Rios v. Symington
| Decision Date | 30 June 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. CV-92-0129-SA,CV-92-0129-SA |
| Citation | 833 P.2d 20,172 Ariz. 3 |
| Parties | Senator Peter RIOS, in his individual capacity and as President, Arizona State Senate, Petitioner, v. Governor J. Fife SYMINGTON, III, Real Party in Interest, and Tony West, Treasurer of the State of Arizona; Arizona Department of Economic Security; Arizona Department of Health Services; Arizona Department of Building and Fire Safety; Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System; Arizona Department of Insurance; Arizona Department of State Parks; Arizona Department of Corrections; Arizona Department of Public Safety; Arizona Department of Revenue; Arizona Department of Liquor Licenses; Arizona Department of Racing; Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency; Arizona Department of Emergency and Military Affairs; Lavere O. Connolly, as Treasurer of Apache County; Marsha Bonham, as Treasurer of Cochise County; Connie Fry, as Treasurer of Coconino County; Priscilla M.L. Knuckey, as Treasurer of Gila County; Nellie Plasencio, as Treasurer of Graham County; Jackie D. Quinn, as Treasurer of Greenlee County; Gearan Harris, as Treasurer of La Paz County; Glenn Stapley, as Treasurer of Maricopa County; Dora Goodmiller, as Treasurer of Mohave County; J.R. Despain, as Treasurer of Navajo County; James Lee Kirk, as Treasurer of Pima County; Jim L. Turnbull, as Treasurer of Pinal County; Acencion "Chon" Canchola, as Treasurer of Santa Cruz County; Richard Jacobs, as Treasurer of Yavapai County; Teresa Poland, as Treasurer of Yuma County; Respondents. |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
On March 17, 1992, Governor Fife Symington convened the seventh special session of the Fortieth Legislature of the State of Arizona to consider "[t]he adjustments necessary to produce a balanced state budget for fiscal year 1991-1992" and "[t]o make appropriations and necessary statutory changes to address the overcrowding situation in the state's prison system." In response to the Governor's call, the Legislature enacted House Bills 2001 and 2002. House Bill 2001 is primarily a "fund transfer" bill that directs the transfer of various sums of money from special funds to the state's general fund. It also directs the transfer of county-held Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization (RICO) forfeiture monies to the RICO account of the Department of Public Safety, and adjusts the "in lieu" tax for the state compensation fund. House Bill 2002 amends the general appropriations bill for fiscal year 1991-1992, in part creating new appropriations and in part directing various increases and decreases in previous appropriations.
On March 28, 1992, Governor Symington signed both bills into law. In doing so, however, the Governor exercised his line item veto power under article 5, § 7 of the Arizona Constitution to disapprove selected provisions of each bill. As required by the Constitution, Governor Symington transmitted a message to the Legislature containing the reasons for his line item vetoes. At the same time and in the same message, Governor Symington instructed various state agencies to revert specified sums of money to the general fund for the purpose of bringing the total budget in line with the Governor's projected revenues.
Under article 5, § 7 of the Arizona Constitution, the Legislature may override the Governor's veto by a two-thirds vote of each House. No override vote was taken. Instead, the President of the Arizona Senate, Senator Peter Rios, filed this special action directly in this court seeking a judicial declaration that the Governor's vetoes and reversion orders are invalid.
This court has original jurisdiction over the issuance of extraordinary writs 1 against state officers. Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 5(1); see also Arizona Corp. Comm'n v. Superior Court, 107 Ariz. 24, 25, 480 P.2d 988, 989 (1971). Although the Legislature's usual remedy when confronted with a Governor's veto would be to attempt an override, we conclude that, in this instance, it is not the Legislature's exclusive remedy. In limited circumstances, a judicial proceeding by way of special action may be appropriate to test the constitutionality of executive conduct. Because this case involves a dispute at the highest levels of state government, the issues are substantial and present matters of first impression in this state, and a prompt determination is required, we accepted jurisdiction following oral argument. 2
While we accepted jurisdiction to provide future guidance to the Executive and the Legislature, we caution that we did not do so lightly. We agree with the words of the Florida Supreme Court speaking in a similar case:
[I]t would be a serious mistake to interpret our acceptance of jurisdiction in this cause as a general willingness to thrust the Court into the political arena and referee on a biennial [in Arizona, annual] basis the assertions of the power of the executive and legislative branches in the appropriations act.... [F]uture attempts to invoke this Court's jurisdiction on similar grounds will be viewed with great circumspection.
The foundation of our state government, like that of the federal government, is laid on the simple yet elegant premise that power shall be distributed between three coordinate branches of government. Article 3 of the Arizona Constitution sets forth this distribution of power:
The powers of the government of the State of Arizona shall be divided into three separate departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and, except as provided in this Constitution, such departments shall be separate and distinct, and no one of such departments shall exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the others.
Alexander Hamilton's observation in The Federalist No. 78 is equally applicable to Arizona: the Legislature commands the power of the purse. With regard to that power, the language of our Constitution is plain. The lawmaking power vests solely in the Legislature, see Ariz. Const. art. 4, Pt. 1, § 1, and ordinarily public funds may be expended only by legislative authority. See Ariz. Const. art. 4, Pt. 2, § 20 (appropriations bills); Ariz. Const. art. 9, § 5 (); see also LeFebvre v. Callaghan, 33 Ariz. 197, 204, 263 P. 589, 591 (1928) (). The Legislature, in the exercise of its lawmaking power, establishes state policies and priorities and, through the appropriation power, gives those policies and priorities effect.
Although the power of appropriation is vested in the Legislature, our Constitution does not deny the Executive participation in the appropriation process. Article 5, section 7 grants to the Governor a special veto power over items of appropriation: "If any bill presented to the Governor contains several items of appropriations of money, he may object to one or more of such items, while approving other portions of the bill." The purpose of the line item veto, as it relates to the general appropriations bill, is to prevent "pork barreling" by the Legislature. See Fairfield v. Foster, 25 Ariz. 146, 152-53, 214 P. 319, 322 (1923) (). The framers of the Constitution thus established an additional executive check on the appropriation process, allowing the Executive to "line out" items of appropriation to which he or she objects. This veto power in turn is tempered by the Legislature's ability to override such vetoes by a two-thirds vote. See Ariz. Const. art. 5, § 7.
House Bill 2001 directs the transfer of funds from 61 different special funds to the general fund and also directs the transfer of county-held RICO forfeiture monies to the RICO account of the Department of Public Safety. The Governor vetoed 5 of the special fund transfers and the RICO transfer. We hold that the Governor's veto of the special fund transfers is valid but that his veto of the RICO transfer is invalid. We discuss the special fund transfers separately from the RICO fund transfer.
The five vetoed transfers are:
(1) Section 3, number 8: $70,000 from the department of mental retardation capital investment fund established by A.R.S. § 4-116.
(2) Section 3, number 13: $392,300 from the mobile home relocation fund established by A.R.S. § 33-1476.02.
(3) Section 4, number 12: $6,200 from the donations fund of the Arizona health care cost containment system (AHCCCS) and long-term care system fund established by A.R.S. § 36-2913.
(4) Section 4, number 18: $16,300 from the department of insurance computer system fund established by Laws 1990, chapter 69, § 1.
(5) Section 4, number 35: $2,200 from the land and water conservation surcharge fund established under the authority of A.R.S. § 41-511.26.
Our initial inquiry is whether the creation of the special funds constituted appropriations. Our second inquiry, assuming the acts creating the special funds are appropriations, is whether the Governor may properly line item veto transfers from those funds.
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Arizonans for Second Chances, Rehab., & Pub. Safety v. Hobbs
...to file E-Qual initiative petitions. We note that the Secretary does not contest Petitioners’ standing. See Rios v. Symington , 172 Ariz. 3, 5 n.2, 833 P.2d 20, 22 n.2 (1992) (declining to address standing in a special action involving constitutional issues of statewide importance where the......
-
Detroit Fire Fighters Ass'n v. City of Detroit, Docket No. 96430
...Constitution to refuse to spend those funds, and performs only a ministerial function. [Citations omitted.]7 See Rios v. Symington, 172 Ariz. 3, 12, 833 P.2d 20, 29 (1992), which discussed general separation of powers principles. The court stated:Thus, the Governor must manage the governmen......
-
Kotterman v. Killian
...object, in such a manner that the executive officers of the government are authorized to use that money." Rios v. Symington, 172 Ariz. 3, 6-7, 833 P.2d 20, 23-24 (1992) (quoting Hunt v. Callaghan, 32 Ariz. 235, 239, 257 P. 648, 649 (1927)). The power of appropriation belongs only to the leg......
-
Washington State Legislature v. Lowry
...provisos in appropriations bills. 14 This interpretation is consistent with that of other state constitutions. Rios v. Symington, 172 Ariz. 3, 833 P.2d 20 (1992); State ex rel. Coll v. Carruthers, 107 N.M. 439, 759 P.2d 1380 (1988); Karcher v. Kean, 97 N.J. 483, 479 A.2d 403 In summary, the......