Roach v. Loxahatchee Groves Water Control Dist.

• Decision Date: 04 August 1982
• Docket Number: No. 81-134,81-134
• Citation: 417 So.2d 814
• Parties: William S. ROACH, Appellant, v. LOXAHATCHEE GROVES WATER CONTROL DISTRICT, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 814

417 So.2d 814

William S. ROACH, Appellant, v. LOXAHATCHEE GROVES WATER CONTROL DISTRICT, Appellee.

No. 81-134.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

Fourth District.

Aug. 4, 1982.

John L. Bryan, Jr., of Scott, Royce, Harris & Bryan, P. A., Palm Beach, for appellant.

Don Beverly of Beverly & Freeman, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

OWEN, WILLIAM C., Jr., (Retired) Associate Judge.

The principal issue on this appeal is whether a water control district created under and governed by Chapter 298, Florida Statutes (1981), properly denied a landowner permission to build a bridge over the district's canal. We hold that the power of a district to deny a bridge permit can only be based on a finding that the proposed bridge would obstruct the water flow in the canals or otherwise threaten the effectiveness of the canals. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with directions.

The appellant Roach, a landowner who owns property abutting the appellee Loxahatchee Groves Water Control District (the District), desiring to bridge one of the District's canals in order to gain access to a public road, "F" Street, ¹ submitted an application to the District for permission to build a culvert or bridge and requested the information he would need to design a bridge compatible with the District's water management plan. After several communications, Roach was informed that the District had, on March 12, 1979, adopted a policy of prohibiting new culverts and of prohibiting bridges that would restrict water flow in the canals. The District, however, failed to provide more specific information concerning the amount of water flow contemplated and the type or types of bridges that would be compatible with its plan.

In due course, the District held a public hearing on Roach's application. The board considered a report prepared by the District staff and engineer. The report recommended denial of permission for a number of reasons including the fact that Roach had failed to provide construction plans. ² Other than considering the report, the board did not address the question of whether Roach's proposed bridge would interfere with the water flow in the District's canals. The only evidence on that issue was the statement by Roach's attorney that Roach would construct the bridge in compliance with any conditions, any specifications, and any limitations the board would provide. The focus of the hearing concerned Roach's proposed use of his property, the traffic impact, and the economic impact on the residents who live within the District boundaries. At the conclusion of the hearing, the board voted to deny the application. On December 8, 1981, the board rendered a written order denying the application for the reason that, "The issuance of a bridge permit would not be in the best interests of the District, its landowners and taxpayers."

The Legislature, in providing for the organization of water control districts (then commonly known as drainage districts) by the enactment of a general law now codified as Chapter 298, Florida Statutes (1981), conferred certain limited powers on these statutory creatures for the purpose of reclaiming and draining swamps and overflowed lands. See Ideal Farms Drainage District v. Certain Lands, 154 Fla. 554, 19 So.2d 234, 239 (1944); Palm Beach County v. South Florida Conservancy District, 126 Fla. 170, 170 So. 630 (1936). The management of each district is by a board of supervisors. Because the districts are creatures of statute, each board of supervisors must look entirely to the statute for its authority. State ex rel. Davis v. Jumper Creek Drainage District, 153 Fla. 451, 14 So.2d 900, 901 (1943). The law is well-settled that drainage districts have only those powers which the Legislature has delegated by statute. Forbes Pioneer Boat Line v. Board of Commissioners, 77 Fla. 742, 82 So. 346 (1919) (no power to collect tolls); State ex rel. Vans Agnew v. Johnson, 112 Fla. 7, 150 So. 111, 112 (1933); Halifax Drainage District of Volusia County v. State, 134 Fla. 471, 185 So. 123, 129 (1938) (only limited taxing power); State ex rel. Davis v. Jumper Creek Drainage District, 153 Fla. 451, 14 So.2d 900, 901 (1943); Rabin v. Lake Worth Drainage District, 82 So.2d 353, 355 (Fla.1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 958, 76 S.Ct. 348, 100 L.Ed. 833 (1956); see generally 20 Fla.Jur.2d Drains & Sewers § 6 (1980).

The appellee District, in the present case, has asserted that the Legislature conferred general police powers on water control or drainage districts. To support this assertion, the appellee relies on certain language that was contained in Section 298.01(1), Florida Statutes (1979). That provision provided that drainage districts could be formed "for the purpose of preserving and protecting water resources, for sanitary and agricultural purposes, or when the same may be conducive to the public health, convenience or welfare, or of public utility or benefit, by drainage, irrigation, or water management." (emphasis added). The appellee asserts that the emphasized portion constitutes a grant of general police powers.

The appellee's argument is flawed for numerous reasons. First, to the extent that the Legislature allowed drainage districts to conduct activities conducive to public health, convenience or welfare, those activities are explicitly limited to "drainage, irrigation, or water management." Thus, contrary to the appellee's assertions the quoted language does not evidence a legislative intent to confer general police powers. Second, the section relied upon merely regulated the formation of districts, not their powers. The particular language relied upon was deleted effective July 1, 1980, when the Legislature amended the statute and changed the rules regarding formation of districts. See Ch. 80-281, §§ 1 and 14, Laws of Fla. Third, the amendment deleting the quoted language became effective prior to the denial of appellant Roach's application. Thus, even if one could construe the quoted language as evidence of legislative intent to confer general police powers, one would have to conclude that the Legislature withdrew those powers as of July 1, 1980. Finally, the delegation of unlimited legislative police powers to a water control district without greater guidelines than exist in the present statute would probably be unconstitutional in violation of the Florida nondelegation doctrine. See, e.g., Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So.2d 913 (Fla.1978).

The...