RL JORDAN CO. v. BOARDMAN PETROLEUM
| Decision Date | 18 October 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 3059.,3059. |
| Citation | 527 S.E.2d 113,338 S.C. 478 |
| Parties | Carolyn J. McCRAW, Respondent, v. MARY BLACK HOSPITAL, Employer, and PHT Services, Ltd., Appellants. |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
David Hill Keller, of Haynsworth, Marion, McKay & Guerard, of Greenville, for appellants.
Danny R. Smith, of Spartanburg; and Deborah R.J. Shupe, of Louthian & Louthian, of Columbia, for respondent.
ORDER WITHDRAWING ORIGINAL OPINION AND SUBSTITUTING SUBSEQUENT OPINION, AND DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING
After careful consideration of the Petition for Rehearing, the Court is unable to discover any material fact or principle of law that has been either overlooked or disregarded and, hence, there is no basis for rehearing. It is, therefore, ordered that the Petition for Rehearing be denied. However, Opinion No. 3059, filed October 18, 1999, is withdrawn and the attached opinion is substituted therefor.
In the Discussion of the original opinion, third full paragraph, sixth sentence, it states as follows: "McCraw knew in 1991 that her symptoms were related to the chemicals in the endoscopy unit, but there is no evidence that any physician had conclusively determined that her exposure to the chemicals had triggered the progression of her pulmonary disease, much less notified McCraw of that fact." We now substitute the word "definitively" in place of the word "conclusively" in the attached opinion.
In this workers' compensation case, Mary Black Memorial Hospital (the hospital) appeals a circuit court order which awarded benefits to Carolyn J. McCraw, reversing the full commission's finding that she had failed to file her claim within the two year statute of limitations period. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
McCraw worked continuously for the hospital from 1961 until November of 1992. From 1986 to September, 1991 she worked as an assistant in the endoscopy unit, where her duties included cleaning and disinfecting equipment with cleaners containing Glutaraldehyde, a respiratory irritant.1 The cleaners burned McCraw's eyes and irritated her throat, causing chest tightness, congestion, wheezing, choking, and coughing. Initially, her symptoms resolved when she left work at the end of the day, but by the time she left her employment, McCraw's symptoms remained even after leaving work each day.
In 1990, McCraw was treated by Dr. Mary Lou Applebaum on one occasion for sinusitis.2 Dr. Applebaum is a pulmonary specialist who is the director of the respiratory center at the hospital. Dr. Applebaum also worked with McCraw in the endoscopy unit and observed her breathing difficulties while working with the chemicals. By September of 1991, McCraw realized her respiratory symptoms were related to her exposure to the chemicals. When she saw Dr. Applebaum in the endoscopy unit, she asked Dr. Applebaum if it would help for her to leave the endoscopy unit. Dr. Applebaum responded that she "certainly thought it was worth a try." In September 1991, McCraw transferred out of the endoscopy unit and was ultimately placed in the child care center of the hospital.
McCraw began seeing Dr. Applebaum again as a patient on March 30, 1992. In July 1992, Dr. Applebaum treated McCraw for asthmatic bronchitis. On October 30, 1992, Dr. Applebaum reported that McCraw continued to suffer from sinusitis and bronchitis. Dr. Applebaum testified McCraw's allergies predisposed her to these types of infections.
On November 13, 1992, McCraw again complained to Dr. Applebaum of congestion and shortness of breath. Dr. Applebaum told McCraw to stop working and admitted McCraw to the hospital on November 19, 1992, for treatment of pneumonia and asthma. With in-patient care, the pneumonia cleared up, but the asthma remained. McCraw left the hospital on November 22, 1992, but did not return to work. She submitted a long term disability claim to the hospital on January 12, 1993, in which she stated her condition was related to her employment.
Dr. Applebaum testified that McCraw initially had a stable asthmatic condition which was mild in degree and allowed her to work on a regular basis, but the chemical exposure triggered a severe progression of the disease which was not reversible upon leaving that environment. To a reasonable degree of medical certainty, Dr. Applebaum believed McCraw's exposure to chemicals in the endoscopy unit and her work in the hospital's child care center exacerbated McCraw's underlying condition to the point McCraw is unable to maintain employment.
On November 14, 1994, McCraw filed a form 50 claiming total disability and seeking benefits from exposure to chemicals within the scope of her employment. The hospital denied McCraw's claims. The hearing commissioner awarded McCraw benefits finding she sustained a compensable occupational respiratory disease brought within the applicable statute of limitations. The full commission reversed the hearing commissioner finding Dr. Applebaum diagnosed McCraw with lung disease in 1991 but McCraw failed to file a workers' compensation claim within two years of receiving notice of the definitive diagnosis.
The circuit court reversed the full commission finding the two-year filing period commenced only after the claimant was given notice of a definitive diagnosis and became totally disabled. The circuit court found McCraw complied with the statute of limitations and remanded the matter to the full commission for disposition and payment of benefits. The circuit court subsequently denied the hospital's motion to alter or amend judgment and found the hospital's additional sustaining grounds were not preserved and were meritless. The hospital appeals, contending McCraw failed to comply with the applicable statute of limitations and failed to report the alleged injury to the hospital within the statutorily defined time period.
In reviewing a Workers' Compensation Commission's decision, an appellate court must affirm the Commission's factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence and not controlled by legal error. Tiller v. National Health Care Center, 334 S.C. 333, 513 S.E.2d 843 (1999). "Substantial evidence is not a mere scintilla of evidence, but evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion the agency reached." Tiller, 334 S.C. at 338,513 S.E.2d at 845 (citing Grayson v. Carter Rhoad Furniture, 317 S.C. 306, 454 S.E.2d 320 (1995)).
"An appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of an agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact unless the agency's findings are clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the record." Tiller, 334 S.C. at 339, 513 S.E.2d at 845. "The statute of limitations applicable to workers' compensation claims, like the Workers' Compensation Act as a whole, should be given liberal construction, and any reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage." Rogers v. Spartanburg Regional Medical Ctr., 328 S.C. 415, 418, 491 S.E.2d 708, 710 (Ct.App.1997) (citations omitted).
The hospital contends South Carolina Code section 42-15-40 bars McCraw's occupational disease claim. We disagree.
Section 42-15-40 provides in pertinent part:
The right to compensation under this title is barred unless a claim is filed with the commission within two years after an accident, or if death resulted from accident, within two years of the date of death. However, for occupational disease claims the two-year period does not begin to run until the employee concerned has been diagnosed definitively as having an occupational disease and has been notified of the diagnosis.
S.C.Code Ann. § 42-15-40 (Supp.1998) (emphasis added).
The full commission found as a fact that Dr. Applebaum definitively diagnosed McCraw with lung disease, categorized as occupational asthma, in 1991. The circuit court reversed on the grounds that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until McCraw had been notified of a definitive diagnosis and suffered total disability, citing Bailey v. Covil Corp., 291 S.C. 417, 354 S.E.2d 35 (1987) as its authority. Although we disagree with the circuit court's interpretation of Bailey, we conclude the full commission's finding was clearly erroneous in view of the substantial evidence in the record. Consequently, we affirm. See Brading v. County of Georgetown, 327 S.C. 107, 490 S.E.2d 4 (1997) ().
In 1991, Dr. Applebaum only spoke with McCraw about her illness when they worked together in the endoscopy unit. Dr. Applebaum did not treat McCraw as a patient, aside from her treatment in 1990 for sinusitis, until March 30, 1992. Even then, Dr. Applebaum did not diagnose McCraw with occupational asthma. There is simply no evidence Dr. Applebaum formally evaluated, let alone definitively diagnosed, McCraw with an occupational disease in 1991. Although Dr. Applebaum testified she could hear McCraw wheezing, she did not examine McCraw, test her, diagnose her, or treat her in 1991. McCraw knew in 1991 that her symptoms were related to the chemicals in the endoscopy unit, but there is no evidence that any physician had definitively determined that her exposure to the chemicals had triggered the progression of her pulmonary disease, much less notified McCraw of that fact. The confirmation that chemicals in the work environment should be avoided and were potentially related to breathing difficulties, even though relayed to the claimant by a qualified physician, do not under any view of the evidence constitute a definitive diagnosis of an occupational disease as contemplated by the statute. Rogers, 328 S.C. at 418, 491 S.E.2d at 710 (...
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...this workers' compensation case, we granted a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' opinion. See McCraw v. Mary Black Hosp., 338 S.C. 478, 527 S.E.2d 113 (Ct.App.2000). We affirm in part, vacate in part, reverse in part, and FACTS Respondent Carolyn McCraw worked for petitioner......