Robbins v. Robbins

• Decision Date: 29 November 1961
• Citation: 343 Mass. 247,178 N.E.2d 281
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
• Parties: Ronni R. ROBBINS v. Saul L. ROBBINS.

Page 281

178 N.E.2d 281

343 Mass. 247

Ronni R. ROBBINS v. Saul L. ROBBINS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Norfolk.

Argued Oct. 5, 1961.

Decided Nov. 29, 1961.

Joseph B. Abrams and Robert J. Sherer, Boston, for petitioner.

Haskell C. Freedman, Boston, for respondent.

Before WILKINS, C. J., and SPALDING, CUTTER, KIRK and SPIEGEL, JJ.

SPALDING, Justice.

Ronni R. Robbins and Saul L. Robbins were married in this Commonwealth on April 19, 1953. Five years later on a libel brought by the wife in the Probate Court for Norfolk County, the parties were divorced, the decree becoming absolute on November 10, 1958. Under the decree the husband was ordered to pay to the wife the sum of $6,000 within certain specified periods, and in addition $100 per week. On September 13, 1959, in this Commonwealth, the wife married one Paul Goodman, a resident of Missouri. Following the marriage, Ronni and Goodman went to Missouri where they lived together for only two days. A few weeks later Ronni returned to Boston. Thereafter the instituted annulment proceedings in the Circuit Court of Kansas City, Missouri, and a decree annulling the marriage was entered by that court on January 11, 1960. ¹

The present proceeding is a petition brought by Saul (petitioner) against Ronni (respondent), after the decree of annulment, for a modification of the alimony decree. The petition for modification alleged that the marriage of the respondent to Goodman 'constituted such a substantial change in the circumstances' as would warrant a modification of the decree. The modification prayed for was that the petitioner be relieved from all payments of alimony subsequent to September 13, 1959. On September 8, 1960, a decree was entered modifying the original decree 'by striking therefrom all provisions for payment of alimony as of September 8, 1960; and that any arrearages that may be due * * * [under the original decree to and including that date] are to be paid forthwith; all until the further order of the Court.' From this decree the respondent appealed. The evidence is reported and the judge made a report of the material facts.

The findings of the judge which are pertinent to the issue before us (the correctness of the modification decree) are these. The decree of annulment in Massouri was entered by 'a court of competent jurisdiction.' After stating the grounds which were the basis for that decree (misrepresentations as to age, health, 'building a home,' and raising a family), the judge stated, 'The respondent may have been deceived by Goodman as to his age and general health and as a result of such deception entitled to an annulment under the laws of * * * Missouri, but she was of sound mind and capable of understanding the full meaning, legally and morally, of the marriage contract. The thirty-one year old respondent lives with her parents in Newton'; she 'has not worked since her divorce from the petitioner.' Her vision in both eyes 'is impaired to a limited degree, but notwithstanding the deficiency she has a license to operate and does operate a motor vehicle.' She is 'capable of pursuing some type of remunerative vocation.' The judge concluded that on 'the basis of the above facts' the respondent was not entitled to further alimony.

1. The authority for modification of an alimony decree is found in G.L. c. 208, § 37, which reads: 'After a decree for alimony or an annual allowance for the wife or children, the court may, from time to time, upon the petition of either party, revise and alter its decree relative to the amount of such alimony or annual allowance and the payment thereof, and may make any decree relative thereto which it might have made in the original suit.' Although this statute appears on its face to give complete discretion to the court in the revision of alimony decrees, this court has repeatedly said that no modification can be made unless the petitioner shows a change of circumstances since the entry of the earlier decree. Southworth v. Treadwell, 168 Mass. 511, 47 N.E. 93; Smith v. Smith, 190 Mass. 573, 575, 77 N.E. 522; McIlroy v. McIlroy, 208 Mass. 458, 464-465, 94 N.E. 696; Coughlin v. Coughlin, 312 Mass. 452, 454, 45 N.E.2d 388; Ziegler v. McKinlay, 318 Mass. 765, 767, 64 N.E.2d 15; Coe v. Coe, 320 Mass. 295, 306-307, 69 N.E.2d 793; Whitney v. Whitney, 325 Mass. 28, 31-32, 88 N.E.2d 647; O'Brien v. O'Brien, 325 Mass. 573, 576, 91 N.E.2d 775. Our law is in harmony with the great weight of authority on this subject. See annotation in 18 A.L.R.2d 13, 17 et seq.; Am.Jur., Divorce and Separation, § 742. And the basis for this rule is sound. The parties have had their day in court in the issue ought not to be relitigated unless there has been a change of circumstances after the entry of the original decree.

2. The only material evidence introduced by the husband to show a change in circumstances relates to the wife's remarriage and its subsequent annulment. The respondent's marriage to Goodman, if not annulled, would have been such a material change in circumstances as to justify a revision of the former decree. Southworth v. Treadwell, 168 Mass. 511, 512, 47 N.E. 93. Compare Ziegler v. McKinlay, 318 Mass. 765, 767, 64 N.E.2d 15. But the marriage was annulled, as the judge below found, by a 'court of competent jurisdiction.' The only ground suggested for impeaching the annulment decree is an alleged mistake of law by the Missouri court. It is conceded in the respondent's brief that the Missouri court might possibly have erred 'either in not applying Massachusetts law or in applying it incorrectly.' The findings of the judge shed no light on this point. For purposes of this appeal, we assume with the petitioner that Missouri incorrectly applied its own conflict of laws rule in the annulment proceeding by failing to apply the law of the place of the marriage (Massachusetts). See Hartman v. Valier & Spies Milling Co., 356 Mo. 424, 432-433, 202 S.W.2d 1, and Levy v. Levy, 309 Mass. 230, 233, 34 N.E.2d 650. But this is not a sufficient basis for attacking the decree. Even if the Missouri court failed to apply correctly its conflict of laws rule, the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution, art. 4, § 1, would require the courts of this Commonwealth to treat the Missouri annulment decree as a final and binding adjudication of the respondent's marriage status with Goodman. Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402, 72 S.Ct. 398, 96 L.Ed. 448. It is settled law that a foreign judgment cannot be denied recognition solely because of error of law or fact which does not affect the jurisdiction of the court rendering the judgment. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 28 S.Ct. 641, 52 L.Ed. 1039; American Exp. Co. v. Mullins, 212 U.S. 311, 29 S.Ct. 381, 53 L.Ed. 525; Roche v. McDonald, 275 U.S. 449, 48 S.Ct. 142, 72 L.Ed. 365; Titus v. Wallick, 306 U.S. 282, 59 S.Ct. 557, 83 L.Ed. 653. Restatement: Conflict of Laws, § 431. The 'full faith and credit clause of the Constitution precludes any inquiry into the merits of the cause of action, the logic or consistency of the decision, or the validity of the legal principles on which the judgment is based.' Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462, 61 S.Ct. 339, 342, 85 L.Ed. 278. In the light of these principles we must deal with the case on the footing that there has been a valid annulment of the respondent's marriage to Goodman.

3. There remains the question whether the annulled marriage to Goodman constitutes a change of circumstances sufficient to support the decree below. The respondent's remarriage, which was fraudulently procured, was voidable but not void. It has been stated generally that an annulment decree relates back and makes such a marriage void from its inception. Callow v. Thomas, 322 Mass. 550, 553, 78 N.E.2d 637, 2 A.L.R.2d 632, and cases cited. It is the respondent's contention that an application of this principle requires the conclusion that nothing of legal significance remains after the annulled marriage to justify a finding of changed circumstances. However, as we pointed out in the Callow case, the relation-back doctrine has not been applied by the courts remorselessly where to...