Waterbury Twin v. Renal Treatment Centers

• Decision Date: 14 July 2009
• Docket Number: No. 18218.,18218.
• Citation: 292 Conn. 459,974 A.2d 626
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: WATERBURY TWIN, LLC, et al. v. RENAL TREATMENT CENTERS-NORTHEAST, INC., et al.

974 A.2d 626

292 Conn. 459

WATERBURY TWIN, LLC, et al. v. RENAL TREATMENT CENTERS-NORTHEAST, INC., et al.

No. 18218.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued February 10, 2009.

Decided July 14, 2009.

Houston Putnam Lowry, with whom was Julie A. Morgan, Meriden, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

John F. Conway, Wallingford, with whom was W. Glen Pierson, for the appellees (defendants).

ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE and ZARELLA, Js.

NORCOTT, J.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether a landlord, after withdrawing its complaint in a summary process action, is required to serve a new notice to quit pursuant to General Statutes § 47a-23¹ prior to filing a new summary process action against its tenant. The plaintiffs, Waterbury Twin, LLC, and 150 MH, LLC, appeal² from the judgment of the trial court dismissing their summary process action against the defendants, Renal Treatment Centers-Northeast, Inc. (Renal Treatment Centers), and Davita, Inc. (Davita).³ Because we conclude that the plaintiffs' withdrawal of the initial summary process action required them to serve a new notice to quit prior to commencing a new summary process action against the defendants, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following facts and procedural history. In August, 2007, the parties entered into a written agreement whereby the plaintiffs agreed to lease commercial premises in Waterbury to the defendants for ten years. Renal Treatment Centers entered into possession of the premises on August 30, 2007, and has been in possession since.⁴ The plaintiffs allege that the defendants have failed to pay common area maintenance charges when due, or within any applicable grace period from October, 2007, through January, 2008, and also have caused various damages to the utilities on the premises during the construction process. On January 18, 2008, the plaintiffs caused a notice to quit for the nonpayment of rent to be served on the defendants, directing them to vacate the premises on or before January 23, 2008.⁵ The notice to quit was served on January 19, 2008. The defendants, however, have refused to vacate the premises.

On January 31, 2008, the plaintiffs served the defendants with a summary process complaint (initial complaint) with a return date of February 7, 2008, which the marshal returned to the court on February 5, 2008. On February 11, 2008, the defendants moved to dismiss the initial complaint, contending that it violated General Statutes § 47a-23a⁶ of the summary process statutes because it had not been returned to court at least three days before the return day. On February 15, 2008, the plaintiffs withdrew the initial complaint.

The following day, February 16, 2008, the plaintiffs commenced this summary process action by issuing a new summary process complaint (new complaint) with a return date of March 4, 2008, which was served on February 25, 2008, and returned to the court on February 26, 2008. The plaintiffs did not serve a new notice to quit prior to issuing the new complaint in this action. Thereafter, on February 27, 2008, the defendants notified the plaintiffs by letter that they had assumed that the notice to quit had been withdrawn and the lease had been reinstated. Additionally, they enclosed a rent check for the month of March, 2008.⁷

The plaintiffs thereafter acknowledged receiving the rent check, but informed the defendants that the notice to quit had not been withdrawn and that the lease would not be reinstated. The plaintiffs accepted the check, but applied it to the damages owed by the defendants.

The defendants then moved to dismiss this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming that the plaintiffs, after withdrawing the initial complaint, were required to serve a new notice to quit prior to commencing this summary process action. The trial court, relying on the Appellate Court's decision in Housing Authority v. Hird, 13 Conn.App. 150, 156-57, 535 A.2d 377, cert denied, 209 Conn. 825, 552 A.2d 433 (1988), concluded that the plaintiffs' withdrawal of the initial complaint had revived the lease by returning the parties to "square one," namely, "the status quo prior to the service of the notice to quit." The trial court concluded, therefore, that the plaintiffs were required to serve a new notice to quit prior to commencing the current action. The trial court further stated, in dicta, that the notice to quit was itself invalid, notwithstanding the fact that it "tracked" the language of § 47a-23, because it failed to provide adequate notice as to which moneys were due, specifically, base rent or additional rent. Accordingly, the trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss and rendered judgment dismissing the new complaint. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly concluded that the withdrawal of a summary process action automatically withdraws the underlying, otherwise valid, notice to quit, thus restoring the written lease and requiring the landlord to serve a new notice to quit prior to filing a second summary process action.⁸ The plaintiffs argue that serving a new notice to quit does not promote judicial economy, and rely on a line of trial court cases holding that a subsequent summary process action may be maintained using a previously served, otherwise valid notice to quit.⁹ The plaintiffs further contend that the Appellate Court's decisions in Housing Authority v. Hird, supra, 13 Conn.App. at 150, 535 A.2d 377, and Bridgeport v. Barbour-Daniel Electronics, Inc., 16 Conn.App. 574, 548 A.2d 744, cert. denied, 209 Conn. 826, 552 A.2d 432 (1988), are not controlling in the present case because they involved facially defective notices to quit. In response, the defendants argue that, under Hird, the withdrawal of the prior summary process action had the effect of restoring the parties' written lease, thereby requiring the landlord to a serve a new notice to quit prior to commencing a new summary process action. The defendants rely on a trial court decision emphasizing the promotion of judicial economy by this bright line rule,¹⁰ and note that the plaintiffs could have either amended their defective return date rather than withdrawing the initial complaint, or simply served a new notice to quit. The defendants also posit that permitting a notice to quit to survive the withdrawal of the summary process action would create uncertainty in the subsequent landlord-tenant relationship, should such proceedings not immediately be reinstituted. We agree with the defendants and conclude that, if a landlord has withdrawn a summary process action filed against a tenant the landlord is required to serve a new notice to quit pursuant to § 47a-23 prior to commencing another summary process action against that tenant under § 47a-23a.

"Summary process is a special statutory procedure designed to provide an expeditious remedy.... It enable[s] landlords to obtain possession of leased premises without suffering the delay, loss and expense to which, under the common-law actions, they might be subjected by tenants wrongfully holding over their terms....

"Summary process statutes secure a prompt hearing and final determination.... Therefore, the statutes relating to summary process must be narrowly construed and strictly followed." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Young v. Young, 249 Conn. 482, 487-88, 733 A.2d 835 (1999).

Service of a valid notice to quit, which terminates the lease and creates a tenancy at sufferance;¹¹ Bargain Mart, Inc. v. Lipkis, 212 Conn. 120, 134, 561 A.2d 1365 (1989); "is a condition precedent to a summary process action" under § 47a-23 that implicates the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction over that action. Bristol v. Ocean State Job Lot Stores of Connecticut, Inc., 284 Conn. 1, 5, 931 A.2d 837 (2007); id. ("defective" notice to quit deprives court of subject matter jurisdiction); see also, e.g., Lampasona v. Jacobs, 209 Conn. 724, 728-29, 553 A.2d 175 (same), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 919, 109 S.Ct. 3244, 106 L.Ed.2d 590 (1989). Thus, the defendants' "motion to dismiss ... properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court.... A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction.... [O]ur review of the court's ultimate legal conclusion and resulting [determination] of the motion to dismiss [is] de novo." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) R.C. Equity Group, LLC v. Zoning Commission, 285 Conn. 240, 248, 939 A.2d 1122 (2008).

Our analysis of the plaintiffs' claims begins with the Appellate Court's decision in Housing Authority v. Hird, supra, 13 Conn.App. at 150, 535 A.2d 377. In Hird, a landlord initially had sought to evict a tenant for violating certain lease terms governing pets and apartment conditions. Id., at 152-53, 535 A.2d 377. In July, 1985, the landlord served a notice to quit and then initiated a summary process action that was resolved on its merits in the tenant's favor on November 6, 1985. Id., at 153, 535 A.2d 377. The landlord then served a second notice to quit on the tenant on November 15, 1985, alleging that the tenant had failed to pay rent for November, and thereafter instituted another summary process action. Id. The landlord withdrew the second summary process action on January 29, 1986, in response to the tenant's motion to dismiss alleging that the landlord had failed to comply with applicable federal regulations. Id. The landlord refused the efforts of the tenant to restore her tenancy, and filed a third notice to quit on January 31, 1986, alleging that the tenant had failed to pay rent for January, which was followed by a summary process action shortly thereafter. Id., at 154, 535 A.2d 377.

The Appellate Court first concluded that the...