Ritchie v. United Mine Workers of America

• Decision Date: 13 May 1969
• Docket Number: No. 18456.,18456.
• Parties: M. W. RITCHIE, Sr., Mark Cann, B. C. McClanahan and Henry C. Kelly, d/b/a Ritchie Coal Co., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

410 F.2d 827 (1969)

M. W. RITCHIE, Sr., Mark Cann, B. C. McClanahan and Henry C. Kelly, d/b/a Ritchie Coal Co., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 18456.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

May 13, 1969.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Harrison Combs, Washington, D. C., for appellant; Edward L. Carey, Willard P. Owens, Washington, D. C., E. H. Rayson, Knoxville, Tenn., on brief.

J. E. Johnson, III, N. Mitchell Meade, and Arthur L. Brooks, Jr., Lexington, Ky., for appellees.

Before PHILLIPS and EDWARDS, Circuit Judges, and KENT, District Judge.^*

PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment for damages entered in favor of appellees (Ritchie) against the United Mine Workers of America (UMW).

The action was filed under both federal law and the common law of Kentucky. Federal jurisdiction is based upon § 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA).¹ This action also is based upon a tort claim under the common law of Kentucky for wrongful interference with Ritchie's business.

The jury returned a verdict against UMW for $14,000 for the destruction of Ritchie's coal tipple, $150,000 for loss of profits, and $250,000 as punitive damages. A judgment was rendered against UMW for $414,000. For reasons set out below we reverse the judgment of the District Court.

Ritchie, a partnership, operated a coal tippling business at Sassafras, Perry County, Kentucky. It purchased coal from various independent mines. The coal was transported to Ritchie's tipple by mine owners or independent truckers. There it was processed through the tipple and loaded into railroad cars for shipment to points in Kentucky and other States.

In 1959 Ritchie was not under contract with any union. It had only three employees, none of whom was a member of UMW or any other union. During this time UMW was negotiating with the coal operators of the coal fields of Eastern Kentucky in an attempt to get the operators to sign a bargaining contract known as the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950, as amended in 1958. In the spring, summer and fall of 1959 there were approximately 176 small coal operators who had refused to sign the contract.

On March 16, 1959, the previous UMW contract with some of the operators expired and a strike was called. Members of the UMW Local District 30 began intense picketing of all the operators. On the opening day of the strike a large group of UMW pickets, numbering between 500 and 1,000, came to the Ritchie tipple and demanded that the contract be signed or else that the operation of the tipple be closed down. Throughout a three county area members of UMW conducted a vigorous program of mass picketing interspersed with violence. Approximately one-half of the entire Kentucky State police force was assigned to this area to keep the highways open and curtail violence. Only with the aid of State police and an injunction issued by the United States District Court was the Louisville & Nashville Railroad, with trains operated by management personnel,² able to serve Ritchie and operators of other tipples and mines on a curtailed schedule. When State police found themselves unable to maintain order, the Governor of Kentucky called out the National Guard.

In the three county area State police documented a record of six cases of dynamiting public utilities; twenty cases of shooting into tipples, trucks or railroad facilities; sixteen cases of dynamiting coal tipples, augers or mine property and fifteen cases of dynamiting private property, houses, trucks or places of business; six cases of burning of coal tipples or fires at tipples; and ten cases of breach of the peace, including the flourishing of deadly weapons. The record discloses repeated instances of threats, profane name-calling, beatings and shootings at tipple operators, truck drivers and mines. One truck driver was shot through the hand while en route to the Ritchie tipple. Another truck driver was killed at the Little Shepherd tipple. A man was killed by a State policeman.

A further description of the mass picketing and violence which occurred in this three county area of Eastern Kentucky in 1959 is set forth in the opinions of this Court in Sunfire Coal Co. v. UMW, 313 F.2d 108 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 924, 84 S.Ct. 268, 11 L. Ed.2d 166, denial of new trial aff'd, 335 F.2d 958, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 990, 85 S.Ct. 701, 13 L.Ed.2d 610; and Flame Coal Co. v. UMW, 303 F.2d 39, 97 A.L. R.2d 1136 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 891, 83 S.Ct. 186, 9 L.Ed.2d 125.

In the proceeding styled National Labor Relations Board v. UMW, the Board entered an order directing that UMW, District 30 and their officers and agents not exert force or commit acts of violence in various specified particulars. The order of the Board was enforced by this Court in an unpublished consent decree dated May 20, 1960. Thereafter this Court adjudged the UMW, District 30 and certain individuals to be in civil contempt for violation of the decree. N.L.R.B. v. UMW, 393 F.2d 265 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 841, 89 S.Ct. 123, 21 L.Ed.2d 113.

After the issuance of injunctions upon applications of the National Labor Relations Board and the Louisville & Nashville Railroad, mass picketing ceased but numerous incidents of violence continued in the area throughout the summer and fall of 1959.

On October 5, 1959, shortly after midnight, the Ritchie tipple was destroyed completely by fire set by unknown persons.

Ritchie filed this suit against the UMW on February 27, 1963. The jury returned its verdict against the UMW on November 7, 1966. UMW has made 17 assignments of error. We shall discuss only those issues necessary, for the proper disposition of this appeal.

1) Pendent Jurisdiction

Ritchie instituted this action alleging both a violation of § 303 of the LMRA and of the State common law. UMW contends that the District Court was in error in exercising its jurisdiction over the State common law claim along with the federal claim and should have dismissed that part of the action arising under State common law.

Before a federal court can properly exercise pendent jurisdiction, "the state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact." United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1138, 16 L.Ed.2d 218. The "common nucleus of fact" in the case before us was the labor dispute and the related incidents of violence which took place in the vicinity of the Ritchie tipple. If the federal and state character of the claims be disregarded and still the "plaintiff's claims are such that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding, then, assuming substantiality of the federal issues, there is power in federal courts to hear the whole." Id. at 725, 86 S.Ct. at 1138. Based upon the allegations in the complaint and the proof presented at the trial, we hold that the federal issue of secondary boycott had sufficient substance to warrant the exercise of the District Court's jurisdiction over both claims. "Its pendent jurisdiction justification lies in considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants * * *." Id. at 726, 86 S.Ct. at 1139. The application of this doctrine is within the sound discretion of the Court and we are of the opinion that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in submitting to the jury the issues related to the common law of Kentucky, applying the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, supra.

2) Statute of Limitations

UMW contends that count two of Ritchie's complaint, which alleged an "unlawful conspiracy" to destroy its business, was barred by the Kentucky one year statute of limitations for conspiracy. K.R.S. § 413.140.³ Ritchie argues that although the words "unlawful conspiracy" were used in the complaint, the basis of the State law claim was the common law tort of wrongful interference with business. Thus, contends Ritchie, the destruction of the tipple and the resulting damage to its business are governed by K.R.S. § 413.120.⁴

Count one of the amended complaint alleges in part that:

"The defendant, through its duly authorized agents and representatives, acting within the scope and course of their authority as such agents and representatives, did destroy by dynamite and/or fire the tipple of the said Ritchie Coal Company. * * *"

Ritchie also alleged loss of profits as a direct and proximate result of the acts of UMW. Rule 8(a) (2), Fed.R.Civ.P., requires only that the plaintiff set forth a short and plain statement of the claims showing that he is entitled to relief. The designation of counts is not controlling of the interpretations to be placed on these claims. Federal pleadings are construed liberally in order to prevent errors in draftsmanship from barring justice to litigants. Rule 8(f), Fed.R.Civ.P. In so construing the complaint in the case before us, we reject the UMW's argument that the State law claim was founded in conspiracy and therefore controlled by the one year limitation period. All the necessary averments were present in the complaint to bring the State claim within the five year limitation period.

Chief Judge Weick in the majority opinion in Riverside Coal Co., Inc. v. UMW, 410 F.2d 267, (6th Cir.) said:

"While the complaint by an amendment alleged that the acts of UMW also constituted an unlawful conspiracy, it is clear that plaintiffs\' cause of action under the common law of Kentucky was for wrongful interference with plaintiffs\' business. This is a tort which has long been recognized by the courts of Kentucky. United Construction Workers v. New Burnside Veneer, 274 S.W.2d 787 (Ky. 1955)."

3) The Clear Proof Standard

UMW contends that Ritchie did not establish by clear proof, as required by § 6 of the Norris-La Guardia Act,⁵ that UMW through its field representatives or the officers of Local 30 participated in, authorized...