Beauchesne v. David London & Co.

• Decision Date: 18 July 1977
• Docket Number: No. 77-113,77-113
• Citation: 375 A.2d 920,118 R.I. 651
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court
• Parties: Albert BEAUCHESNE v. DAVID LONDON & CO. Appeal.

Page 920

375 A.2d 920

118 R.I. 651

Albert BEAUCHESNE v. DAVID LONDON & CO.

No. 77-113 Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

July 18, 1977.

[118 R.I. 661] Abedon & Visconti Ltd., Girard R. Visconti, Providence, for plaintiff.

Keenan, Rice, Dolan, Reardon & Kiernan, H. Eliot Rice, Providence, for defendant.

OPINION

KELLEHER, Justice.

This employer's appeal from a decree of the Workmen's Compensation Commission awarding benefits to an employee for injuries received at a company-sponsored Christmas party raises an issue of first impression in this jurisdiction. Hereafter we shall refer to the employer as "the company" and the employee by his last name.

The company, whose specialty is the sale of burlap bags and reconditioned barrels, is a family corporation whose ownership and management team consists of a father and his three sons. Beauchesne began working for the company in February of 1974 as a part-time employee and switched to full-time upon his graduation from high school. At the time Beauchesne began his full-time employment, he was 18 years old. On December 24, 1974, he attended the annual Christmas party, which was held in the third-floor offices of the company building, with pizza, soda, beer, and whiskey being supplied by the company. About 2:30 in the afternoon the day's work was put aside, and the festivities commenced.

The employees were told that they could come to the party or leave for the day, as they chose, and that they would be paid for a full day. All the employees (five in number), as well as the London brothers, attended, although one employee left early without telling anyone. The others received a $10 bonus at the party, and the one who left was given his bonus later. Beauchesne apparently partook of the proverbial Christmas cheer, and sometime later in the afternoon became intoxicated. At about 4 p. m. he fell from a third-floor window and suffered a fractured skull, a fractured cervical spine, and severe damage to the arteries and veins in the area of the left knee. Subsequently, his left leg had to be amputated above the knee.

The trial commissioner's findings pertinent to this appeal are that Beauchesne was intoxicated on December 24, 1974; that he sustained his injuries "in the employment of the (company), connected therewith and referable thereto"; and that since December 25, 1974 he has been totally incapacitated. In turn these were affirmed by the full commission.

The company contends first that the full commission erred in affirming the trial commissioner's finding of fact that Beauchesne's injury occurred in the course of employment. We note at the outset that when we are asked to review the commission's findings, our role is limited to searching the record to see if there is any legal evidence to support the commission's findings, Knowlton v. Porter Trucking Co., R.I., 362 A.2d 131 (1976). If there is, those findings cannot be disturbed absent fraud. Gilbane Bldg. Co. v. Zorabedian, 113 R.I. 129, 318 A.2d 466 (1974); St. Laurent v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 113 R.I. 10, 316 A.2d 504 (1974).

The company maintains that the injury was not in the course of employment because work had ceased for the day and attendance at the party was optional. We feel that these points are not in themselves determinative and that all the facts surrounding the party must be considered. An examination of the cases dealing with injuries suffered by employees while attending or traveling to and from employer-sponsored social or recreational events disclosed that generally jurisdictions are split on the question of recovery, but that basically each case is unique, turning on its own facts. See 47 A.L.R.3d 566 (1973).

Perhaps the most lucid opinion on the subject is Moore's Case, 330 Mass. 1, 110 N.E.2d 764 (1953). The court there set forth criteria to be examined in determining whether employment and recreational activity are sufficiently related to warrant an award. These factors are: (1) the "customary nature of the activity"; (2) the "employer's encouragement or subsidization" of it; (3) the employer's management or direction of the enterprise; (4) the "presence of substantial pressure or actual compulsion * * * to attend and participate"; and (5) whether the employer expects or receives a benefit from employee participation in the activity. Moore's Case, supra at 4-5, 110 N.E.2d at 766-67. ¹ As the court there noted, "(w)hat is required in each case is an evaluation of the significance of each factor * * * in relation to the enterprise as a whole." Id. at 5, 110 N.E.2d at 767.

Professor Larson has observed in 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 22.11 at 5-63 (1972) that placing the activity "physically in contact with the employment environment" and associating "the time of the activity somehow with the employment" go a long way towards establishing a link between the recreation and employment. He notes that, having done this, "the exact nature and purpose of the activity itself does (sic) not have to bear the whole load of establishing work connection, and consequently the employment-connection * * * does not have to be as conspicuous as it otherwise might." Id.

We have said that an employee's injury is compensable if the peculiar facts and circumstances of a particular case establish a causal connection or nexus between the injury and the employment. We have also stressed that the term "causal connection" when employed in workmen's compensation cases does not carry the same connotation as does the term "proximate cause" when it is used as a term of reference in negligence actions. A causal connection or nexus can be established for the purposes of workmen's compensation if the conditions and nature of the employment contribute to the injury. To find a nexus, we first attempt to determine if the injury occurred during the period of employment at a place where the employee might reasonably have been and while he was reasonably fulfilling the duties of his employment or doing something incidental thereto or to the conditions under which those duties were to be performed. Carvalho v. Decorative Fabrics Co., R.I., 366 A.2d 157 (1976); Montanaro v. Guild Metal Prods., Inc., 108 R.I. 362, 275 A.2d 634 (1971); Boullier v. Samsan Co., 100 R.I. 676, 219 A.2d 133 (1966). Compensation is not to be denied merely because the employee's injury occurred off the premises or at a time other than his regular working hours, but the facts and circumstances of each case will be examined with an eye to ascertaining if the record establishes a nexus or a link between the injury and the employment. Lima v. William H. Haskell Mfg. Co., 100 R.I. 312, 215 A.2d 229 (1965).

It is obvious that when we take the criteria of the Moore case and apply them to the company's Christmas party, we find the necessary nexus between Beauchesne's injuries and his employment. The party was held in the plant during a period usually reserved for work and for which the employees were actually paid. While the party may not be classified as an expressed "command performance" for the employees, one can certainly conclude, as did the commission, that their attendance was expected. The testimony giving rise to that inference rests on the facts that the weekly paychecks and the bonus checks were given to all of the employees at the party by one of the London brothers. Additionally, all employees and the three brother-employers attended. As one court has noted, "(l)iteral compulsory attendance at the company's affairs would not have produced the desired employee enthusiasm * * *. It would not be realistic to find that respondent's complete control of the (party) and the inducement to the employees of wages without work while enjoying the affair did not constitute a far greater and more effectual compulsion upon the employees" than mandatory attendance. Kelly v. Hackensack Water Co., 10 N.J.Super. 528, 536, 77 A.2d 467, 471 (1950).

We come now to the question of what, if any, benefit the company might have expected to glean from the party. When the president of the company was asked if the goal of the Yuletide festivities was the promotion of good fellowship, he replied that such an event is a "common thing" and that "(w)e have always had a Christmas party." These responses were a clear indication that management felt that a Christmastime get-together financed by the company did much to create good will between labor and management. Certainly, improved employee relationships, which can and frequently do result from such activities, create a more congenial working atmosphere. Kohlmayer v. Keller, 24 Ohio St.2d 10, 12, 263 N.E.2d 231, 233 (1970). This in turn produces greater job interest and better service. Additionally, the expense of the party may constitute a business expense for income tax purposes and, as the Kohlmayer court observed, "(t)angible business benefits are even more likely to be realized where, as here, a small business is involved." Id. Thus, we agree with the proposition that benefits may accrue to an employer from a purely social affair. Id. at 13, 263 N.E.2d at 233; Ricciardi v. Damar Prods. Co., 45 N.J. 54, 211 A.2d 347 (1965); Hill v. McFarland-Johnson, Eng., 25 A.D.2d 899, 269 N.Y.S.2d 217 (1966). We are sure that almost up until the time the president saw the open window, ² looked around, and observed Beauchesne lying on the first-floor platform everybody believed that the annual Christmas party was a great vehicle for promoting peace on earth and good will toward men.

The full commission found a nexus, and there is certainly evidence in the record which affords the requisite basis for this finding. In taking this position, we are well-aware of our holding in Lawrence v. American Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 92 R.I. 1, 165 A.2d 735 (1960), where this court upheld the commission's denial of benefits to an employee who was injured while returning home from what he said was an outing given by his...