Roach v. State

• Decision Date: 20 June 2017
• Docket Number: Court of Appeals Case No. 49A04-1608-CR-1918
• Parties: Eugene ROACH, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

79 N.E.3d 925

Eugene ROACH, Appellant-Defendant,

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.

Court of Appeals Case No. 49A04-1608-CR-1918

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Filed June 20, 2017

Attorney for Appellant: Suzy St. John, Indianapolis, Indiana

Attorneys for Appellee: Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, James B. Martin, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana

Barnes, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] Eugene Roach appeals his conviction for Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. We remand.

Issues

[2] Roach raises two issues, but we address one dispositive issue, which we restate as whether the trial court properly denied his Batson challenge.¹

Facts

[3] Indiana State Police Trooper Thomas Bennett was involved in a traffic stop in Marion County when a woman alerted him to a nearby situation. Trooper Bennett saw Roach and a woman near a bicycle and saw Roach hit the woman. Trooper Bennett yelled, "[H]ey, stop, police!" Tr. p. 135. Roach made eye contact with Trooper Bennett, got on his bicycle, and pedaled away. A bystander intervened and blocked Roach from leaving, and Trooper Bennett arrested Roach. The State charged Roach with Level 6 felony criminal confinement, Class A misdemeanor battery, and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. The State later dismissed the criminal confinement and battery charges.

[4] During voir dire of Roach's jury trial on the resisting law enforcement charge, the State asked, "What are some duties of law enforcement officers that you can think of? Mr. James, what are some duties of law enforcement officers that you can think of?" Tr. p. 68. After discussing the matter with a couple of prospective jurors, the State asked, "Mr. Wilson, you got anything to add to that?" Id. Prospective Juror Wilson ("Juror Wilson") responded, "Do the right thing." Id. Defense counsel also gave a hypothetical about the victim of an assault walking away from a police officer. She then asked, "How about you, Mr. Wilson? How do you feel about it?" Id. at 81. Juror Wilson responded, "I INAUDIBLE press charges." Id. These were the only verbal interactions with Juror Wilson evident on the record.

[5] The State apparently used a peremptory challenge to strike Juror Wilson. Defense counsel then told the trial court, "[I]t's possible we're raising a Batson challenge, because he was the only African American on the panel."Id. at 97. The trial court said, "It's a little premature still. INAUDIBLE juror seven." Id. Defense co-counsel then said, "I was about to say he was the only black man in the Jury pool...." Id. Defense co-counsel then noted, "For the record, I note that Mr. Kevin Wilson, who is juror number fourteen is the only black male in the Jury pool. Our client is a black male." Id. at 98-99. Defense co-counsel argued that Juror Wilson's answers during voir dire were not different than two white males—Mr. Bercot and Mr. Coble—that were also questioned. In response, the State said:

First, the reason that Mr. Wilson was struck was Mr. Wilson's body language throughout the entirety of voir dire, particularly given when Mr. Clapp was asking [a] question. The first thing that I wrote on my Jury questionnaire was skeptical and then I wrote disengaged. In addition to that, which I found problematic given the way that he was acting in the Jury box, given that combined with the fact that when Ms. Zuran questioned him about whether or not he would stop if a police officer asked him to stop, he said no, I wouldn't stop. So, given the facts of this case, I think those two things combined lead to our strikes. Now, additionally, Ms. Frick said that she took some notes about Mr. Wilson not saying anything different from Mr. Bercot and from Mr. Coble. As far as I recall, Mr. Wilson didn't say anything different from juror, Jason Costa, who is a white male who we struck for the same reason that we struck Mr. Wilson. Those being that he tended to agree with the questions that defense was asking and his general attitude.

Id. at 99-100. Defense co-counsel responded:

I would note that in fact, Mr. Bercot did say that you would have a right to walk away and that there was no need to respond [to] an officer and again, for the record, I will note Mr. Bercot is a white male and I'd also note, I say this for respectively, but Mr. Seitz is not a mind reader. He can't tell whether or not Mr. Wilson was disengaged and skeptical. In fact, Ms. Eder, who is on the Jury said, she seemed reluctant in her responses. So, I would argue that her body language and responses were quite similar.

Id. at 100. The trial court then found: "Having listened to the arguments of both side[s], I don't see that the State struck him with a purposeful act of discrimination. So, I'm going to deny your challenge." Id. at 100-101.

[6] The jury found Roach guilty as charged of Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. The trial court sentenced Roach to 365 days with credit of forty-two days with the remainder suspended to non-reporting probation. Roach now appeals.

Analysis

[7] Roach argues that the trial court erred by overruling his Batson objection to the striking of Juror Wilson. It is well-settled that using a peremptory challenge to strike a potential juror solely on the basis of race violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Jeter v. State , 888 N.E.2d 1257, 1262 (Ind. 2008) (citing Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) ), cert. denied . In Batson , the United States Supreme Court provided a three-step process for determining when a strike is discriminatory:

"First, a defendant must make a prima facie showing that a peremptory challenge has been exercised on the basis of race; second, if that showing has been made, the prosecution must offer a race-neutral basis for striking the juror in question; and third, in light of the parties' submissions, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination."

Foster v. Chatman , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 1737, 1747, 195 L.Ed.2d 1 (2016) (quoting Snyder v. Louisiana , 552 U.S. 472, 476-477, 128 S.Ct. 1203, 1207, 170 L.Ed.2d 175 (2008) ). "[I]n considering a Batson objection, or in reviewing a ruling claimed to be Batson error, all of the circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity must be consulted." Id. at 1748.

[T]his procedure places great responsibility in the hands of the trial judge, who is in the best position to determine whether a peremptory challenge is based on an impermissible factor. This is a difficult determination because of the nature of peremptory challenges: They are often based on subtle impressions and intangible factors.

Davis v. Ayala , ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 2187, 2208, 192 L.Ed.2d 323 (2015). "[T]he trial court's decision as to whether a peremptory challenge was discriminatory is given ‘great deference’ on appeal...." Collier v. State , 959 N.E.2d 326, 329 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Killebrew v. State , 925 N.E.2d 399, 401 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied ). The trial court's ruling on "the issue of discriminatory intent must be sustained unless it is clearly erroneous." Snyder , 552 U.S. at 477, 128 S.Ct. at 1207.

[8] In the first step, "the burden is low, requiring that the defendant only show circumstances raising an inference that discrimination occurred." Addison v. State , 962 N.E.2d 1202, 1208 (Ind. 2012) (citing Johnson v. California , 545 U.S. 162, 170, 125 S.Ct. 2410, 2417, 162 L.Ed.2d 129 (2005) ). "This is commonly referred to as a ‘prima facie’ showing." Id. "Although the removal of some African American jurors by the use of peremptory challenges does not, by itself, raise an inference of racial discrimination, the removal of ‘the only ... African American juror that could have served on the petit jury’ does ‘raise an inference that the juror was excluded on the basis of race.’ " Id. at 1208-09 (quoting McCormick v. State , 803 N.E.2d 1108, 1111 (Ind. 2004) ) (internal citations omitted).

[9] Here, the record indicates that Juror Wilson was the only African American male in the jury pool. It is unclear, however, whether there was an African American female in the jury pool. The State concedes that this issue is "now moot because the trial court directed the parties to step two...." Appellee's Br. p. 14 (citing Addison , 962 N.E.2d at 1209 n.2 ). Consequently, we will move on to step two.

[10] In step two, "the burden shifts to the prosecution to ‘offer a race-neutral basis for striking the juror in question.’ " Addison , 962 N.E.2d at 1209 (quoting Snyder , 552 U.S. at 477, 128 S.Ct. 1203 ). " ‘Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.’ " Id. (quoting Purkett v. Elem , 514 U.S. 765, 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 1771, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995) ). Although the race-neutral reason must be more than a mere denial of improper motive, the reason need not be particularly "persuasive, or even plausible." Id.

[11] The State responded that it struck Juror Wilson based on his "body language ... combined with the fact that when [defense counsel] questioned him about whether or not he would stop if a police officer asked him to stop, he said no, I wouldn't stop." Tr. p. 99. Roach concedes that "[n]either reason was based on Juror Wilson's race so the explanation was facially race-neutral." Appellant's Br. p. 10.

[12] In the final step of the analysis, the trial court "must determine whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination." Addison , 962 N.E.2d at 1209. The trial court must evaluate the persuasiveness of the step two justification. Id. at 1210. "It is then that ‘implausible or fantastic justifications may (and probably will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination.’ " Id. (quoting Purkett , 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S.Ct. at 1771 ). "The issue is whether the trial court finds the prosecutor's race-neutral explanation credible." Id. "...