Rivera v. Arias
| Decision Date | 15 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | Index No.: 524765/2019 |
| Citation | 2020 NY Slip Op 33109 (U) |
| Parties | GLENDALIZ RIVERA, Plaintiff, v. ADRIAN ARIAS, KATHY FERNANDEZ, SHIFAT BAKHT, HEALTHFIRST, INC., HEALTHFIRST HEALTH PLAN INC., HEALTHFIRST PHSP, INC., AND HF MANAFEMENT SERVICES LLC, Defendants |
| Court | New York Supreme Court |
The following papers NYSCEF Doc #'s 14 to 28 read on this motion:
Papers
NYSCEF DOC NO.'s
Notice of Motion/Order to Show Cause Affidavits (Affirmations) Annexed 14-18 Opposing Affidavits (Affirmations)
21-26 Reply Affidavits 28
After having heard Oral Argument on JULY 15, 2020 and upon review of the foregoing submissions herein the court finds as follows:
Defendants move pursuant to 3211(a)(7) for an order dismissing the plaintiff's complaint. (MS#1). Plaintiff opposes the same.
Plaintiffs commenced this action alleging claims pursuant to State and City Law for Discrimination based on Gender, and Sexual Harassment, quid pro quo, and disability, and retaliation.
Pursuant to CPLR 3211, the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction (see, CPLR 3026). We accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (Morone v. Morone, 50 NY2d 481, 484, 429 NYS2d 592, 413 NE2d 1154; Rovello v. Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633, 634, 389 NYS2d 314, 357 N.E.2d 970). In assessing a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), however, a court may freely consider affidavits submitted by the plaintiff to remedy any defects in the complaint (Rovello v. Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d at 635, 389 NYS2d 314, 357 N.E.2d 970) and "the criterion is whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether he has stated one" (Guggenheimer v. Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275, 401 NYS2d 182, 372 NE2d 17; Rovello v. Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d at 636, 389 NYS2d 314, 357 N.E.2d 970). Further, the court may consider any factual submissions made in opposition to a motion to dismiss a pleading in order to remedy pleading defects (see Quinones v. Schaap, 91 AD3d 739, 740, 937 NYS2d 262; Daub v. Future Tech Enter., Inc., 65 AD3d at 1005, 885 NYS2d 115). Minovici v. Belkin BV, 109 AD3d 520, 521, 971 NYS2d 103, 106 (2013) "[B]are legal conclusions and factual claims which are flatly contradicted by the evidence are not presumed to be true on such a motion" (Palazzolo v. Herrick, Feinstein, LLP, 298 AD2d 372, 751 NYS2d 401). If the documentary proof disproves an essential allegation of the complaint, dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) is warranted even if the allegations, standing alone, couldwithstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action (see McGuire v. Sterling Doubleday Enters., LP, 19 AD3d 660, 661, 799 NYS2d 65). "Whether the complaint will later survive a motion for summary judgment, or whether the plaintiff will ultimately be able to prove its claims ... plays no part in the determination of a pre-discovery 3211[a][7] motion to dismiss" (Shaya B. Pac., LLC v. Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, LLP, 38 AD3d 34, 38; see EBC I, Inc. v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 5 NY3d 11, 19).
In provisions of its Administrative Code known as the New York City Human Rights Law, the City has specifically prohibited discrimination on the basis of actual or perceived age, race, creed, color, national origin, gender, disability, marital status, partnership status, sexual orientation, or alienage or citizenship status, in connection with employment, apprentice training programs, the operation of places of public accommodation, the sale or rental of housing accommodations, land, or commercial space, and lending practices, and the granting of licenses and permits. It has also declared such practices as blockbusting and solicitation to be unlawful real estate practices. It is an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden by the enactment, or to attempt to do so, and for any person engaged in any activity covered thereby to retaliate or discriminate against any person for opposing or complaining about the doing of such acts. Moreover, it is an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with, or attempt to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with, any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his or her having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of, any rightgranted or protected by the New York City Human Rights Law. The provisions of the Law defining and proscribing discriminatory practices likewise prohibit such discrimination against a person because of the actual or perceived race, creed, color, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, or alienage or citizenship status of a person with whom such person has a known relationship or association. Claims under New York City Human Rights Law must be evaluated separately from those brought under New York State Human Rights Law. 18 N.Y. Jur. 2d Civil Rights § 12.
As New York's federal and State trial courts are recognizing the need to take account of the Restoration Act, the application of the City HRL as amended by the Restoration Act must become the rule and not the exception. Williams v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 61 A.D.3d 62, 66-69, 872 N.Y.S.2d 27, 31-33 (2009)
While the Restoration Act amended the City HRL in a variety of respects, the core of the measure was its revision of Administrative Code § 8-130, the construction provision of the City HRL (Local Law 85, § 7, deleted language, new language italicized): The provisions of this [chapter] title shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the uniquely broad and remedial purposes thereof, regardless of whether federal or New York State civil and human rights laws, including those laws with provisions comparably-worded to provisions of this title, have been so construed. Id.
As a result of this revision, the City HRL now explicitly requires an independent liberal construction analysis in all circumstances, even where State and federal civil rights laws have comparable language. The independent analysis must be targeted tounderstanding and fulfilling what the statute characterizes as the City HRL's "uniquely broad and remedial" purposes, which go beyond those of counterpart State or federal civil rights laws. Section 1 of the Restoration Act amplifies this message. It states that the measure was needed because the provisions of the City HRL had been "construed too narrowly to ensure protection of the civil rights of all persons covered by the law." Id.
It goes on to mandate that provisions of the City HRL be interpreted "independently from similar or identical provisions of New York state or federal statutes." The City Council's debate on the legislation made plain the Restoration Act's intent and consequences: Insisting that our local law be interpreted broadly and independently will safeguard New Yorkers at a time when federal and state civil rights protections are in jeopardy. Id. The Council directs courts to the key principles that should guide the analysis of claims brought under the City HRL: "discrimination should not play a role in decisions made by employers, landlords and providers of public accommodations; traditional methods and principles of law enforcement ought to be applied in the civil rights context; and victims of discrimination suffer serious injuries, for which they ought to receive full compensation" (Committee Report, 2005 N.Y. City Legis. Ann., at 537).
Defendants' burden with respect to plaintiff's claims under the City's Human Rights Law is more onerous than under the state law. "The Administrative Code's legislative history clearly contemplates that the New York City Human Rights Law be liberally and independently construed with the aim of making it the most progressive in the nation" (Farrugia v. North Shore University Hospital, 13 Misc.3d 740, 745, 820 N.Y.S.2d 718 [Sup Ct, N.Y. Co, Acosta, J, 2006] ). In 2005, unsatisfied with how courtswere applying the same principles to both the state and city laws, the City Council enacted the Local Civil Rights Restoration Act ("Local Law 85"), which calls for every provision of the City's Human Rights Law to be construed "broadly in favor of discrimination plaintiffs, to the extent that such a construction is reasonably possible" (Albunio v. City of New York, 16 NY3d 472, 477-78 [2011] ). "As a result of this revision, the City [Human Rights Law] now explicitly requires an independent liberal construction analysis in all circumstances, even where State and federal civil rights laws have comparable language" (Williams v. NYC Housing Authority, 61 AD3d 62, 66, 872 NYS2d 27 [1st Dept 2009, Acosta, J], lv den 13 NY3d 702 [2009] ). Judicial interpretation of similarly worded state or federal "provisions may be used as aids in interpretation only to the extent that the counterpart provisions are viewed as a floor below which the City's Human Rights law cannot fall, rather than a ceiling above which the local law cannot rise" (id. at 66-67, 872 N.Y.S.2d 27, citing section 1 of Local Law 85. That intentional divergence from analogous federal and state laws created some legal confusion. Most of the significant, oft-cited decisions clearly stated that the same principles and analyses applicable to federal and state laws also governed the City's Human Rights Law (see, e.g., Forrest v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, supra, 3...
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