Rivera v. Santiago, 3070
| Decision Date | 30 July 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 3070,3070 |
| Citation | 495 A.2d 1122,4 Conn.App. 608 |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Adela RIVERA v. Venancio SANTIAGO. |
Sheryl J. Sha'afi, Farmington, for appellant (plaintiff).
Before DUPONT, C.P.J., and HULL and STODOLING, JJ.
The plaintiff brought an action pursuant to General Statutes § 47a-14h, 1 which provides judicial relief for tenants who claim that their landlords have failed to perform their legal duties as required by § 47a-7 of the Connecticut General Statutes. The plaintiff's complaint was filed on January 18, 1984. On October 24, 1983, the defendant landlord had caused a notice to quit to be served on the plaintiff tenant. A summary process action was commenced on December 5, 1983, returnable on January 10, 1984.
The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint for lack of jurisdiction since it concluded that the service of a notice to quit terminated the landlord-tenant relationship, which serves as the basis for any action under General Statutes § 47a-14h. The plaintiff has appealed, claiming the trial court erred in concluding that no landlord-tenant relationship existed between the parties because of the pendency of a summary process action.
General Statutes § 47a-1(d) provides that " '[l]andlord' means the owner, lessor or sublessor of the dwelling unit or the building of which it is a part." " 'Tenant' means the lessee, sublessee or person entitled under a rental agreement to occupy a dwelling unit to the exclusion of others or as is otherwise defined by law." General Statutes § 47a-1(l ). 2 A landlord-tenant relationship, in its most common and traditional form, is one in which there is an oral or written rental agreement between the parties containing the terms and the conditions for the use and occupancy of the subject dwelling unit. "A tenancy at sufferance arises when a person who came into possession of land rightfully continues in possession wrongfully after his right thereto has terminated." Welk v. Bidwell, 136 Conn. 603, 608-609, 73 A.2d 295 (1950).
The issuance by a landlord of a notice to quit is an unequivocal act terminating the lease agreement with the tenant. Termination of the lease does not terminate the tenancy since, upon service of a notice to quit, a tenancy at sufferance is created. Bushnell Plaza Development Corporation v. Fazzano, 38 Conn.Sup. 683, 460 A.2d 1311 (1983). In the present action, the plaintiff became a tenant at sufferance on October 24, 1983, when she was served with a notice to quit. Nonetheless, the landlord-tenant relationship continued.
The statutory obligations of the landlord and tenant continue even when there is no longer a rental agreement between them. After a notice to quit has been served, for example, a tenant at sufferance no longer has a duty to pay rent. He still, however, is obliged to pay a fair rental value in the form of use and occupancy for the dwelling unit. Lonergan v. Connecticut Food Store, Inc., 168 Conn. 122, 131, 357 A.2d 910 (1975). A landlord also is required to fulfill his statutory obligations, even after a notice to quit has been served on the tenant and a summary process case is begun. Ciavaglia v. Bolles, 38 Conn.Sup. 603, 605-606, 457 A.2d 669 (1982). In that case, funds paid into court during the pendency of a summary process action for use and occupancy were properly partially distributed to hold over tenants in order to reimburse them for sums spent in discharge of obligations imposed on the landlord by virtue of General Statutes § 47a-7. Id., 606.
Although General Statutes §§ 47a-14h and 47a-7 use the terms "tenant" and "landlord," there is no provision which requires that the relationship between the parties be based solely on a rental contract. The wording of the statutes militates against such a narrow construction. "A statute is to be construed so that all its parts have meaning...." Eagle Hill Corporation v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 2 Conn.App. 68, 75, 477 A.2d 660 (1984).
General Statutes § 47a-14h(g) provides that "[t]he court, in ordering interim or final relief, may order that accrued payments of rent or use and occupancy held by the clerk be used for the repair of the building or be distributed in accordance with the rights of the parties." (Emphasis added.) Under Connecticut law, use and occupancy, by definition, is an amount equal to fair rental value and payable during the pendency of a summary process action. General...
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