Rios v. Industrial Commission
| Decision Date | 26 October 1978 |
| Docket Number | O-M,CA-IC,No. 1,1 |
| Citation | 586 P.2d 219,120 Ariz. 374 |
| Parties | Domingo RIOS, Deceased, Herlinda Suniga (Rios), alleged widow, Domingo Suniga (Rios) and Diane Suniga (Rios), minors, Individually and by their guardian ad litem, Herlinda Suniga (Rios), Petitioners, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Arizona, Respondent, Strip-atic, Respondent Employer, State Compensation Fund, Respondent Carrier. 1853. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
Friedman & Foster, P. C. by Stephen C. Newmark, Steven M. Friedman, Phoenix, for petitioners.
John H. Budd, Jr., Chief Counsel, The Industrial Commission of Arizona, Phoenix, for respondent.
Robert K. Park, Chief Counsel, State Compensation Fund by Courtney L. Varner, Phoenix, for respondents employer and carrier.
The main issue raised by this special action is whether the Industrial Commission has jurisdiction to determine the dependency of a minor applicant claiming death benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act when that determination would necessarily require resolution of a paternity question. We hold that the Commission does have such jurisdiction and set aside the award.
The essential facts are that Domingo Rios died on July 9, 1975, as the result of injuries received in an industrial accident which occurred on July 2, 1975. At the time of his death, the deceased was living with and supporting the petitioners, who were totally dependent on him. The petitioners filed a widow and dependents' claim for death benefits, pursuant to A.R.S. § 23-1046 although the alleged widow admitted on the form that she was never "formally married" to decedent. On September 9, 1976, the claim was denied by the respondent carrier's Notice of Claim Status. A timely request for hearing was filed by the petitioners. A pretrial conference was held on January 31, 1977. The results of this conference are set forth in the hearing officer's letter to counsel dated February 3, 1977, stating, in part, that the claims were timely filed and "no jurisdictional issue will be involved," that no evidence of either a ceremonial or common law type marriage on behalf of petitioner Herlinda Suniga (Rios) would be presented, and that "(t)he only actual evidence which will be submitted at time of formal hearing will concern the dependency status, parentage, etc., of the two minor children applicants herein." The April 21st formal hearing was held on the basis of these agreements.
The hearing officer's award of June 16, 1977, found that Herlinda Suniga (Rios) was not a widow or surviving spouse of the deceased within the meaning of A.R.S. § 23-1064(A) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, and therefore not entitled to benefits. He further found that the minor Domingo Suniga (Rios) "was not fathered by the deceased, but by another man in the State of Texas" and, hence, not the "child" or stepchild of the deceased. The hearing officer refused to make a finding concerning the paternity of Diane Suniga (Rios), and concluded that "the Industrial Commission does not have jurisdiction to determine the paternity of the applicant herein, Diane Suniga (Rios)." The award as to Diane was left open pending the filing of an independent action in the superior court to establish her paternity under A.R.S. § 12-841, et seq. The hearing officer relied on the express language of A.R.S. § 12-841 to find exclusive jurisdiction to determine paternity in the superior court. This section reads:
The superior court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in proceedings to establish maternity or paternity. All such proceedings shall be civil actions.
In this special action, petitioners question the hearing officer's refusal to determine Diane Suniga's (Rios) entitlement. They point out that if the hearing officer is correct and exclusive original jurisdiction to determine maternity and paternity is in the superior court, then the hearing officer acted without jurisdiction when he determined the "maternity" of Herlinda Suniga (Rios) and the "paternity" of minor Domingo Suniga (Rios). This argument points out the dilemma that the hearing officer found himself in.
Turning to the law, it is well settled that the exclusive jurisdiction to determine all issues of law and fact relating to a claimant's entitlement to compensation benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act is vested in the Industrial Commission. S. H. Kress & Co. v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 66 Ariz. 67, 69, 182 P.2d 931, 933 (1947); Industrial Commission v. Superior Court, 5 Ariz.App. 100, 104, 423 P.2d 375, 379 (1967); Sandoval v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power District, 117 Ariz. 209, 213, 571 P.2d 706, 710 (App.1977). See Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Western Casualty & Surety Co., 111 Ariz. 259, 262-3, 527 P.2d 1091, 1094-5 (1974). See also 2 A Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law § 65.10 (1976). This exclusive jurisdiction is based on Article 18, Section 8 of the Arizona Constitution, 1 A.R.S., while pursuant to statute, the Commission is charged with the "adjudication of claims for compensation arising out of the provisions of this chapter (Chapter 6 of Title 23, 8 A.R.S.)." A.R.S. § 23-921.
The burden of establishing the jurisdictional facts giving the Commission exclusive jurisdiction is on the employee or his dependents. McCormick v. Industrial Commission, 96 Ariz. 88, 392 P.2d 299 (1964); Swatzell v. Industrial Commission, 78 Ariz. 149, 277 P.2d 244 (1954). These jurisdictional facts are primarily set out in A.R.S. § 23-1021 and § 23-1061(A). A.R.S. § 23-1021 reads:
A. Every employee coming within the provisions of this chapter who is injured, and the dependents of every such employee who is killed by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, wherever the injury occurred, unless the injury was purposely self-inflicted, shall be entitled to receive and shall be paid such compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury or death, such medical, nurse and hospital services and medicines, and such amount of funeral expenses in event of death, as are provided by this chapter.
B. Every employee covered by insurance in the state compensation fund who is injured by accident arising out of and in the course of employment, and the dependents of every such employee who is killed, provided the injury was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid such compensation from the state compensation fund for loss sustained on account of the injury, shall receive such medical, nurse and hospital services and medicines, and such amount of funeral expenses in event of death, as provided in this chapter.
A.R.S. § 23-1061(A) reads:
A. Notwithstanding the provisions of § 23-908, no application for compensation shall be valid or claim thereunder enforceable unless notice of an accident resulting in an injury shall be given by the employee, or if resulting in death by the parties entitled to compensation, or someone on their behalf, to the commission in writing within one year after the injury occurred or the right thereto accrued. The commission upon receiving the notice shall give notice to the employer of the injury.
When these jurisdictional facts are established, the Commission, through its hearing officer, is charged with the adjudication of claims for compensation. A.R.S. § 23-921, Supra. In the instant case, where the carrier has denied the claims and a hearing is requested this process requires a formal hearing and an adjudication by the hearing officer of the deceased workman's "dependents," as defined by A.R.S. § 23-1046 (death benefits) and A.R.S. § 23-1064 (presumption of dependency). See El Dorado Insurance Co. v. Industrial Commission, 25 Ariz.App. 617, 620, 545 P.2d 465, 468 (1976).
The issue, then, is simply stated: Does A.R.S. § 12-841, Supra, as the carrier claims, preclude the Commission from determining the dependency status of Diane Suniga (Rios) where that would necessarily require a determination of paternity? We think not.
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