McCraw v. Mary Black Hosp.
Decision Date | 17 June 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 25480.,25480. |
Parties | Carolyn J. McCRAW, Employee, Respondent, v. MARY BLACK HOSPITAL, Employer, and PHT Services, Ltd., Carrier, Petitioners. |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
David Hill Keller, of Haynsworth Sinkler Boyd, P.A., of Greenville, for petitioners.
Danny R. Smith, of Spartanburg, and Deborah R.J. Shupe, of Columbia, for respondent.
In this workers' compensation case, we granted a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' opinion. See McCraw v. Mary Black Hosp., 338 S.C. 478, 527 S.E.2d 113 (Ct.App.2000). We affirm in part, vacate in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Respondent Carolyn McCraw worked for petitioner Mary Black Hospital (the Hospital) as a nursing assistant from 1961 until November of 1992. From 1986 to September 1991, she worked in the endoscopy unit where her duties included assisting physicians, restocking the rooms, and disinfecting equipment. When disinfecting the endoscopes, McCraw used cleaners containing Glutaraldehyde, a chemical known to be a respiratory irritant. The cleaners burned McCraw's eyes, irritated her throat, and eventually caused chest tightness, congestion, wheezing, coughing, and breathing difficulty. Initially, her symptoms would abate when she left work, but by the time she left the endoscopy unit, McCraw's breathing problems continued when she was home.
Dr. Mary Lou Applebaum, a pulmonary specialist, worked with McCraw in the endoscopy unit and observed her breathing difficulties while working with the chemicals. Dr. Applebaum testified that she saw McCraw two or three times a week and McCraw consulted with her on an informal basis. Dr. Applebaum stated that during this time she was not seeing McCraw in the context of a doctor-patient relationship.1 By 1991, McCraw realized her respiratory symptoms were related to her exposure to the chemicals and asked Dr. Applebaum if it would help for her to leave the endoscopy unit. Dr. Applebaum responded that she "certainly thought it was worth a try." In September 1991, McCraw transferred out of the endoscopy unit. Ultimately, McCraw was placed in the child care center of the hospital where she took care of employees' sick children. McCraw continued to have breathing problems and get respiratory infections after she left the endoscopy unit.
McCraw began seeing Dr. Applebaum regularly as a patient beginning in March 1992. From March to November 1992, Dr. Applebaum treated McCraw for asthmatic bronchitis, sinusitis and pneumonia. McCraw went for an office visit with Dr. Applebaum on November 19, 1992, and Dr. Applebaum told McCraw she had to stop work. That same day, McCraw was admitted to the hospital with diagnoses of asthma and pneumonia.
McCraw's last day of work at the Hospital was November 18, 1992. She submitted a long term disability claim to the Hospital, dated January 12, 1993, in which she stated her condition was related to her employment.2 McCraw filed her workers' compensation claim on November 14, 1994.
At her deposition, Dr. Applebaum testified that exposure to Glutaraldehyde has been associated in medical literature with the development of occupational asthma. Dr. Applebaum stated that McCraw initially had a stable asthmatic condition which was mild in degree and allowed her to work on a regular basis, but the chemical exposure triggered a "severe progression" of the disease which was not reversible upon leaving that environment. To a reasonable degree of medical certainty, Dr. Applebaum believed McCraw's exposure to chemicals in the endoscopy unit and her work in the Hospital's child care center exacerbated McCraw's condition to the point McCraw is unable to maintain employment.
The Single Commissioner awarded McCraw benefits finding she sustained a compensable occupational respiratory disease, i.e., occupational asthma, caused by her exposure to Glutaraldehyde. The Commissioner found McCraw was permanently and totally disabled as of November 19, 1992. In addition, the Commissioner found that McCraw's claim met the notice and statute of limitations requirements. In a 2-1 decision, the Full Commission reversed. The Commission made specific findings of fact that Dr. Applebaum diagnosed McCraw with lung disease, i.e., occupational asthma, in 1991 and that McCraw failed to file her claim within two years of receiving notice of this diagnosis.
The circuit court reversed the Commission's decision. Citing Bailey v. Covil Corp., 291 S.C. 417, 354 S.E.2d 35 (1987), the circuit court found the statute of limitations for an occupational disease claim is triggered by definitive diagnosis and total disability. Since total disability did not occur until November 19, 1992, the circuit court held that the November 14, 1994, filing of McCraw's claim was timely.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision on the statute of limitations, but relied upon different reasoning. The Court of Appeals held the Commission's finding that McCraw was definitively diagnosed in 1991 was unsupported by substantial evidence in the record. Specifically, the Court of Appeals stated the following:
McCraw, 338 S.C. at 485, 527 S.E.2d at 116-17 (citation omitted).
Moreover, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the circuit court that total disability is required to trigger the statute of limitations. Instead, the Court of Appeals held that the statute of limitations "begins to run for an occupational disease when the claimant receives notice of a definitively diagnosed occupational disease and suffers some compensable injury, that is, some disability." Id. at 488, 527 S.E.2d at 118.
As to petitioners' argument that McCraw failed to give timely notice of her claim, the Court of Appeals found that the crucial date regarding notice also would be November 19, 1992. The court further decided petitioners had not appealed the Commissioner's finding that McCraw gave timely notice, and therefore, it is the law of the case. Id.
Finally, the Court of Appeals reversed the portion of the circuit court's order which remanded the case to the Commission with instructions to award McCraw benefits. The Court of Appeals held that the circuit court erred in this respect because the Commission, as the ultimate fact finder, had not yet reached the merits of McCraw's claim which petitioners had also challenged in their appeal to the Commission. Therefore, the Court of Appeals remanded to the Commission for additional proceedings. Id.
Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals improperly made "its own determination of facts" by finding that respondent had not been definitively diagnosed in 1991, contrary to the specific finding of the Commission. We disagree. This Court must affirm the findings of fact made by the Commission if they are supported by substantial evidence. E.g., Tiller v. National Health Care Ctr. of Sumter, 334 S.C. 333, 338, 513 S.E.2d 843, 845 (1999)
. Substantial evidence is not a mere scintilla of evidence, but evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion the agency reached. Id. The Court may reverse the decision if the administrative findings are clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record. Id.; S.C.Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6) (Supp.2001).
The workers' compensation statute of limitations states in relevant part:
The right to compensation under this title is barred unless a claim is filed with the commission within two years after an accident, or if death resulted from accident, within two years of the date of death. However, for occupational disease claims the two-year period does not begin to run until the employee concerned has been diagnosed definitively as having an occupational disease and has been notified of the diagnosis.
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