Roberson v. State

• Decision Date: 05 November 1898
• Citation: 40 Fla. 509,24 So. 474
• Parties: ROBERSON et al. v. STATE.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

24 So. 474

40 Fla. 509

ROBERSON et al. v. STATE.

Florida Supreme Court

November 5, 1898

Error to criminal court of record, Orange county; Isaac A. Stewart Judge.

James Roberson and Tom Edenfield were convicted of burglary, and they bring error. Reversed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

1. Motions for severance are addressed to the discretion of trial courts, and an appellate court will not interfere with the ruling denying such motion where there is nothing in the record showing the truth of the matters proposed as grounds therefor.

2. Statements of matters of fact in motions cannot be taken as evidence of the facts therein recited.

3. Questions addressed to proposed jurors as to whether they 'understand the meaning of a circumstantial evidence case,' and as to whether a case hypothetically stated depends upon circumstantial evidence, are properly excluded because they do not tend to test the qualifications of the proposed jurors; nor are such questions authorized by section 1086, Rev. St., which provides that, 'when the nature of any case, civil or criminal, requires a knowledge of reading writing, and arithmetic, or either, to enable the juror to understand the evidence on the trial, it shall be cause of challenge if he does not possess such qualifications, to be determined by the judge presiding at the trial.'

4. The trial court is authorized to regulate the order of the introduction of evidence, and its discretion in this matter will only be interfered with by an appellate court where clearly abused.

5. Evidence of another and distinct crime, committed by a defendant in no way connected by circumstances with the one for which he is being tried, is inadmissible; but proof of any fact, with its circumstances, even though amounting to a distinct crime, if it has some relevant bearing upon the issue being tried, is admissible.

6. Evidence of the misconduct of a defendant in intentionally suppressing, destroying, or concealing the evidences of a crime alleged to have been committed by him is relevant.

7. Evidence that a defendant charged with breaking and entering a building with intent to commit larceny subsequent to the alleged breaking intentionally burned the building alleged to have been broken, in order to conceal the physical evidences of such breaking, is admissible.

8. Evidence that goods alleged to have been stolen by breaking and entering a building were recently after the breaking found in the defendant's possession, and of the explanation of such possession by the defendant then given is material; but evidence that the search was instituted and conducted under authority of another and distinct warrant, for another and distinct crime in no way connected with the crime of larceny of the particular goods found, or the breaking by which they were obtained, is inadmissible.

9. Under sections 1096, 1097, Rev. St., a witness may be questioned as to his previous conviction of crime in this state, and it is not necessary to produce the record of his conviction unless the witness denies or fails to admit such conviction.

10. The general rule is that evidence of particular acts of misconduct cannot be introduced to impeach the credibility of a witness.

11. It is proper to show the relations of the doers to one another, which, with other relevant facts, may tend to support an inference of a conspiracy between them to commit a crime charged.

12. If evidence introduced tends to prove an irrelevant or immaterial fact as well as one material and relevant, the court properly refuses an instruction withdrawing such evidence entirely from the consideration of the jury, but errs if it refuses an instruction properly framed, limiting the consideration of such evidence by the jury to its legitimate purpose.

13. Remarks of the judge, during the trial, as to the credibility of a witness, or as to the weight of any evidence relevant to the issue, are an improper assumption of or infringement upon the province of the jury, and, when duly excepted to by the party injured, they may be assigned as error, and constitute ground for reversal.

14. The opinion of a witness as to the identity of a person seen by him is admissible in all cases where the witness has a previous personal acquaintance with or knowledge of such person, and bases his opinion upon such acquaintance or knowledge.

15. Evidence of other burglaries, and the finding of other stolen goods in other persons' houses, and of other arrests for other offenses, made in the same neighborhood, and about the same time, is properly excluded when offered in behalf of a defendant charged with a breaking and entry with intent to commit larceny.

16. Upon the trial of two or more defendants charged with a breaking and entry with intent to commit larceny, any evidence tending to show a joint possession by the defendants, recently after the theft, of the goods alleged to have been stolen at the time of the breaking and entry, is admissible.

17. Where property taken by a recent breaking and entry is found in the exclusive possession of one who offers no reasonable and credible explanation of his possession, the law authorizes the jury to presume or infer that he not only stole the property, but that he broke and entered the building from which it was stolen, although there is no other evidence connecting him with the breaking.

18. Unless the breaking and entry and the larceny were parts of the same transaction, or, if not parts of the same transaction, unless the breaking and entry and the larceny were committed by the same person, the exclusive possession of the recently stolen property does not warrant the presumption that the possessor is guilty of the breaking and entry, although it does warrant the presumption that he is guilty of larceny.

COUNSEL

W. L. Palmer, for plaintiffs in error.

William B. Lamar, Atty. Gen., for the State.

OPINION

CARTER J.

At a term of the criminal court of record of Orange county held in December, 1897, the plaintiffs in error were convicted upon an information charging them with breaking and entering the dwelling house of one J. S. Kedney with intent to commit a felony, to wit, larceny of personal property of J. S. Kedney therein, exceeding the value of $20, and from the sentences imposed they have sued out this writ of error.

I. The defendants moved for a severance for reasons based upon various matters of fact not appearing of record. No proof of the truth of these matters of fact was offered, and, although the motion recites that the state attorney had admitted in the presence of the court that he expected to introduce upon the trial certain evidence, which the defendants claimed would give them the right of severance, the record before us does not show such admission, and we cannot take the statements of the motion as evidence of the facts therein recited. Garner v. State, 31 Fla. 170, 12 So. 638; Lambright v. State, 34 Fla. 564, 16 So. 582. As the matter of severance rests in the sound discretion of the trial court (Ballard v. State, 31 Fla. 266, 12 So. 865), we cannot interfere with a ruling denying same, in the absence of evidence showing the truth of matters proposed as grounds therefor.

II. Plaintiffs in error propounded to proposed jurors the following questions: '(1) Do you understand the meaning of a circumstantial evidence case? (2) If A. owns a barn worth $1,000, its contents worth $500, the barn and the contents are insured for $3,000, A. is seen to enter the building and leave it, and shortly afterwards the barn is burned, he is charged with burning the house. Would you call that a case of circumstantial evidence?' The court correctly refused to permit these questions to be answered, for the answers, whether affirmative or negative, could have had no bearing upon the qualifications of the proposed jurors. The law does not require jorors to be lawyers, and, if it should become necessary upon the trial for them to know the definition of circumstantial evidence, they could be taught that definition by proper instructions from the court. The questions were not authorized by that part of section 1086, Rev. St., which provides that, 'when the nature of any case, civil or criminal, requires a knowledge of reading, writing and arithmetic, or either, to enable the juror to understand the evidence on the trial, it shall be cause of challenge if he does not possess such qualification, to be determined by the judge presiding at the trial,' as contended by defendants. These questions were not framed to ascertain the extent of the proposed jurors' knowledge of 'reading, writing, or arithmetic,' even if the 'nature of the case' was such as to authorize inquiries along that line.

III. The evidence against the defendants was largely circumstantial. There was no positive proof that the Kedney dwelling was ever broken, but the evidence tended to show that the building was occupied by its owner as a winter residence until about June 15, 1897, when he departed for his home in Minnesota, leaving the house unoccupied, but in the care of neighbors, with whom the keys were left; that the goods alleged to have been stolen at the time of the alleged breaking, consisting of household furniture, were left in the second story of the building by the owner; that those in charge of the building visited it at various times up to September 26th, observing no evidences of a breaking of the building, or the loss of any of the furniture, and it seems not to have been suspected that the house had been broken, or the goods stolen, until after the destruction of the house by fire on September 26th. There was also evidence tending to show that defendant Roberson, about June 12th, made inquiries of one Albert Carey as to the location of the...