RLR v. PRAGUE PUBLIC SCHOOL DIST. I-103

• Decision Date: 31 August 1993
• Docket Number: No. CIV-92-2062-C.,CIV-92-2062-C.
• Citation: 838 F. Supp. 1526
• Parties: R.L.R. and C.A.R., individually and as parents and next friends of R.L.M.R., a minor, Plaintiffs, v. The PRAGUE PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT I-103; David Cox in his capacity as Superintendent of the Prague Public School District I-103; Jack Bullard, Joe Milligan, Sam Smith, Alberta Schmeusser, Steve Richardson and Randy Stricklin, in their capacities as members of the School Board of the Prague Public School District I-103; and John Doe(s), Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Oklahoma

838 F. Supp. 1526

R.L.R. and C.A.R., individually and as parents and next friends of R.L.M.R., a minor, Plaintiffs, v.The PRAGUE PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT I-103; David Cox in his capacity as Superintendent of the Prague Public School District I-103; Jack Bullard, Joe Milligan, Sam Smith, Alberta Schmeusser, Steve Richardson and Randy Stricklin, in their capacities as members of the School Board of the Prague Public School District I-103; and John Doe(s), Defendants.

No. CIV-92-2062-C.

United States District Court, W.D. Oklahoma.

August 31, 1993.

Margaret McMorrow-Love, Joe C. Lewallen, Jr., and Stephen R. Stephens of the firm of Fellers, Snider, Blankenship, Bailey & Tippens, Oklahoma City, OK, for plaintiffs.

Carolyn Gregg Hill, William D. Watts, and Michelle Johnson of the firm of Andrews, Davis, Legg, Bixler, Milsten & Price, Oklahoma City, OK, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

CAUTHRON, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court for consideration of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment.For the reasons explained below, the motion, having been treated as a motion for summary judgment, will be granted.

At age fourteen, plaintiff, R.L.M.R., was an eighth grade student at Prague Middle School.During the fall of 1991, she became sexually involved with her basketball coach, Albert W. Thorpe("Thorpe").R.L.M.R. and R.L.R. and C.A.R, her parents (hereafter parent-plaintiffs) sue for (1) deprivations of liberty interests without due process by persons acting under color of state law (42 U.S.C. § 1983); (2) intentional gender discrimination (20 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq., hereafter Title IX); and (3) negligence (51 Okla. Stat. §§ 151, et seq., hereafter the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act).Defendants are the Prague School District, its superintendent, and members of the School Board, all in their official capacities.¹

Factual Background

For the purposes of this motion, defendants assert the following facts are not disputed.Plaintiffs do not challenge defendants' list of material facts except those contained in ¶¶ 13, 15, 17, and 18.The Court's discussion of the disputed facts begins on page eleven (11).

1.A sexual relationship began between R.L.M.R. and Thorpe sometime in October, 1991, and ended the night of November 25, 1991.

2.Thorpe and R.L.M.R. took care to keep their relationship a secret.

3.Thorpe thought it was against the policies of the School District to have sex with R.L.M.R.

4.Defendant Superintendent Cox took immediate action and suspended Thorpe the night he learned of Thorpe's relationship with R.L.M.R.

5.In the fall of 1988, three years before the events of this case took place, Superintendent Cox was told about a rumor that Thorpe was seeing a high school senior, Shannon Jensen.

6.When Superintendent Cox and the high school principal, Ted Gillispie, confronted Thorpe the next morning about that rumor, Thorpe told them the rumor was not true.

7.Principal Gillispie questioned Shannon Jensen who told him the rumor was not true.

8.Superintendent Cox and Principal Gillispie told Thorpe that if he had any relationship with a student other than a professional teacher-pupil relationship, he would be fired.

9.Superintendent Cox concluded there was no basis to the rumor about Thorpe and Shannon Jensen based on the fact that both parties denied the rumor and that he had not observed anything in Thorpe's demeanor or behavior to cause him to consider the rumor true.

10.In the winter of 1989, Craig Price, the boyfriend of Lesley Bullard, a high school senior, accused Thorpe of trying to date Lesley Bullard.Thorpe himself reported Price's accusation to Principal Gillispie.

11.Superintendent Cox did not learn of the Lesley Bullard rumor until four to six months later.

12.In 1989, School Board member Jack Bullard was told by his daughter, Lesley Bullard, about a conversation she had with Thorpe.Thorpe and Lesley Bullard discussed going dancing after Lesley Bullard graduated.Jack Bullard was not concerned because Lesley was a senior and he thought Thorpe was a nice young man.

13.Defendants assert that prior to November 25, 1991, none of the defendants had any knowledge of Thorpe's relationship with R.L.M.R. (disputed by plaintiffs).

14.Defendant former School Board member Milligan has not been on the School Board since January, 1990, and knew nothing about Thorpe's conduct until after November 25, 1991.

15.Defendants assert no one complained about Thorpe's conduct to the School Board or its individual members (disputed by plaintiffs).

16.In the fall of 1988, when defendantSchool Board member Schmeusser heard rumors that something was going on between Thorpe and Shannon Jensen, Schmeusser told Superintendent Cox, who told Schmeusser he had already talked to Thorpe and there was no truth to the rumor.

17.Defendants assert that other than School Board member Schmeusser, prior to November 25, 1991, no one on the School Board heard any rumors about any misconduct between Thorpe and any female student (disputed by plaintiffs).

18.Defendants allege the State of Oklahoma Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights investigated this case and found "there was no evidence to indicate that sexual harassment occurred because there was no evidence that the conduct was unwelcomed sic"(disputed by plaintiffs).

Rather than provide, as required by LocalRule 14(B), a "concise statement of material facts as to which the plaintiffs contend a genuine issue exists,"plaintiffs have listed "material facts which preclude the entry of summary judgment."In many instances these "facts" are not facts, but arguments as to the legal effect of inferences drawn by counsel from deposition testimony.To the extent any of the "material facts" are material, they will be discussed infra, at p. 15.

Plaintiffs' Claims

In plaintiffs' complaint, three theories are asserted for which plaintiffs seek in excess of $50,000 for compensatory, special, general, and punitive damages, together with attorneys' fees.In the first claim, plaintiffs allege defendants committed acts which deprived them of their liberty interests pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 without due process.The liberty interests are alleged to be R.L.M.R.'s right "to be free from sexual harassment and abuse while attending a publicly mandated course of education."Complaintat ¶ 17.It is alleged these actions also deprived parent-plaintiffs of these same rights.Complaintat ¶ 18.The violations are claimed to be caused by defendants' "reckless indifference for the Plaintiffs' rights," failure to maintain an "appropriate system of review of sexual abuse and harassment claims," failure to "identify conduct by their employees which constitutes sexual abuse and harassment," and the lack of an adequate "system of training their employees about the law of sexual abuse and harassment in public schools."Complaintat ¶¶ 19, 20, and 21.

In the alternative second claim for relief, plaintiffs allege the school and school district violated Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972(20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq.).Complaintat ¶¶ 25-29.The violations are claimed to be the unreasonable interference with R.L.M.R.'s "ability to attend public school and perform her studies and activities in a normal manner," the creation of an "intimidating, hostile, offensive and abusive school environment," and the failure to "deal with a known problem of sexual abuse and harassment."Complaintat ¶¶ 31-33.These acts are alleged to constitute intentional gender discrimination against R.L.M.R. Complaintat ¶ 35.

In the alternative third claim, plaintiffs allege they have complied with the required notice provisions and assert they have a claim compensable under the Governmental Tort Claim Act, Okla.Stat. tit. 51, §§ 151, et seq.The conduct alleged in this claim is that defendants knew, or should have known, of "the complaints against Thorpe relating to his attempts to have dating and/or sexual relationships with minor female students of the Prague Middle School and Prague High School."Complaintat ¶ 37.This conduct is alleged to be "sufficiently egregious that Thorpe should have been summarily dismissed because of his sexual propensity towards minor female students."Id.Although defendants allegedly knew, or should have known, Thorpe was incompetent as a teacher and coach, and that he had a propensity to sexually harass and abuse female students, it is alleged defendants did not "properly investigate claims against Thorpe" and failed to "insure that Thorpe was competent to coach and supervise female students."Complaintat ¶¶ 38, 39.Because defendants allegedly knew, or should have known, that one in R.L.M.R.'s position "would be subjected to unreasonable risk or harm" from their employee Thorpe, plaintiffs claim these acts constitute defendants' breach of their duties to "use reasonable care in the hiring and retention of its employees" and a "failure to conduct reasonable investigations into the background and character of Thorpe."Complaintat ¶¶ 40-41.In this same alternative claim for relief, plaintiffs allege defendants are also liable under the theory of respondeat superior.

Discussion

Parent-Plaintiffs' Claims

§ 1983

Parent-plaintiffs claim they"have a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody and companionship of their children" and that defendants' conduct toward the parent-plaintiffs has "detrimentally affected" their ability to function within the community.Plaintiffs' Briefat 22(June 7, 1993).With a broad brush, parent-plaintiffs paint a picture of their § 1983 claim and suggest defendants' deeds "constitute more than an isolated action against a family member" because defendants' acts "implicate constitutionally protected interests and it is for the jury to determine the nature and extent of the injury to those rights."Id. at 23.

The parent-plaintiffs allege a...