Roach v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 19 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | 0921-21-3 |
| Parties | JOEY DEWAYNE ROACH v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA |
| Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
UNPUBLISHED
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PITTSYLVANIA COUNTY Timothy W. Allen Judge
Joseph A. Sanzone (Sanzone & Baker, L.L.P., on brief), for appellant.
Leah A. Darron, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Jason S Miyares, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Chief Judge Decker, Judges Humphreys and Friedman Argued at Lexington, Virginia
Joey Dewayne Roach appeals his two convictions for receiving stolen property in violation of Code § 18.2-108. The appellant contends that the trial court erred in finding the evidence sufficient to support the convictions. He also argues that the trial court erred in admitting testimony pertaining to the value of the stolen items. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the convictions.
On November 1, 2019, Officer Michael Morris of the Virginia Department of Wildlife Resources went to a farm in Pittsylvania County owned by the appellant's father to investigate the theft of two motorboats. Bedie Bailey had purchased the boats, a 1990 Chaparral and a 1986 Glassport, in the mid-1990s for over $5,000 each. In the summer of 2019, Bailey kept the boats at his parents' lake house in Pittsylvania County and used them over the course of the summer. He discovered the boats were missing in October 2019. Bailey did not know the appellant or give him permission to take or use his boats or boat trailers.
When Officer Morris arrived at the Roach farm, he saw the stolen Glassport hitched to a white Ford pickup truck. The appellant was at the farm and told Morris that the truck was his. He said that Marvin Layne had brought two motorboats to the farm six months before and said he needed a place to store them. The appellant also stated that he had learned "a few days prior" that the boats were stolen and told Layne to remove them. According to the appellant, Layne had moved the Chaparral from the premises to an unknown location earlier that day and wanted Roach to "haul" the Glassport for him.
After talking with Layne on November 2, 2019, the next day, Morris met with the appellant again on November 3, 2019. During this meeting, the appellant told Morris that both boats had been at the farm for about two months and he, not Layne, had moved the Chaparral from the farm and "dump[ed]" it. Later on November 3, the appellant telephoned Morris and requested another meeting because he had not been "completely truthful" about the boat thefts. When they met the next day, the appellant told Officer Morris that Billy Barbour and Brian Dove had stolen the boats and brought them to the farm. He also said that Barbour and Dove had used the Chaparral's boat trailer to steal another boat.
At his trial, the appellant testified that the white Ford truck "belonged to the farm," rather than to him. He said that Dove was a laborer at the farm and had been there on November 1, 2019, "moving the boats around" before Morris arrived. The appellant claimed he did not know the boats were stolen until Morris arrested him. He testified that Morris asked him to find out who brought the boats to the farm. The appellant said that he knew Dove had brought the boats but had "mixed up" Layne and Dove when he initially told Morris that Layne was responsible for the boats. He denied dumping any boats. He acknowledged, however, that he sometimes removed "stuff" from the farm property that people had "drop[ped] off" there. The appellant admitted that he was a convicted felon.
Both motorboats and trailers were returned to Bailey. He testified that he bought the boats in the "mid-90s."[2] He stated that he paid over $5,000 for each boat. Over the appellant's objection, Bailey testified that he would have sold the Chaparral on November 1, 2019, for over $5,000, "certainly" more than $500. He also testified that he would have sold the Glassport for "well over $500." Morris testified that the boats did not appear to have been used recently or to be in good condition.
The appellant argued that the trial court should not have considered Bailey's testimony regarding the price at which he would have sold the boats as evidence of their value. He also contended that the owner's value estimation was "impossible for a boat bought thirty years ago." In addition, the appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to establish any connection between him and the theft of the boats or that he possessed the boats.
The trial court accepted Bailey's testimony as evidence of the value of the boats. It concluded that the appellant's testimony was not credible because he had made several contradictory statements to Officer Morris and then at trial. Accordingly, the court found the appellant guilty of receiving stolen property in excess of $500.[3]
The appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions for receiving stolen property. Primarily, he argues that merely "removing abandoned property from his father's farm" did not show "ownership or control" of the boats.
"When considering the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court views the evidence 'in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party below.'" Williams v. Commonwealth, 71 Va.App. 462, 483 (2020) (quoting Smallwood v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 625, 629 (2009)). This standard requires the Court to "discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences to be drawn [from that evidence]." Bagley v. Commonwealth, 73 Va.App. 1, 26 (2021) (alteration in original) (quoting Cooper v. Commonwealth, 54 Va.App. 558, 562 (2009)).
On appeal, "[t]he judgment of the trial court is presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it." McGowan v. Commonwealth, 72 Va.App. 513, 521 (2020) (quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). The appellate court "does not ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (quoting Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204, 228 (2018)). "Instead, we ask only 'whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id. (quoting Secret, 296 Va. at 228). "If there is evidentiary support for the conviction, 'the reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion might differ from the conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the trial.'" Id. (quoting Chavez v. Commonwealth, 69 Va.App. 149, 161 (2018)).
In addition, determining witness credibility "is within the exclusive province of the [fact finder], which has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses as they testify." Dalton v. Commonwealth, 64 Va.App. 512, 525 (2015) (quoting Lea v. Commonwealth, 16 Va.App. 300, 304 (1993)). The trier of fact "[i]s free to believe or disbelieve, in part or in whole, the testimony of any witness." Bazemore v. Commonwealth, 42 Va.App. 203, 213 (2004) (en banc); see Rollston v. Commonwealth, 11 Va.App. 535, 547 (1991). Further, "[i]n its role of judging witness credibility, the fact finder is entitled to disbelieve the self-serving testimony of the accused and to conclude that the accused is lying to conceal his guilt." Flanagan v. Commonwealth, 58 Va.App. 681, 702 (2011) (quoting Marable v. Commonwealth, 27 Va.App. 505, 509-10 (1998)). "When 'credibility issues [have been] resolved by the [trial court as trier of fact] in favor of the Commonwealth, those findings will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong.'" Towler v. Commonwealth, 59 Va.App. 284, 291 (2011) () (quoting Corvin v. Commonwealth, 13 Va.App. 296, 299 (1991)). "These principles apply . . . to bench trials no differently than to jury trials." Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 249 (2016) (alteration in original).
It is under this standard of review that we consider the appellant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions for receiving stolen property. Code § 18.2-108(A) states that "[i]f any person buys or receives from another person, or aids in concealing, any stolen goods or other thing, knowing the same to have been stolen, he shall be deemed guilty of larceny thereof, and may be proceeded against, although the principal offender is not convicted." A conviction under Code § 18.2-108 requires proof that property "was (1) previously stolen by another, and (2) received by [the] defendant, (3) with knowledge of the theft, and (4) a dishonest intent." Shaver v. Commonwealth, 30 Va.App. 789, 800 (1999) (quoting Bynum v. Commonwealth, 23 Va.App. 412, 419 (1996)). Guilty knowledge "is sufficiently shown if the circumstances proven are such as must have made or caused the recipient of stolen goods to believe they were stolen." Id. at 800-01 (quoting Reaves v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 443, 451 (1951)). Significantly, "[b]ecause larceny is a continuing offense, anyone who knows that personal property is stolen and assists in its transportation or disposition is guilty of larceny." Williams v. Commonwealth, 56 Va.App. 638, 643 (2010) (quoting Hampton v. Commonwealth, 32 Va.App. 644, 650-51 (2000)).
The appellant contends that the evidence did not prove he possessed the stolen boats. "Possession may be actual or constructive." Bagley, 73 Va.App. at 27. "[T]he issue of constructive possession 'is largely a factual one.'" Smallwood, 278 Va. at 631 (quoting Ritter v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 732, 743 (1970)). To...
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