo, 215 F.3d 124, 131 (1st Cir.2000). See also, Quinones v. Houser Buick, 436 F.3d 284, 290 (1st Cir.2006) ( ). Additionally, the document "must concern facts as opposed to conclusions, assumptions, or surmise", Perez v. Volvo Car Corp., 247 F.3d 303, 316 (1st Cir.2001), not conclusory allegations Lopez-Carrasquillo v. Rubianes, 230 F.3d at 414.
Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir.2000) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
"A court is not obliged to accept as true or to deem as a disputed material fact each and every unsupported, subjective, conclusory, or imaginative statement made to the Court by a party." Garcia v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 535 F.3d 23, 31 n. 5 (1st Cir.2008) (internal citation, brackets and quotation marks omitted).
The Court finds the following material facts uncontested for purposes of this Order.
Plaintiff was a career employee with the Small Business Administration's ("SBA") Disaster Program in Puerto Rico since 1989.
At all times relevant to her complaint, plaintiff was a Grade 13 supervisor for SBA's Puerto Rico District Office ("PRDO").
In or about November 2002, plaintiff, along with ANA M. DEL TORO and JOSE A. IBERN, two other supervisors at PRDO, submitted an informal complaint to the Agency's Ad hoc Committee on Sexual Harassment for Investigation. The complaint accused senior management at PRDO of favoring a female employee with employment benefits not provided to other employees. Complainants requested that their identity remain anonymous.
On December 17, 2002, plaintiff and the two other complainants were informed that the Ad hoc Committee had investigated their complaint and had determined that there was no basis for their claims.
On February 20, 2003, the PRDO held a training session on the Agency's Telecommuting Program. EFRAIN PARDO, PRDO Deputy District Director, and IVAN IRIZARRY, PRDO District Director, were present during the training.
On March 4, 2003, GERMAN HERNANDEZ, PRDO Agency Attorney Advisor, sent a memo to PARDO expressing his concern regarding derogatory comments concerning the Telecommuting Program he had overheard plaintiff making to other employees.
On March 11, 2003, IRIZARRY was forwarded the minutes from the Local Partnership Council February 28, 2003 meeting, wherein the Union representatives present thereat pointed to employee complaints about plaintiff's continued comments to them that their positions would be eliminated or contracted out if they participated in the Telecommuting Program. The Union indicated that the employees felt threatened and anxious due to the aforementioned comments made by a supervisor. It requested that plaintiff be instructed to cease and desist from this practice and for management to take action on the matter.
On March 25, 2003, PARDO issued plaintiff a letter proposing a two-day suspension for unprofessional conduct regarding her behavior during the telecommuting training session.
On April 3, 2003, plaintiff submitted her written response to the proposed suspension.
On April 24, 2003, IRIZARRY issued a decision letter sustaining the charge of unprofessional conduct against plaintiff. The letter explained that the suspension would...
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