River Excursions, Inc. v. City of Davenport
| Decision Date | 19 December 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 83-1449,83-1449 |
| Citation | 359 N.W.2d 475 |
| Parties | RIVER EXCURSIONS, INC., Appellee, v. CITY OF DAVENPORT, Iowa and Davenport Levee Improvement Commission, Appellants. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Michael J. Meloy, City Atty., for appellants.
John J. Carlin, Davenport, for appellee.
Considered by HARRIS, P.J., and McGIVERIN, LARSON, SCHULTZ, and WOLLE, JJ.
This appeal from the trial court's entry of partial summary judgment presents a threshold question of appellate jurisdiction. In partially sustaining plaintiff's motion for summary judgment the trial court held that plaintiff was entitled to specific performance of a three-year option in its lease. It reserved for trial, however, the determination of what new terms the renewed lease would contain. We find that the trial court's ruling was not a final judgment for purposes of appeal, and we decline to permit an interlocutory appeal. We therefore dismiss this appeal.
Plaintiff has been using dock facilities furnished by the defendants in the operation of its excursion service on the Mississippi River. Plaintiff's three-year written lease with the defendants expired on March 31, 1983, but a renewal clause provided:
The commission further grants you an option to renew the lease for an additional three years at new rental rates and terms and upon payment similar to that which is described above, subject to all the conditions of this agreement.
Plaintiff brought this action for specific performance of the renewal option. Defendants answered that the lease was too vague and indefinite to be enforced. After both parties submitted motions for summary judgment, the trial court entered a partial summary judgment finding that plaintiff had a right to specific performance of the option agreement. The court, however, did not decide all of the issues presented by the parties' motions. It did not rule on plaintiff's request for attorney fees. Moreover, it reserved for trial any determination of what the new rental rates and terms would be, stating The court finds as a matter of law that the only material issue in controversy is the "new rental rates and terms" to be incorporated into the renewal lease and that if plaintiff, as the option grantee, proposes new rental rates and terms that the defendant finds unreasonable, then that issue shall be tried to the court.
Defendants filed a notice of appeal from the trial court's entry of partial summary judgment, and neither party requested that we permit an interlocutory appeal.
Even though neither party has questioned our jurisdiction to hear and decide this case, we will sua sponte dismiss an appeal that is neither authorized by our rules nor permitted by court order. Qualley v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 261 N.W.2d 466, 468 (Iowa 1978); Mid-Continent Refrigerator Co. v. Harris, 248 N.W.2d 145, 146 (Iowa 1976). It matters not that plaintiff filed no motion to dismiss the appeal as it might have under Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 23(a).
Only a judgment that is final may be appealed as a matter of right. Iowa R.App.P. 1(a). Judgments and orders that are not final may be appealed only if permission is granted by this court. Iowa R.App.P. 1(c), 2. We therefore must examine the trial court's ruling and the entire record to determine whether this appeal should now be decided either as an appeal of right or as a permitted interlocutory appeal.
Ordinarily a summary judgment that is not dispositive of the entire case is not a final judgment for purposes of appeal. Mid-Continent Refrigerator Co. v. Harris, 248 N.W.2d at 146. A ruling is not final when the trial court intends to act further on the case before signifying its final adjudication of the issues. Flynn v. Lucas County Memorial Hospital, 203 N.W.2d 613, 614-15 (Iowa 1973). That was certainly true here. The trial court explicitly recognized that new terms of the lease were genuinely in dispute and would need to be decided after a trial to the court unless the defendants would agree to the new terms plaintiff was directed to submit to them before trial.
In exceptional cases there may be more than one final order, as when an interim judgment or order finally settles the relative rights of the parties and leaves only practical details of equitable relief to be worked out. See, e.g., Rowen v. LeMars Mutual Insurance Co., 357 N.W.2d 579, 581 (Iowa 1984); Green v. Advance Homes, Inc., 293 N.W.2d 204, 207 (Iowa 1980). This is not such a case. The relative rights of the parties under the renewed lease here in question cannot yet meaningfully be ascertained. Finality here must await a determination of the new terms of the lease, fixed either following trial or by a judgment recognizing that defendants have accepted the terms plaintiff is directed to propose.
Defendants had no right to appeal, because the trial court's ruling granting partial summary judgment was not final within the meaning of Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 1.
We have recognized that in a small fraction of cases the parties may reasonably mistake an interlocutory ruling for a final order and fail to request permission to appeal. To cover such situations Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 1(c) provides:
If an appeal to the supreme court is improvidently taken because the order from which appeal is taken is interlocutory, this alone shall not be ground for dismissal. The papers upon which the appeal was taken shall be regarded and acted upon as an application for interlocutory appeal under rule 2, rules of appellate procedure, as if duly presented to the supreme court at the time the appeal was taken.
We have recently cautioned, however, that rule 1(c) should rarely be invoked since it incorporates the rule 2(a) standards for determining when interlocutory appeal should be permitted. Rule 2(a) provides in pertinent part:
Such appeal may be granted ... on finding that such ruling or decision involves substantial rights and will materially affect the final decision and that a determination of its correctness before trial on the merits will better serve the interests of justice.
Applying those standards we decline to permit interlocutory appeal from the trial court's entry of partial summary judgment.
We need not decide whether the trial court's decision meets the first two criteria, "involves substantial rights" and "will materially affect the final decision." The ruling on summary judgment matters does not meet the final test, "a determination of its correctness before trial on the merits will better...
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